Part III The Right to Justice, C Restrictions on Rules of Law Justified By Action to Combat Impunity, Principle 30 Restrictions on the Principle of the Irremovability of Judges

Author(s):  
Gosnell Christopher

Principle 30 deals with restrictions on the principle of the irremovability of judges. Judicial independence, both institutional and individual, is essential in any justice system and must be respected in a trans-regime setting. At the same time, it is necessary for the judiciary to adjudicate the crimes of a past regime with adequate vigour. This can present a major dilemma between necessary continuity and necessary reform, one that Principle 30 is designed to address. According to Principle 30, judges may not be removed if they were appointed ‘in conformity with the requirements of the rule of law’, but may be removed if they were ‘unlawfully appointed’ or ‘derive their judicial power from an act of allegiance’. This chapter first provides a contextual and historical background on Principle 30 before discussing its theoretical framework and how judges are treated in a trans-regime setting.

2005 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 120-153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michal Agmon-Gonnen

In a democratic country an independent justice system plays a major role in protecting human rights and the rule of law. However, an independent judicial system is at risk from a number of factors that derive from outside the sytsem as well as from within. The external dangers facing judicial independence are often discussed; whereas the internal perils that weaken the system as well as judicial independence, are far less known. This article will focus on the danger from within and will discuss the judicial administration's influence on human rights, specifically the right to due process under the law.


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 353-365 ◽  
Author(s):  
Petra Bárd ◽  
Wouter van Ballegooij

This article discusses the relationship between judicial independence and intra-European Union (EU) cooperation in criminal matters based on the principle of mutual recognition. It focuses on the recent judgment by the Court of Justice of the EU in Case C-216/18 PPU Minister for Justice and Equality v. LM. In our view, a lack of judicial independence needs to be addressed primarily as a rule of law problem. This implies that executing judicial authorities should freeze judicial cooperation in the event should doubts arise as to respect for the rule of law in the issuing Member State. Such a measure should stay in place until the matter is resolved in accordance with the procedure provided for in Article 7 TEU or a permanent mechanism for monitoring and addressing Member State compliance with democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights. The Court, however, constructed the case as a possible violation of the right to a fair trial, the essence of which includes the requirement that tribunals are independent and impartial. This latter aspect could be seen as a positive step forward in the sense that the judicial test developed in the Aranyosi case now includes rule of law considerations with regard to judicial independence. However, the practical hurdles imposed by the Court on the defence in terms of proving such violations and on judicial authorities to accept them in individual cases might amount to two steps back in upholding the rule of law within the EU.


2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 345-362
Author(s):  
Elisabeth Yulia Rana Sinta Dewi ◽  
Melina Gabrila Winata ◽  
Ella Yolanda Sakerebau

Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menghapuskan pandangan diskriminatif akibat dipengaruhi oleh budaya patriarki yang menyebabkan terabaikannya nilai-nilai keadilan moral, sehingga diperlukan kesadaran akan kesetaraan gender dalam kepastian hukum dan dalam sistem peradilan. Metode dalam penelitian ini menggunakan metode yuridis empiris dengan bahan primer berupa wawancara dan putusan pengadilan yang diambil secara random sampling, serta bahan hukum sekunder berupa buku, literatur, jurnal serta peraturan perundang-undangan. Substansi Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana dalam penanganan kasus pelecehan seksual saat ini tidak lagi memadai, karena per-kembangan jenis macam pelecehan seksual menurut Komnas Perempuan. Penelitian ini menyimpulkan bahwa pertimbangan hukum yang dilakukan oleh hakim lebih memper-timbangkan faktor perbuatan daripada faktor korban. Dalam tiga kasus yang penulis teliti penjatuhan pidana jauh di bawah hukuman maksimal akibat penafsiran KUHP yang dilakukan hakim secara gramatikal yang terkurung oleh positivisme. Padahal penemuan hukum oleh hakim akan membentuk yurisprudensi dapat digunakan pada masa mendatang dengan lebih memperhatikan keadilan dan hak pemulihan bagi korban. Gender Perspective in the Court System on Sexual Harassion Cases This study aims to eradicate discriminatory views influenced by patriarchal culture which results in the neglect of moral values, so that awareness of gender equality is needed in the rule of law and in the justice system. This study uses empirical juridical methods. Primary legal materials was collected by conducting interviews and analyzing court decisions taken by random sampling method, as well as secondary legal materials was collected from books, literature, journals and statutory regulations. The substance of the Criminal Code in handling sexual harassment cases is currently no longer adequ-ate, due to the development of types of sexual harassment according to the National Commission on Women. This research concludes that the judge considers the act factor rather than the victim factor. In the three cases the author examined, criminal conviction was far below the maximum sentence due to grammatically interpretation of the Criminal Code by judges confined by positivism perspective. Though the legal finding (rechtvinding) by the judge will form jurisprudence, which can be used in the future by focusing more to justice and the right of recovery for victims.


Author(s):  
Maria Fanou

In its recent Opinion 1/17, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) examined the compatibility of an external judicial body, the Investment Court System (ICS) under the EU–Canada Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement (CETA), with EU law. At a time when judicial independence has arisen as one of the main challenges for the rule of law in the EU, this article discusses the Court’s findings in relation to the compatibility of the ICS with the right of access to an independent and impartial tribunal.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

Principle 20 is concerned with the jurisdiction of international and internationalized criminal tribunals regarding the prosecution of war crimes and other atrocities. The word ‘impunity’, defined at the beginning of the United Nations Updated Set of Principles, implies punishment or some similar sanction. It inexorably directs us towards judicial activity of criminal courts or the lack of it. The first sentence of Principle 20 is addressed to the national justice system, while the second sentence focuses on the international and internationalized criminal tribunals and their relationship to national courts. The final sentence of Principle 20 requires States to ‘fully satisfy their legal obligations’ with respect to international and internationalized criminal tribunals. This chapter first provides a contextual and historical background on Principle 20 before discussing its theoretical framework and how it has been observed in practice.


Author(s):  
Catherine Dupré

AbstractThe 2018 CJEU ruling in LM highlighted the importance of judicial independence for the rule of law and protection of the right to fair trial. In so doing, the judgment raised problematic questions about the relationship between Article 2 values and the EU Charter rights, and their connection with mutual trust. This chapter considers these issues through the lens of human dignity, which is both the first foundational value under Article 2 and the first right in the EU Charter. By discussing how the LM judgment raises the constitutional status of the right to a fair trial, this chapter argues that a focus on human dignity could effectively link Article 2 values with EU Charter rights and facilitate assessment of their respective breach.


2021 ◽  
pp. 303-326
Author(s):  
Anne Dennett

This chapter examines the role of the judiciary in the UK constitution, the critically important concepts of judicial independence and neutrality, accountability of judges, and judicial power. The UK courts administer justice; uphold the rule of law; and act as a check on executive power. Judicial independence requires that judges should be free from external influences in their decision-making, and make decisions without political interference or fear of reprisal. Meanwhile, judicial neutrality means that judges should determine legal disputes impartially, objectively, and solely by applying the law. At first sight, judicial accountability seems inconsistent with being independent, but it is essential that the judiciary adheres to the highest standards in carrying out its functions. In the absence of a codified constitution, the boundaries of judicial power operate within a framework of constitutional principles and conventions, but there is debate over the limits of that power.


2019 ◽  
pp. 288-310
Author(s):  
Anne Dennett

This chapter examines the role of the judiciary in the UK constitution, the critically important concepts of judicial independence and neutrality, accountability of judges, and judicial power. The UK courts administer justice; uphold the rule of law; and act as a check on executive power. Judicial independence requires that judges should be free from external influences in their decision-making, and make decisions without political interference or fear of reprisal. Meanwhile, judicial neutrality means that judges should determine legal disputes impartially, objectively, and solely by applying the law. At first sight, judicial accountability seems inconsistent with being independent, but it is essential that the judiciary adheres to the highest standards in carrying out its functions. In the absence of a codified constitution, the boundaries of judicial power operate within a framework of constitutional principles and conventions, but there is debate over the limits of that power.


Author(s):  
Mayer-Rieckh Alexander ◽  
Duthie Roger

Principle 35 deals with guarantees of non-recurrence of human rights violations, along with some general principles and objectives. It outlines ‘institutional reforms and other measures’ as the means of achieving prevention through their contribution to the rule of law, respect for human rights, and public trust in government institutions. It also highlights the importance of adequate representation of women and minority groups as well as broad public consultation in the process. Four ‘objectives’ are listed in Principle 35: the first repeats the notion of the rule of law and the next three refer to specific measures that are among those included in Principles 36–38. This chapter first provides a contextual and historical background on Principle 35 before discussing its theoretical framework and practice. It concludes with a critical assessment of the notion of guarantees of non-recurrence itself.


Author(s):  
Stanisław Biernat ◽  
Paweł Filipek

AbstractIn the LM ruling, the Court of Justice developed the Aranyosi and Căldăraru test and indicated it as the one to be applied for the assessment of judicial independence and fair trial guarantees in the context of executing European Arrest Warrants. Although serious threats to the rule of law and judicial independence in some EU countries, like Poland, have been documented over recent years, no warrant has so far been definitely rejected as a consequence of the application of the LM test, although there are cases in which the execution of warrants to Poland has been suspended. This naturally raises questions as to whether the mechanism proposed by the Court responds to the need of protecting the right to a fair trial and safeguarding judicial independence. In this contribution we evaluate the mechanism devised by the Court, taking into account the available judicial practice after the LM ruling. We point out that the almost automatic transfer of a mechanism proposed to evaluate the functioning of a prison system to that evaluating a fair trial and judicial independence has not been fully successful. The mechanism proposed by the Court reveals a number of problematic issues and proves to be insufficient and not entirely adequate to assess judicial independence and guarantees of a fair trial.


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