Part II Predominant Security Challenges and International Law, Environmental Security, Ch.32 Pandemics and Other Health Emergencies

Author(s):  
Heath J Benton

This chapter traces the normative challenges underlying the legal framework for health security. Today’s challenges can be understood as the result of three successive stages of development in global health law. First was the securitization of global public health, whereby a diffuse group of international and national health officials, outside experts, and advocates worked to redefine infectious disease outbreaks as a critical national and international security issue. Secondly, this concept of global health security was inscribed in law through the 2005 revisions to the International Health Regulations, which adopted a governance framework that appeared to be deliberately modelled on domestic emergency powers regimes. Thirdly, this development, rather than settling the World Health Organization’s (WHO) authority in health emergencies, has in turn set off waves of contestation that concern the nature of global health security and how it should be institutionalized. This includes contestation about the internal governance arrangements within the WHO; external conflicts of jurisdiction between the WHO and other institutions; and disagreement about the normative orientation and scope of the WHO’s emergency power.

2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (5) ◽  
pp. 568-580 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick M. Burkle

AbstractIf the Ebola tragedy of West Africa has taught us anything, it should be that the 2005 International Health Regulations (IHR) Treaty, which gave unprecedented authority to the World Health Organization (WHO) to provide global public health security during public health emergencies of international concern, has fallen severely short of its original goal. After encouraging successes with the 2003 severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) pandemic, the intent of the legally binding Treaty to improve the capacity of all countries to detect, assess, notify, and respond to public health threats has shamefully lapsed. Despite the granting of 2-year extensions in 2012 to countries to meet core surveillance and response requirements, less than 20% of countries have complied. Today it is not realistic to expect that these gaps will be solved or narrowed in the foreseeable future by the IHR or the WHO alone under current provisions. The unfortunate failures that culminated in an inadequate response to the Ebola epidemic in West Africa are multifactorial, including funding, staffing, and poor leadership decisions, but all are reversible. A rush by the Global Health Security Agenda partners to fill critical gaps in administrative and operational areas has been crucial in the short term, but questions remain as to the real priorities of the G20 as time elapses and critical gaps in public health protections and infrastructure take precedence over the economic and security needs of the developed world. The response from the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network and foreign medical teams to Ebola proved indispensable to global health security, but both deserve stronger strategic capacity support and institutional status under the WHO leadership granted by the IHR Treaty. Treaties are the most successful means the world has in preventing, preparing for, and controlling epidemics in an increasingly globalized world. Other options are not sustainable. Given the gravity of ongoing failed treaty management, the slow and incomplete process of reform, the magnitude and complexity of infectious disease outbreaks, and the rising severity of public health emergencies, a recommitment must be made to complete and restore the original mandates as a collaborative and coordinated global network responsibility, not one left to the actions of individual countries. The bottom line is that the global community can no longer tolerate an ineffectual and passive international response system. As such, this Treaty has the potential to become one of the most effective treaties for crisis response and risk reduction worldwide. Practitioners and health decision-makers worldwide must break their silence and advocate for a stronger Treaty and a return of WHO authority. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2015;9:568–580)


Author(s):  
Wesley Wark

In the years following the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2002–2003, the World Health Organization (WHO) created a new system for global disease outbreak surveillance. The system relied on timely reporting by nation-states and gave the WHO a leading role in the global response. It also recognized the value of a multiplicity of sources of information, including from open-source media scanning. The post-SARS system faced its most significant task with the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in the People’s Republic of China and its rapid spread in 2020. The WHO architecture for early warning of disease outbreaks arguably failed and gives rise to questions about how the international community can better respond to pandemic threats in future. This article explores the inter-connectedness of Canada’s system for global health surveillance, featuring the work of the Global Public Health Intelligence Network and that of the WHO, and argues that, while Canada has positioned itself as a global leader, much work needs to be done in Canada, and globally, if the concept of collective health security and shared early warning is to be maintained in the future.


Author(s):  
Pascale Ondoa ◽  
Tjeerd Datema ◽  
Mah-Sere Keita-Sow ◽  
Linda Oskam ◽  
Jean-Bosco Ndihokubwayo ◽  
...  

Background: Functional national laboratory networks and systems are indispensable to the achievement of global health security targets according to the International Health Regulations. The lack of indicators to measure the functionality of national laboratory network has limited the efficiency of past and current interventions to enhance laboratory capacity in resourcelimited-settings.Scorecard for laboratory networks: We have developed a matrix for the assessment of national laboratory network functionality and progress thereof, with support from the African Society of Laboratory Medicine and the Association of Public Health Laboratories. The laboratory network (LABNET) scorecard was designed to: (1) Measure the status of nine overarching core capabilities of laboratory network required to achieve global health security targets, as recommended by the main normative standards; (2) Complement the World Health Organization joint external evaluation tool for the assessment of health system preparedness to International Health Regulations (2005) by providing detailed information on laboratory systems; and (3) Serve as a clear roadmap to guide the stepwise implementation of laboratory capability to prevent, detect and act upon infectious threats.Conclusions: The application of the LABNET scorecard under the coordination of the African Society of Laboratory Medicine and the Association of Public Health Laboratories could contribute to the design, monitoring and evaluation of upcoming Global Health Security Agenda-supported laboratory capacity building programmes in sub Saharan-Africa and other resource-limited settings, and inform the development of national laboratory policies and strategic plans. Endorsement by the World Health Organization Regional Office for Africa is foreseen.


2021 ◽  

Global (public) health security is defined by the World Health Organization as the activities required, both proactive and reactive, to minimize the danger and impact of acute public health events that endanger people’s health across geographical regions and international boundaries. This definition is normative in that it tells us how global health security ought to be done. It does not explain how “activities” should be enacted, or what should be done to “minimize” the danger and impact of public health events across geographical regions and international boundaries. The literature below is a sample of the rich research that has tried to grapple with the how and what questions of global health security. This entry includes research from a range of disciplines, including public health, political science, law, economics, sociology, anthropology, and philosophy. It is just a small sample but there are thematic continuities across the literature that led to the selection of the sections identified below. A large part of the literature providing General Overviews, in the 1990s and 2000s, examined the evolution of the definition of “global health security” as an extension of, or distinct from, national health security. The marriage of global health and security became the subject of much debate. In particular, what events constitute Securitization, which is the second theme of literature examined below? The evolution of Biosecurity literature emerged at the same time. Securitization literature is quite different from biosecurity literature in that biosecurity literature does not engage, for the most part, with discussions about the protection of peoples (as defined under global health security). This literature has been concerned primarily with the protection of states. The consequence of two health security literatures running at different tracks of inquiry is different approaches, interests, and prioritization of global health security. This has led to the proliferation of Multidisciplinary usage of the term “global health security” from a range of theoretical and methodological perspectives. However, gaps remain practice and research. A consistently neglected area of global health security is Inequalities. Who are the “peoples” in global health security practice and research? Finally, this entry examines the events where global health security is (or is not) “applied” to health threats, which is examined in the Outbreaks section.


Author(s):  
Roojin Habibi ◽  
Steven J. Hoffman ◽  
Gian Luca Burci ◽  
Thana Cristina de Campos ◽  
Danwood Chirwa ◽  
...  

Abstract The International Health Regulations (ihr), of which the World Health Organization is custodian, govern how countries collectively promote global health security, including prevention, detection, and response to global health emergencies such as the ongoing covid-19 pandemic. Countries are permitted to exercise their sovereignty in taking additional health measures to respond to such emergencies if these measures adhere to Article 43 of this legally binding instrument. Overbroad measures taken during recent public health emergencies of international concern, however, reveal that the provision remains inadequately understood. A shared understanding of the measures legally permitted by Article 43 is a necessary step in ensuring the fulfillment of obligations, and fostering global solidarity and resilience in the face of future pandemics. In this consensus statement, public international law scholars specializing in global health consider the legal meaning of Article 43 using the interpretive framework of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.


2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 412-426 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tsion Berhane Ghedamu ◽  
Benjamin Mason Meier

Immunization plays a crucial role in global health security, preventing public health emergencies of international concern and protecting individuals from infectious disease outbreaks, yet these critical public health benefits are dependent on immunization law. Where public health law has become central to preventing, detecting, and responding to infectious disease, public health law reform is seen as necessary to implement the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA). This article examines national immunization laws as a basis to implement the GHSA and promote the public's health, analyzing the scope and content of these laws to prevent infectious disease across Sub-Saharan Africa. Undertaking policy surveillance of national immunization laws in 20 Sub-Saharan African countries, this study: (1) developed a legal framework to map the legal attributes relevant to immunization; (2) created an assessment tool to determine the presence of these attributes under national immunization law; and (3) applied this assessment tool to code national legal landscapes. An analysis of these coded laws highlights legal attributes that govern vaccine requirements, supply chains, vaccine administration standards, and medicines quality and manufacturer liability. Based upon this international policy surveillance, it will be crucial to undertake legal epidemiology research across countries, examining the influence of immunization law on vaccination rates and disease outbreaks.


2019 ◽  
Vol 95 (5) ◽  
pp. 1093-1110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clare Wenham

Abstract Linking health and security has become a mainstream approach to health policy issues over the past two decades. So much so that the discourse of global health security has become close to synonymous with global health, their meanings being considered almost interchangeable. While the debates surrounding the health–security nexus vary in levels of analysis from the global to the national to the individual, this article argues that the consideration of health as a security issue, and the ensuing path dependencies, have shifted in three ways. First, the concept has been broadened to the extent that a multitude of health issues (and others) are constructed as threats to health security. Second, securitizing health has moved beyond a rhetorical device to include the direct involvement of the security sector. Third, the performance of health security has become a security threat in itself. These considerations, the article argues, alter the remit of the global health security narrative; the global health community needs to recognize this shift and adapt its use of security-focused policies accordingly.


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