Regulation of the EU Financial Markets

This book aims to analyse and discuss the main changes and new provisions introduced by MiFID II/MiFIR. The book chapters are grouped in a thematic way, covering the following areas: (i) investment firms and investment services, (ii) trading, (iii) supervision and enforcement, (iv) the broader view and the future of MiFID II/MiFIR.

Subject Recent developments in EU financial markets regulation. Significance EU authorities have conceded that the January 2017 deadline for implementing the revised Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II) must be pushed back, probably for a year. The postponement underlines a gap within the EU between tough rhetoric on financial market reform and the institutional ability to translate it into practice. However, EU regulators have made clear that the MiFID II delay will not spill over to slow other reforms -- for example, by moving to resolve a long-running dispute with the United States over derivatives clearing. Impacts Firms' compliance challenges will be formidable and are as yet undefined. The scope of these challenges will depend on formal adoption of the final texts of pending technical standards. The MiFID II delay vindicates concerns expressed by ESMA, and will buttress its authority.


2011 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 521-533 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niamh Moloney

Since the outset of the financial crisis, the EU financial markets regime1 has been undergoing a period of turbulence which contrasts sharply with the period of relative stability which it briefly enjoyed over 2005–2007 and post-FSAP (Financial Services Action Plan2). The FSAP reforms had been adopted. The Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) had emerged as an influential actor, driving some degree of supervisory coordination and co-operation and constructing a significant soft law ‘rule-book.’ And the 2007 Lamfalussy Review suggested broad political, institutional and stakeholder satisfaction with the Lamfalussy process. There was little enthusiasm for grand adventures in institutional design, albeit that supervision, an institutionally-driven concern, was presciently if belatedly emerging as a concern of the EU institutions. The Review's main concern, however, was with strengthening the pragmatic, if somewhat haphazard, network-based, ‘supervisory convergence’ model as the means for supervising the integrating EU financial market. With respect to regulation, reflecting the wider international zeitgeist pre-crisis,3 ‘Better Regulation’ and the need for a ‘regulatory pause’ were the watchwords of a Commission which, once the massive FSAP regime was safely in place, espoused the benefits of self-regulation and highlighted the risks of intervention without impact assessment, extensive consultation and evidence of market failure.4 This was most apparent with respect to credit rating agencies,5 debt market transparency,6 hedge funds,7 and clearing and settlement.8 Institutionally, a relatively sophisticated law-making apparatus, in the form of the Lamfalussy structures, a plethora of advisory bodies and stakeholder bodies (notably FIN-NET which represents the consumer and SME interest), had been established.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Joachim Wuermeling

Abstract The departure of the global financial centre in London from the EU raises fundamental questions about the future of the European financial market. But we should refrain from discussing which European financial centre will get which part of the London pie. Instead, we ought to be asking: How can we develop a European financial system that spreads investment and risk among many strong shoulders?


2018 ◽  
Vol 246 ◽  
pp. F2-F2

The future relationship between the UK and the EU remains unclear. Despite that uncertainty the economy has gained momentum over the last few months, fiscal outturns have been better and financial markets appear to be sanguine about the uncertainty. It is against this backdrop that the Chancellor will have announced the Budget on 29 October, after this Review went to press.Our main forecast is conditional on a ‘soft’ Brexit, but we also describe the consequences of an orderly no-deal Brexit. Under our soft Brexit scenario, the Chancellor will have the necessary space under the fiscal mandate to borrow on average an additional £16 billion per year between 2019–20 and 2022–23 compared with the OBR spring forecast. This, together with better revenues, provides room for the Chancellor to spend an average of around £30 billion more over the same period. Under the no-deal Brexit scenario, borrowing would be an average of £14 billion higher than in the soft Brexit case.Even though the government complies with the fiscal mandate under the soft Brexit scenario, it is unlikely to meet its medium-term objective to balance the budget unless it chooses to tax more.


2015 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zdenek Kudrna

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