The Contribution of the International Court of Justice to the Law on the Use of Force: Missed Opportunities or Unrealistic Expectations?

2009 ◽  
Vol 78 (3) ◽  
pp. 361-396 ◽  
Author(s):  
David McKeever

AbstractIn recent years, the International Court of Justice has been presented with opportunities to pronounce on important dimensions of the law on the use of force. An assessment of the court's handling of these issues must consider first the role attributed to the Court within the international legal regime for preventing and mitigating the use of force, and thus what exactly would amount to 'success' for the Court in such cases. Notwithstanding the inherent limitations on the Court's capacity in this area, this article argues that the Court has largely failed to provide clear guidance on pressing legal questions. An unwarranted caution in utilising the judicial tools at its disposal is one important factor in this regard. Finally, this article highlights some potential consequences of the Court's recent work for the development of international law on the use of force.

2009 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 345-381 ◽  
Author(s):  
MAZIAR JAMNEJAD ◽  
MICHAEL WOOD

AbstractThis article examines the existence, nature, and content of the non-intervention principle in contemporary international law, concentrating on the application of the principle to areas other than the use of force. It looks at the historical development of the principle and the sources and evidence of the law, in particular resolutions of the UN General Assembly, the decisions of the International Court of Justice, and the practice of states. The article then considers some specific treaty-based applications of the principle, and explores how far the principle may apply to non-treaty, non-forcible situations. It next considers a number of circumstances that may preclude the wrongfulness of intervention (Security Council authorization, consent, and countermeasures), before drawing some tentative conclusions.


2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-129 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bojana Lakićević-Đuranović

This paper aims to show the significance of maritime delimitation in the Law of the Sea, as well as the contribution of international jurisprudence to the creation of the rules of maritime delimitation. The decisions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the awards of arbitration tribunals are especially significant in the part of the Law of the Sea dealing with maritime delimitation. Based on the analysis of the principle of equity and the method of equidistance, the jurisprudence of the courts is shown to have established precedents and to have an irreplaceable role in the development of the international Law of the Sea, particularly in the segment of maritime delimitations.


Author(s):  
Jan Klabbers

This chapter reflects on the uncertainties regarding the question of why international organizations would be bound by international law. It places these uncertainties in the broader framework of a vague and ill-defined ‘turn to accountability’. As the chapter shows, international organizations are often held to account for wrongdoing without it being clear whether they have also violated an international legal obligation resting upon them. The chapter then discusses in some detail the 1980 WHO–Egypt advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) regarding whether the WHO could close their Alexandria office and move it to Jordan. Afterwards, the chapter reviews several recent attempts to overcome the ‘basis of obligation’ problem in the law of international organizations, such as the putative constitutionalization of international law or international organizations, the adoption of accountability models, and the emergence of Global Administrative Law.


Author(s):  
Mathias Forteau

This chapter examines one of the most contentious issues in the jus ad bellum: whether and when international law permits a state to use force unilaterally to rescue its nationals abroad when their lives or security are threatened. It first considers the definition of the phrase ‘rescuing nationals abroad’ and the legal scope and legal nature of the justification based on the necessity of carrying out such an act. It analyses the opinion of the International Court of Justice concerning the matter before assessing the current position of international law on the permissibility of rescuing nationals abroad. It also discusses whether the use of force to rescue nationals abroad can be invoked for humanitarian assistance purposes involving non-nationals. The chapter shows that the notion of ‘rescuing nationals abroad’ is ambiguous from a legal perspective and that the legality of using force to rescue nationals abroad has remained unclear since 1945.


Author(s):  
Joerg Kammerhofer

This chapter examines the resilience of the treaty, and perhaps also customary, law on self-defence since 2001. It first considers ‘resilience’ in the context of the jus ad bellum and how law can be resilient vis-à-vis changing circumstance, opinions, interpretation, and state practice. It then looks at the indicators for and against resilience by analysing post-2001 developments, paying particular attention to three areas: jurisprudence, scholarly literature in international law, and state and institutional practice. The chapter also explains what ‘resilience’ can and cannot be, and how the law and its perceptions change—or remain the same. Two avenues on the question of what is resilient are evaluated: either the norm or its interpretation (perception) change. Finally, the chapter considers a number of cases in which the International Court of Justice has made pronouncements on and partial clarifications of important aspects of the law on self-defence since 2001.


Author(s):  
Nico Schrijver

This chapter focuses on Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which prohibits the use of force in international relations. After discussing pre-Charter attempts to restrict states’ freedom to resort to warfare, it examines the emergence of a normative doctrine on a bellum justum. It considers the history of Article 2(4) and the other articles of the Charter that touch on the use of force and outlines exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force, including the so-called Uniting for Peace procedure. It examines the interpretation of Article 2(4) in the practice of the General Assembly, Security Council, and International Court of Justice), together with its inclusion in a number of multilateral treaties. Finally, it assesses the question whether the use of force after 1945 conforms to the object and purpose of Article 2(4), as well as the legal status of the prohibition to use force in contemporary international law.


2018 ◽  
Vol 87 (4) ◽  
pp. 466-484
Author(s):  
Graham Melling

Due to the nature of the international legal system, the International Court of Justice (icj) is regularly presented with new questions about which international law is unclear or to which it does not yet extend – and is thereby incomplete. The approach of the icj when faced with such gaps raises some fundamental questions about the nature of the international legal system and the judicial function of the icj. The purpose of this article is to revisit and the critically evaluate the issue of how the icj responds when faced with a gap or lacuna in the law.


Author(s):  
Gray Christine

This chapter focuses on the law concerning the use of force and intervention in internal conflicts such as civil wars. The 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations (General Assembly Resolution 2625) spelled out the content of the prohibition of the use of force in civil conflicts: every state has the duty not to foment, finance, incite, or tolerate subversive, terrorist, or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another state and the duty not to interfere in civil strife in another state. The International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case and in Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo confirmed that these provisions of the Declaration on Friendly Relations were declaratory of customary international law. The chapter shows that in most cases of forcible intervention in a civil war it is not the interpretation but the application of the law that leads to difficulty.


1998 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 287-320 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johan G. Lammers

The subject-matter of this article is the Judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case. Following an exposition of the relevant facts, it continues with a critical analysis of the Judgment of the Court. In addition to a brief analysis of the issues involving the law of treaties, the law of state responsibility, the law of state succession, and the treaty obligations of Hungary and Slovakia relating to the use of Danube water and the protection of its environment, it focuses on the rules and principles of general international law concerning the use of international watercourses and the protection of the environment that were applied by the Court in this case.


2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 661-683
Author(s):  
SERGEY M. PUNZHIN

AbstractOn the basis of a thorough empirical analysis, the article comes to a number of theoretical conclusions which have never previously been discussed in the literature. In particular, it demonstrates that the Court's procedure is governed not only by ‘procedural law’ but also by norms which are non-legal. Moreover, it clearly circumscribes which norms in the documents relating to the functioning of the Court are procedural and which lack this character. In their entirety, provisions governing the Court's procedure form a ‘normative system’, with the law being only one of its elements. The Court's procedural norms originate both from the traditional sources of international law as well as from sources which, according to the usual classification, do not necessarily belong to that category. The procedural norms that are derived from all of these sources, while not tending towards uniformity in terms of their characteristics and effect, nevertheless form a system which operates as a whole. The procedure of the International Court of Justice does not fit neatly within the general scheme of ‘legal versus non-legal norms’; neither can one readily apply the theory of traditional sources of international law to a procedural system which brings together heterogeneous elements and must therefore be explained keeping in mind its own logic and nature.


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