scholarly journals Rational coordination with no communication or conventions

2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (6) ◽  
pp. 1183-1211
Author(s):  
Valentin Goranko ◽  
Antti Kuusisto ◽  
Raine Rönnholm
Keyword(s):  
Coordination Games ◽  
Decision Methods ◽  
Rational Players

Abstract We study pure coordination games where in every outcome, all players have identical payoffs, ‘win’ or ‘lose’. We identify and discuss a range of ‘purely rational principles’ guiding the reasoning of rational players in such games and compare the classes of coordination games that can be solved by such players with no preplay communication or conventions. We observe that it is highly nontrivial to delineate a boundary between purely rational principles and other decision methods, such as conventions, for solving such coordination games.

scholarly journals On David Gauthier’s Theories of Coordination and Cooperation

Dialogue ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 55 (4) ◽  
pp. 713-737
Author(s):  
ROBERT SUGDEN
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Coordination Games ◽  
Focal Points ◽  
Team Reasoning ◽  
Original Analysis ◽  
Constrained Maximization ◽  
Rational Players

In 1975, Gauthier discussed Schelling’spure coordination gamesand Hodgson’sHi-Lo game. While developing an original analysis of how rational players coordinate on ‘focal points,’ Gauthier argued, contrary to Schelling and Hodgson, that successful coordination in these games does not depend on deviations from conventional principles of individually rational choice. I argue that Gauthier’s analysis of constrained maximization inMorals by Agreement, which famously deviates from conventional game theory, has significant similarities with Schelling’s and Hodgson’s analyses of coordination. Constrained maximization can be thought of as a pragmatic and contractarian variant of the team-reasoning approach pioneered by Hodgson.

The Political Economy of Italy's Decline

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Lorenzo Capussela
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Tax Evasion ◽  
Social Order ◽  
Economic History ◽  
Multiple Equilibria ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Coordination Games ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Accountability ◽  
Private Goods

This book offers an interpretation of Italy’s decline, which began two decades before the Great Recession. It argues that its deeper roots lie in the political economy of growth. This interpretation is illustrated through a discussion of Italy’s political and economic history since its unification, in 1861. The emphasis is placed on the country’s convergence to the productivity frontier and TFP performance, and on the evolution of its social order and institutions. The lens through which its history is reviewed, to illuminate the origins and evolution of the current constraints to growth, is drawn from institutional economics and Schumpeterian growth theory. It is exemplified by analysing two alternative reactions to the insufficient provision of public goods: an opportunistic one—employing tax evasion, corruption, or clientelism as means to appropriate private goods—and one based on enforcing political accountability. From the perspective of ordinary citizens and firms such social dilemmas can typically be modelled as coordination games, which have multiple equilibria. Self-interested rationality can thus lead to a spiral, in which several mutually reinforcing vicious circles lead society onto an inefficient equilibrium characterized by low political accountability and weak rule of law. The book follows the gradual setting in of this spiral, despite an ambitious attempt at institutional reform, in 1962–4, and its resumption after a severe endogenous shock, in 1992–4. It concludes that innovative ideas can overcome the constraints posed by that spiral, and ease the country’s shift onto a fairer and more efficient equilibrium.

ADDITIVE-VETO MODELS FOR CHOICE AND RANKING MULTICRITERIA DECISION PROBLEMS

2013 ◽  
Vol 30 (06) ◽  
pp. 1350026 ◽  
Author(s):  
ADIEL TEIXEIRA DE ALMEIDA
Keyword(s):  
High Performance ◽  
Additive Model ◽  
Additive Models ◽  
Numerical Application ◽  
Multicriteria Decision ◽  
Decision Methods ◽  
Overall Evaluation ◽  
Low Performance ◽  
Ranking Problems ◽  
Multicriteria Decision Problems

Using additive models for aggregation of criteria is an important procedure in many multicriteria decision methods. This compensatory approach, which scores the alternatives straightforwardly, may have significant drawbacks. For instance, the Decision Maker (DM) may prefer not to select alternatives which have a very low performance in whatever criterion. In contrast, such an alternative may have the best overall evaluation, since the additive model may compensate this low performance in one of the criteria as a result of high performance in other criteria. Thus, additive-veto models are proposed with a view to considering the possibility of vetoing alternatives in such situations, particularly for choice and ranking problems. A numerical application illustrates the use of such models, with a detailed discussion related to real practical problems. Moreover, the results obtained from a numerical simulation show that it is not so rare for a veto of the best alternative to occur in the additive model. This is of considerable relevance depending on the DM's preference structure.

Leadership and Credibility in N-Person Coordination Games

1997 ◽  
Vol 41 (6) ◽  
pp. 767-791 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rick K. Wilson ◽  
Carl M. Rhodes
Keyword(s):  
Coordination Games
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