The Chinese room argument is famous argument introduced by John Searle, in
which Searle presented various problems with the claim that it is possible
for the artificial intelligence to have understanding of a language in a way
in which intelligent beings such as humans have that capacity. The argument
was influential enough to, in decades following it, sparke numerous responses
and critiques, along with a few alleged improvements to it from Searle. In
this article, I will analyze one atypical critique of Searle?s argument, made
by Mark Sprevak. Sprevak, unlike the other critics of the argument, agrees
with Searle that understanding does not exist in Chinese room in any way, but
he claims that Chinese room cannot execute every possible program, like
Searle claims. Because of that, Searle cannot conclude the strong conclusion
he wants from The Chinese room argument. In this article, I will analyze
Searle?s argument, I will give a brief overview of typical responses to it,
and I will analyze Sprevak?s response. In the last section, I will present
argument that shows that Sprevak, if he wants to keep his conclusions, must
either give up one part of his response, or accept one of the typical
responses to Searle?s argument, thus making his own response dependent on the
response from others.
Chinese room and program identity