Establishing the Unconstitutionality of Menstrual Exclusion Practices in India

Socio-cultural norms, stigmas, and taboos associated with menstruation in India take a number of different forms, often resulting in severe restrictions on menstruators, which are described in Part II, below. In fact, a 2016 study found that only one in eight adolescent girls in India faced no restrictions at all during menstruation. The constitutionality of menstrual exclusion practices has most famously been challenged in the Sabarimala case, where the Indian Supreme Court in a 4:1 majority found that the law restricting entry of women of menstruating age into the Sabarimala temple violated women’s constitutional rights to religion and equality. In Part III, analyzing the judgment in Sabarimala, this Article will explore the potential of applying the verdict in Sabarimala to raise constitutional challenges to other forms of menstrual exclusion practices in the country.

Expressive Conduct and Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution: A Purposivist Approach

Unlike the First Amendment of the United States, the quest to develop a grand theory to explain the scope and purpose of the free speech clause of the Indian Constitution has rarely been attempted. In this void, the significant constitutional question of when expressive conduct should trigger free speech protection has not received adequate academic and judicial scrutiny in India despite its global resonance. This article examines the evolution of the current doctrine by the Indian Supreme Court on the issue of expressive conduct and finds that the Court's ad-hoc approach fails to provide a meaningful resolution framework. Analysing the jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court on its First Amendment, it discusses two potential approaches available to the Indian Supreme Court: one based on the speaker's conduct, and the other, based on state purposes. It argues that focusing on state purposes not only provides a principled answer to this conundrum but is also consistent with Indian free speech jurisprudence. Contrary to contemporary scholarship, it demonstrates that the law on Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution, as moulded by the Indian Supreme Court over decades, has implicitly treated the examination of state purpose as its predominant inquiry. This article concludes with some ideas on the limitations and prospects of adopting such an approach.

Recognition of Transgender Community in Domestic Legal Regime: A Comparative Analysis between Sri Lanka and India

Transgender is an Umbrella term to define the people whose gender identity and gender expression differ from their gender assign at birth. At present, the concept of transgender has acquired a great attention in the western world and the number of territories legally validate the transgender community and their rights through national legislations. Concerning South Asian context, the third gender concept is recognized by the Indian Supreme Court but unfortunately, the legal system of Sri Lanka is reluctant to amend the laws to ameliorate the position of the transgender community. This research mainly focused on transgender identity and the laws relating to the transgender community in Sri Lanka and India. The purpose of the research is to examine the existing laws relating to transgender identity in both countries. Moreover, this piece of work tries to identify the contribution of law in improving the position of the transgender community in these territories. Further, this work mainly used the comparative research method and based on internet retrieved documents. Through this work it suggests and identifies the ways and means to improve the condition of Sri Lankan transgender community. Recommendations will be made in this respect. Keywords: transgender community, third gender, legal system, legal recognition, society

WATANIC JURISPRUDENCE: ARTICULATING THE LEGITIMATE ELEMENTS OF THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

The doctrine of the basic structure of a constitution would be undisputable if those elements thereunder are clear and representing the facts of our local history, nationhood, and the principle of the rule of law. Former Chief Justice Tun Abdul Hamid Mohamad argued that the doctrine of the basic structure of a constitution introduced by the Indian Supreme Court contradicts Article 159 of the Federal Constitution and beyond the competent jurisdiction of the local courts. Hence, this article puts forward the conceptual framework of the basic structure adopted by the Federal Court in the case of Indira Gandhi to articulate those elements summed therein viewed from the watanic jurisprudence. The watanic jurisprudence analyses legal documents and sources of sovereignty based upon two philosophical worldviews; continuum and dichotomous frameworks relying upon the local legal history context and the present legal provisions of a country. Depending on a broad and purposive manner in proper linguistic, philosophic, and historical contexts of the Malaysian legal historical documents, the legitimate elements of the basic structure are the principle of sovereignty as embedded in the oath of office of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong together with the matters aggregated in Article 38(4), Article 159(5) and Article 161E. The oath of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong thus legitimizes Syariah compliance as the rule of law. The Federal Constitution of Malaysia also expressly protects its basic structure with strict conditional amendments. In conclusion, the basic structure of our Federal Constitution must be viewed from our local circumstances in compliance with the principle of constitutional supremacy and the rule of law.

From Mythic Saviours to #MeToo at the Indian Supreme Court

The Indian Supreme Court has long enjoyed an almost mythic reputation for progressive and creative jurisprudence, but a series of recent scandals is beginning to erode this well-settled authority. One of the most troubling of these incidents has been an allegation of sexual harassment and intimidation by a Court staffer against then sitting Chief Justice of India (CJI) Ranjan Gogoi. This article draws on media analysis and ethnographic research conducted in the immediate aftermath of the “CJI Scandal” to explore what it means for judges and judging in contemporary India. I argue that the justices’ response to the allegations are part of a broader shift in Indian judging. Far from being the product of an institution imbued with mythic qualities, judging in India is increasingly coming to represent an example of mythos, or “an assertive discourse of power and authority … something to be believed and obeyed.”

A Secular Failure: Sectarianism and Communalism in Shayara Bano v. Union of India

Proponents of secularism often describe their support for this form of governance in terms of the protections it provides against the excesses, dangers, and coercions of religious governance. In reality, however, the differences between secular and religious systems of governance are often overstated, with secularism’s promises being in conversation with secularism’s failures. This article explores one recent and important instance of such secular failure, namely the high-profile Indian case of Shayara Bano v. Union of India deciding the legal legitimacy of “triple talaq,” a common Indian Muslim divorce practice. During the litigation of this case, a prominent Indian Muslim organization ended up engaging in sectarian modes of argumentation, whereby aspersions were cast on the Muslim bona fides of certain persons and communities. Further, in the course of deciding Shayara Bano, a religiously diverse set of Indian Supreme Court justices found themselves disagreeing along communal lines about either the necessity or ability of the secular state to “reform” Muslim family law. In all this, sectarian and communitarian divisions in India were heightened, and the social peace and religious freedom promised by secularism were severely undermined.