4 General Principles of International Humanitarian Law

Author(s):  
Hayashi Nobuo

This chapter explains the general principles of international humanitarian law—i.e. the prohibition of unnecessary suffering; the prohibition of indiscriminate warfare; and the principle of humanity—in their application and interaction. The prohibition against maux superflus—that is, against weapons and materials causing excessive suffering—is an old principle. It is characterized by an intricate mixture of very definite prohibitions on certain specific categories of arms, on one hand, and a rather abstract prohibition on means of warfare which cause unnecessary suffering, on the other. The utmost protection of the civilian population is also an old concept. By the nineteenth century, legal practice had established the prohibition against indiscriminate warfare as a customary rule. The principle of humanity has not always played the definitive role in moderating belligerent conduct. Nevertheless, humanity was clearly a source of normative constraints on the waging of war.

Author(s):  
Bothe Michael

This chapter focuses on rules of the law of neutrality concerning the protection of the victims of armed conflicts, which must be considered as part of international humanitarian law. ‘Neutrality’ describes the particular status, as defined by international law, of a state not party to an armed conflict. This status entails specific rights and duties in the relationship between the neutral and the belligerent states. On one hand, there is the right of the neutral state to remain apart from, and not to be adversely affected by, the conflict. On the other hand, there is the duty of non-participation and impartiality. The right not to be adversely affected means that the relationship between the neutral and belligerent States is governed by the law of peace, which is modified only in certain respects by the law of neutrality. In particular, the neutral State must tolerate certain controls in the area of maritime commerce. The duty of non-participation means, above all, that the state must abstain from supporting a party to the conflict. This duty not to support also means that the neutral state is under a duty not to allow one party to the conflict to use the resources of the neutral state against the will of the opponent.


2019 ◽  
Vol 101 (910) ◽  
pp. 333-355
Author(s):  
Michael N. Schmitt

AbstractAs a general matter, international humanitarian law is up to the task of providing the legal framework for cyber operations during an armed conflict. However, two debates persist in this regard, the resolution of which will determine the precise degree of protection the civilian population will enjoy during cyber operations. The first revolves around the meaning of the term “attack” in various conduct of hostilities rules, while the second addresses the issue of whether data may be considered an object such that operations destroying or altering it are subject to the prohibition on attacking civilian objects and that their effects need be considered when considering proportionality and the taking of precautions in attack. Even if these debates were to be resolved, the civilian population would still face risks from the unique capabilities of cyber operations. This article proposes two policies that parties to a conflict should consider adopting in order to ameliorate such risks. They are both based on the premise that military operations must reflect a balance between military concerns and the interest of States in prevailing in the conflict.


2009 ◽  
Vol 91 (873) ◽  
pp. 69-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sylvain Vité

AbstractAlthough international humanitarian law has as its aim the limitation of the effects of armed conflict, it does not include a full definition of those situations which fall within its material field of application. While it is true that the relevant conventions refer to various types of armed conflict and therefore afford a glimpse of the legal outlines of this multifaceted concept, these instruments do not propose criteria that are precise enough to determine the content of those categories unequivocally. A certain amount of clarity is nonetheless needed. In fact, depending on how the situations are legally defined, the rules that apply vary from one case to the next. By proposing a typology of armed conflicts from the perspective of international humanitarian law, this article seeks to show how the different categories of armed conflict anticipated by that legal regime can be interpreted in the light of recent developments in international legal practice. It also reviews some actual situations whose categorization under existing legal concepts has been debated.


2012 ◽  
Vol 94 (886) ◽  
pp. 533-578 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cordula Droege

AbstractCyber warfare figures prominently on the agenda of policymakers and military leaders around the world. New units to ensure cyber security are created at various levels of government, including in the armed forces. But cyber operations in armed conflict situations could have potentially very serious consequences, in particular when their effect is not limited to the data of the targeted computer system or computer. Indeed, cyber operations are usually intended to have an effect in the ‘real world’. For instance, by tampering with the supporting computer systems, one can manipulate an enemy's air traffic control systems, oil pipeline flow systems, or nuclear plants. The potential humanitarian impact of some cyber operations on the civilian population is enormous. It is therefore important to discuss the rules of international humanitarian law (IHL) that govern such operations because one of the main objectives of this body of law is to protect the civilian population from the effects of warfare. This article seeks to address some of the questions that arise when applying IHL – a body of law that was drafted with traditional kinetic warfare in mind – to cyber technology. The first question is: when is cyber war really war in the sense of ‘armed conflict’? After discussing this question, the article goes on to look at some of the most important rules of IHL governing the conduct of hostilities and the interpretation in the cyber realm of those rules, namely the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution. With respect to all of these rules, the cyber realm poses a number of questions that are still open. In particular, the interconnectedness of cyber space poses a challenge to the most fundamental premise of the rules on the conduct of hostilities, namely that civilian and military objects can and must be distinguished at all times. Thus, whether the traditional rules of IHL will provide sufficient protection to civilians from the effects of cyber warfare remains to be seen. Their interpretation will certainly need to take the specificities of cyber space into account. In the absence of better knowledge of the potential effects of cyber warfare, it cannot be excluded that more stringent rules might be necessary.


Author(s):  
Nils Melzer

This chapter examines the provisions of international humanitarian law (IHL) concerning the distinction between legitimate military targets and persons protected against direct attacks. It explains that the practical application of the principle of distinction in contemporary armed conflicts has become increasingly difficult because of a number of factors. These include the growing asymmetry of military confrontations, the intermingling of armed actors with the civilian population, and the increasing involvement of civilians in the conduct of hostilities.


1991 ◽  
Vol 31 (281) ◽  
pp. 211-214
Author(s):  
Yves Sandoz

In its January-February 1991 issue, the Review informed its readers of the successive representations made by the ICRC from the outbreak of the Middle East conflict both to the States party to the conflict and to the other States to remind them of their obligations under the Geneva Conventions. In particular, the ICRC sent a note verbale on 14 December 1990 to the 164 States party to the Conventions, together with a Memorandum on the applicability of international humanitarian law, and launched appeals to the belligerent States on 17 January and 1 and 24 February 1991.


1987 ◽  
Vol 27 (258) ◽  
pp. 243-249 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cornelio Sommaruga

Ten years ago, on 8 June 1977, the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts adopted two Protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, one relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts and the other to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts.


2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 689-700
Author(s):  
Kai Ambos

Abstract In this short essay, I will argue that the ‘civilian population’ requirement in crimes against humanity (CAH) provisions (e.g. Article 7(1) ICC Statute) must either be radically restricted by way of a teleological (purpose-based) interpretation or — even better — abolished in future CAH provisions. While the traditional International Humanitarian Law approach certainly needs to be adjusted with regard to CAH, such an adjustment does not resolve the considerable limitation of the protective scope of CAH due to the ‘civilian population’ requirement. The contribution of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia to the debate is to be welcomed and serves as a useful starting point for the more radical interpretation and necessary reform of CAH.


2002 ◽  
Vol 71 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-54 ◽  
Author(s):  

AbstractThis article discusses the principles of international humanitarian law in relation to the armed conflict that affected Kosovo and other parts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999. Since the armed action of the NATO countries exclusively existed of acts of air warfare, the discussion is focused on targeting and the interpretation of the definition of military objectives. The question is put whether lex lata proved to be satisfactory during the Kosovo crisis, or whether a de lege ferenda discussion is called for in order to achieve a better protection of the civilian population.


2021 ◽  
pp. 103-115
Author(s):  
Theodor Meron

This chapter details the ways in which international criminal tribunals such as the ICTY have contributed to human rights law and protections. In construing the material elements of crimes under international humanitarian law, international criminal tribunals have had recourse to human rights law and jurisprudence, thereby strengthening human rights law and opening new avenues for its penal enforcement. The beginnings of these developments can be traced, first, to the drafting of crimes against humanity clauses in the Nuremberg Charter and, second, to the drafting of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The tribunals have also made immense contributions to strengthening the proscriptions of rape as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocidal acts. With respect to persecution, the ICTY held that persecution is the gross or blatant denial, on discriminatory grounds, of a fundamental right, laid down in international customary or treaty law, reaching the same level of gravity as the other acts prohibited as crimes against humanity.


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