Get off my cloud: cyber warfare, international humanitarian law, and the protection of civilians

2012 ◽  
Vol 94 (886) ◽  
pp. 533-578 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cordula Droege

AbstractCyber warfare figures prominently on the agenda of policymakers and military leaders around the world. New units to ensure cyber security are created at various levels of government, including in the armed forces. But cyber operations in armed conflict situations could have potentially very serious consequences, in particular when their effect is not limited to the data of the targeted computer system or computer. Indeed, cyber operations are usually intended to have an effect in the ‘real world’. For instance, by tampering with the supporting computer systems, one can manipulate an enemy's air traffic control systems, oil pipeline flow systems, or nuclear plants. The potential humanitarian impact of some cyber operations on the civilian population is enormous. It is therefore important to discuss the rules of international humanitarian law (IHL) that govern such operations because one of the main objectives of this body of law is to protect the civilian population from the effects of warfare. This article seeks to address some of the questions that arise when applying IHL – a body of law that was drafted with traditional kinetic warfare in mind – to cyber technology. The first question is: when is cyber war really war in the sense of ‘armed conflict’? After discussing this question, the article goes on to look at some of the most important rules of IHL governing the conduct of hostilities and the interpretation in the cyber realm of those rules, namely the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution. With respect to all of these rules, the cyber realm poses a number of questions that are still open. In particular, the interconnectedness of cyber space poses a challenge to the most fundamental premise of the rules on the conduct of hostilities, namely that civilian and military objects can and must be distinguished at all times. Thus, whether the traditional rules of IHL will provide sufficient protection to civilians from the effects of cyber warfare remains to be seen. Their interpretation will certainly need to take the specificities of cyber space into account. In the absence of better knowledge of the potential effects of cyber warfare, it cannot be excluded that more stringent rules might be necessary.

2014 ◽  
Vol 96 (895-896) ◽  
pp. 737-749
Author(s):  
Naz K. Modirzadeh

AbstractThis Opinion Note highlights the international humanitarian law (IHL) provisions mandating dissemination of the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols to the civilian population. In referencing three dilemmas concerning contemporary challenges to international law in armed conflict and how each of those dilemmas may result in a “breaking point” or a “turning point”, the author argues that it is vitally important not only for armed forces but also for the general public to learn – and actively engage with – IHL both during war and in (relative) peacetime.


2019 ◽  
Vol 101 (910) ◽  
pp. 333-355
Author(s):  
Michael N. Schmitt

AbstractAs a general matter, international humanitarian law is up to the task of providing the legal framework for cyber operations during an armed conflict. However, two debates persist in this regard, the resolution of which will determine the precise degree of protection the civilian population will enjoy during cyber operations. The first revolves around the meaning of the term “attack” in various conduct of hostilities rules, while the second addresses the issue of whether data may be considered an object such that operations destroying or altering it are subject to the prohibition on attacking civilian objects and that their effects need be considered when considering proportionality and the taking of precautions in attack. Even if these debates were to be resolved, the civilian population would still face risks from the unique capabilities of cyber operations. This article proposes two policies that parties to a conflict should consider adopting in order to ameliorate such risks. They are both based on the premise that military operations must reflect a balance between military concerns and the interest of States in prevailing in the conflict.


2018 ◽  
Vol 100 (907-909) ◽  
pp. 315-336
Author(s):  
Helene Højfeldt Jakobsen

AbstractThis article considers which legal regimes apply in cases where a Danish citizen and/or resident returns from Syria or Iraq after having taken part in the armed conflict on behalf of the group known as Islamic State, and continues his/her affiliation with the armed group. The article argues that international humanitarian law currently applies to the Danish territory and that a Danish foreign fighter may continue to be considered as taking a direct part in hostilities after having returned from Iraq or Syria. The article then considers the application of Danish criminal law to returned foreign fighters and argues that Danish counterterrorism laws do not apply to members of the armed forces of an armed group that is party to an armed conflict with Denmark.


2006 ◽  
Vol 88 (861) ◽  
pp. 197-206 ◽  

A. LegislationAfghanistanA. Legislation. Afghanistan. The Order of the Minister of National Defence on the Establishment of a Board of Curriculum on [the integration of] the International Law of Armed Conflict into the Educational and Training Institutions of the National Armed Forces, as well as National Army Units was adopted in July 2005. The Order nominates the members of the Board and defines a number of duties and actions to be undertaken for the training and education of national armed forces in the law of armed conflict. These activities include in particular the preparation of teaching materials, the appointment of instructors, and the proposed establishment of a legal department within the education and training institutions of the Ministry of Defence.


2009 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 779-799 ◽  
Author(s):  
HANNAH TONKIN

AbstractTens of thousands of contractors work for private military and security companies (PMSCs) during armed conflict and occupation, often hired by states to perform activities that were once the exclusive domain of the armed forces. Many of the obligations and standards that guide states in regulating their armed forces are lacking in relation to PMSCs, raising concerns that states might simply outsource their military policy to PMSCs without taking adequate measures to promote compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL). This article argues that the universally applicable obligation ‘to ensure respect’ for IHL in Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions can provide a key mechanism for addressing these concerns.


2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 128-134
Author(s):  
Sabin Guţan

Abstract The violent events of December 1989 in Romania, which led to the removal of the Communist regime from power are still shrouded in mystery today. The social disorder and the political chaos of those days overlapped with the violent use of the armed forces that used all kinds of weapons. During the armed confrontations, many casualties (military and civilian) and destruction of goods, including cultural ones, took place. In the years following these events a series of theories, hypotheses, controversies, and trials have emerged, but no one has clearly defined the legal nature of this social-political crisis. The purpose of this scientific approach is not to analyze the events and crimes committed in December 1989, but to determine whether and to what extent the international humanitarian law can be applied to these events.


Author(s):  
Laila Almira

<p><em>States and non-State armed groups are increasingly employing cyber capabilities in their military operations in the digitalization environment today. There is a controversy about how current international legal frameworks, especially International Humanitarian Law (IHL), applies to such conduct in cyberspace, most notably in the context of armed conflict. Because one of the fundamental aims of the IHL is to protect civilians from the impact of armed conflict, it is critical to explore the norms of IHL that regulate such operations. This article will be likely to discuss about cyber warfare in the term of armed conflict. Lastly, the article will be reviewing the rules and principle that applies during the cyber warfare.</em></p><p><em> </em></p>


2002 ◽  
Vol 71 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-54 ◽  
Author(s):  

AbstractThis article discusses the principles of international humanitarian law in relation to the armed conflict that affected Kosovo and other parts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999. Since the armed action of the NATO countries exclusively existed of acts of air warfare, the discussion is focused on targeting and the interpretation of the definition of military objectives. The question is put whether lex lata proved to be satisfactory during the Kosovo crisis, or whether a de lege ferenda discussion is called for in order to achieve a better protection of the civilian population.


2006 ◽  
Vol 88 (864) ◽  
pp. 853-880 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel O'Donnell

AbstractDuring the second half of the twentieth century the international community, facing the terrorist phenomenon, reacted with the adoption of a series of treaties concerning specific types of terrorist acts, and the obligations of states with regard to them. Alternatively terrorism-oriented legislation, which initially covered only acts affecting civilians, has gradually expanded to cover some acts of terrorism against military personnel and installations. This contribution attempts to assess the repercussions of this evolution on the status and the protection of armed forces engaged in the so-called “war on terrorism” by examining the existing dynamic between these regulations and international humanitarian law.


Author(s):  
Laurent Gisel ◽  
Tilman Rodenhäuser ◽  
Knut Dörmann

Abstract The use of cyber operations during armed conflicts and the question of how international humanitarian law (IHL) applies to such operations have developed significantly over the past two decades. In their different roles in the Legal Division of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the authors of this article have followed these developments closely and have engaged in governmental and non-governmental expert discussions on the subject. In this article, we analyze pertinent humanitarian, legal and policy questions. We first show that the use of cyber operations during armed conflict has become a reality of armed conflicts and is likely to be more prominent in the future. This development raises a number of concerns in today's increasingly cyber-reliant societies, in which malicious cyber operations risk causing significant disruption and harm to humans. Secondly, we present a brief overview of multilateral discussions on the legal and normative framework regulating cyber operations during armed conflicts, looking in particular at various arguments around the applicability of IHL to cyber operations during armed conflict and the relationship between IHL and the UN Charter. We emphasize that in our view, there is no question that cyber operations during armed conflicts, or cyber warfare, are regulated by IHL – just as is any weapon, means or methods of warfare used by a belligerent in a conflict, whether new or old. Thirdly, we focus the main part of this article on how IHL applies to cyber operations. Analyzing the most recent legal positions of States and experts, we revisit some of the most salient debates of the past decade, such as which cyber operations amount to an “attack” as defined in IHL and whether civilian data enjoys similar protection to “civilian objects”. We also explore the IHL rules applicable to cyber operations other than attacks and the special protection regimes for certain actors and infrastructure, such as medical facilities and humanitarian organizations.


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