The Resilience of the Restrictive Rules on Self-Defence

Author(s):  
Joerg Kammerhofer

This chapter examines the resilience of the treaty, and perhaps also customary, law on self-defence since 2001. It first considers ‘resilience’ in the context of the jus ad bellum and how law can be resilient vis-à-vis changing circumstance, opinions, interpretation, and state practice. It then looks at the indicators for and against resilience by analysing post-2001 developments, paying particular attention to three areas: jurisprudence, scholarly literature in international law, and state and institutional practice. The chapter also explains what ‘resilience’ can and cannot be, and how the law and its perceptions change—or remain the same. Two avenues on the question of what is resilient are evaluated: either the norm or its interpretation (perception) change. Finally, the chapter considers a number of cases in which the International Court of Justice has made pronouncements on and partial clarifications of important aspects of the law on self-defence since 2001.

Author(s):  
Olivier Corten

This chapter examines the doctrine of necessity as an element of the prohibition of the use of force and as a subsidiary condition of the legality of self-defence. It begins by discussing the thesis of necessity as a general justification of the use of force within the context of the international law of responsibility. It then analyses necessity as a condition enshrined in self-defence and in the United Nations collective security system. The chapter also considers the methodological problems that arise from any interpretation of the concept of necessity, especially with respect to the use of force. It highlights the fact that the International Law Commission, the International Court of Justice, and state practice have never recognized necessity as a general justification to use force.


2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-76
Author(s):  
Marco Longobardo

Abstract This article explores the role of counsel before the International Court of Justice, taking into account their tasks under the Statute of the Court and the legal value of their pleadings in international law. Pleadings of counsel constitute State practice for the formation of customary international law and treaty interpretation, and they are attributable to the litigating State under the law on State responsibility. Accordingly, in principle, counsel present the views of the litigating State, which in practice approves in advance the pleadings. This consideration is relevant in discussing the role of counsel assisting States in politically sensitive cases, where there is no necessary correspondence between the views of the States and those of their counsel. Especially when less powerful States are parties to the relevant disputes, the availability of competent counsel in politically sensitive cases should not be discouraged since it advances the legitimacy of the international judicial function.


2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-129 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bojana Lakićević-Đuranović

This paper aims to show the significance of maritime delimitation in the Law of the Sea, as well as the contribution of international jurisprudence to the creation of the rules of maritime delimitation. The decisions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the awards of arbitration tribunals are especially significant in the part of the Law of the Sea dealing with maritime delimitation. Based on the analysis of the principle of equity and the method of equidistance, the jurisprudence of the courts is shown to have established precedents and to have an irreplaceable role in the development of the international Law of the Sea, particularly in the segment of maritime delimitations.


Author(s):  
Boothby William H

This chapter considers the sources of the law of weaponry and discusses matters critical to understanding it. Taking the traditional approach, in addition to general principles of law recognized by nations, the sources of the law consist of customary law and of treaty law, the latter referred to as ‘conventional law’. The chapter looks at customary law, which is, according to Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the law applied by the court as including ‘international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law’. The chapter discusses what does, and respectively does not, comprise state practice and then looks at treaties, how they are made and interpreted, how states explain their understandings of them and related matters. Individual sections then address the status at law of the ICRC Study of Customary International Humanitarian Law and of the UN Secretary General’s Bulletin.


Author(s):  
Jan Klabbers

This chapter reflects on the uncertainties regarding the question of why international organizations would be bound by international law. It places these uncertainties in the broader framework of a vague and ill-defined ‘turn to accountability’. As the chapter shows, international organizations are often held to account for wrongdoing without it being clear whether they have also violated an international legal obligation resting upon them. The chapter then discusses in some detail the 1980 WHO–Egypt advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) regarding whether the WHO could close their Alexandria office and move it to Jordan. Afterwards, the chapter reviews several recent attempts to overcome the ‘basis of obligation’ problem in the law of international organizations, such as the putative constitutionalization of international law or international organizations, the adoption of accountability models, and the emergence of Global Administrative Law.


Author(s):  
Lindsay Moir

This chapter examines the problems that could arise when a state invokes self-defence to justify action against terrorist groups in another state. It first considers indirect armed attack against armed groups and the controversy surrounding the use of self-defence where armed groups are controlled by a foreign state, with particular reference to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) jurisprudence. It then discusses the possibility that an armed attack could occur, permitting a forcible response in the context of international law, without attribution to a state by citing the Nicaragua case in which the ICJ pronounced that self-defence is permissible against a host state in effective control of an armed group. The chapter also looks at the case of Afghanistan and its relationship to Al Qaeda as an example of a state’s claims of self-defence against terrorism.


2018 ◽  
Vol 87 (4) ◽  
pp. 466-484
Author(s):  
Graham Melling

Due to the nature of the international legal system, the International Court of Justice (icj) is regularly presented with new questions about which international law is unclear or to which it does not yet extend – and is thereby incomplete. The approach of the icj when faced with such gaps raises some fundamental questions about the nature of the international legal system and the judicial function of the icj. The purpose of this article is to revisit and the critically evaluate the issue of how the icj responds when faced with a gap or lacuna in the law.


2009 ◽  
Vol 78 (3) ◽  
pp. 361-396 ◽  
Author(s):  
David McKeever

AbstractIn recent years, the International Court of Justice has been presented with opportunities to pronounce on important dimensions of the law on the use of force. An assessment of the court's handling of these issues must consider first the role attributed to the Court within the international legal regime for preventing and mitigating the use of force, and thus what exactly would amount to 'success' for the Court in such cases. Notwithstanding the inherent limitations on the Court's capacity in this area, this article argues that the Court has largely failed to provide clear guidance on pressing legal questions. An unwarranted caution in utilising the judicial tools at its disposal is one important factor in this regard. Finally, this article highlights some potential consequences of the Court's recent work for the development of international law on the use of force.


1999 ◽  
Vol 68 (3) ◽  
pp. 225-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  

AbstractThe aim of this paper is to examine whether the possibility of a genuine non liquet is ruled out by a so-called ‘closing rule’underlying public international law. The answer to this question largely determines the relevance of the debate on the legality and legitimacy of the pronouncement of a non liquet by an international court. This debate was recently provoked by the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat and Use of Nuclear Weapons. In this opinion, the Court held that it could not definitively conclude whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons was contrary to international law in an extreme circumstance of self-defence in which the survival of a state is at stake. Nevertheless, some authors have argued that, since international law contains a closing rule stating that the absence of a prohibition is equivalent to the existence of a permission (or vice versa), the Court had in fact decided the legality of nuclear weapons. By virtue of this closing rule, the pronouncement of a non liquet would be impossible. In our analysis, we have taken issue with this view and claim that there are no a priori reasons for the acceptance of a closing rule underlying international law. It is possible indeed that a legal system is simply indifferent towards a certain type of conduct. Moreover, even if a closing rule would be assumed, this rule would be of no help in determining the legality or illegality of the threat and use of nuclear weapons, since the Court asserted that the current state of international law and the facts at its disposal were insufficient to enable it to reach a definitive conclusion. Nothing follows from this assertion, except the assurance that international law cannot definitively settle the question of the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons: to be permitted or not to be permitted, that is still the question. Hamlet's dilemma precisely.


2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-253 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rossana Deplano, PhD

On 30 May 2016, the International Law Commission (‘ilc’) adopted a set of 16 Draft Conclusions providing a methodology on how to identify customary international law. Although largely based on the two elements approach set forth in article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the ilc study pushes the boundaries of the formal sources of international law beyond the realm of state practice by recognising that the practice of international organizations (‘ios’) as such may be constitutive of custom. This article critically examines the ilc Draft Conclusions concerning the role of ios in the process of custom creation. It examines the concept of resolution adopted by the ilc and assesses the coherence of the interpretive methodology devised by the ilc using the un General Assembly resolutions as a case study. The findings show that the Draft Conclusions fall short of expectation in providing authoritative guidance to scholars and practitioners alike.


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