Insanity

Author(s):  
Katya Frischer

Chapter 25 relates to what is probably the most recognized, but perhaps the most rare, evaluation performed by a forensic professional. The pursuit of an insanity defense today is challenging and, in some states, not even permissible. These cases illustrate the evolution of the various state standards for establishing insanity (and therefore acquittal) for criminal defendants with mental illness. The following cases are included in this chapter: M’Naghten’s Case, Durham v. U.S., Washington v. U.S., Frendak v. U.S., Jones v. U.S., U.S. v. Torniero, Foucha v. Louisiana and Clark v. Arizona.

Author(s):  
Katya Frischer

Chapter 25 relates to what is probably the most recognized, but perhaps the most rare, evaluation performed by a forensic professional. The pursuit of an insanity defense today is challenging and, in some states, not even permissible. These cases illustrate the evolution of the various state standards for establishing insanity (and therefore acquittal) for criminal defendants with mental illness. The following cases are included in this chapter: M’Naghten’s Case, Durham v. U.S., Washington v. U.S., Frendak v. U.S., Jones v. U.S., U.S. v. Torniero, Foucha v. Louisiana, and Clark v. Arizona.


Science ◽  
1992 ◽  
Vol 256 (5055) ◽  
pp. 292-293
Author(s):  
Melvin Sabshin ◽  
Harold Alan Pincus ◽  
Wendy Davis

Science ◽  
1992 ◽  
Vol 256 (5055) ◽  
pp. 292-292
Author(s):  
W. T. Carpenter ◽  
J. R. Rappeport

1985 ◽  
Vol 13 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 9-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caryl E. Boehnert

Thirty men who were found not guilty by reason of insanity were compared to 30 men who relied on the defense but were found guilty, and with 30 men who were evaluated for the defense but opted to plea bargain. Demographic and psychological test data were obtained for each subject. There was significant psychopathology found across groups, more suggestive of major mental illness than of psychopathy. When data on the heinousness of each individual crime were examined, NGRI subjects were found to commit the least heinous offenses, and those on death row were found to commit the most heinous. Directions for future research and the operation of the legal system in general are discussed.


1981 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 236-264
Author(s):  
Scott Leigh Sherman

Abstract“Guilty but mentally ill” legislation responds to the increasing outbreak of violent crimes and to public skepticism concerning the ability of psychiatrists to determine the advisability of a criminal's return to society. Under this alternative to the traditional insanity defense, once the defendant chooses to plead not guilty by reason of insanity, the trier of fact may elect to find him guilty, but mentally ill. This may occur when it is determined that the defendant's mental illness is not severe enough to negate culpability. The court must then sentence the defendant to a term in prison instead of committing him to a psychiatric institution.This Note discusses the origins of the guilty but mentally ill verdict and outlines the development of commitment standards for civil patients and insanity acquittees. While these standards appeared to be merging for a period of time the more recent trend has been to treat civil patients and insanity acquitees differently. This Note maintains that the guilty but mentally ill verdict involves an unnecessarily severe curtailment of the mentally ill offender's constitutional rights.The Note delineates a proposal critiquing the misconceptions on which the statute is based and the excessive restraints on liberty it causes. The proposal examines the reasons for the public's misgivings with the insanity defense and suggests that the threat to the public's safety may not be as serious as it appears. Furthermore, it indicates that while problems remain with the existing insanity defense, the solution to those problems provided by the guilty but mentally ill statute outweighs the risk that insanity acquittees pose to the public.


Thomas Szasz ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 272-282
Author(s):  
C.V. Haldipur

This epilogue summarizes and interconnects the chapters of the book, particularly with regard to Thomas Szasz’s views on the insanity defense and the concept of mental illness. The epilogue’s author knew Szasz personally and shared an office with him for nearly a decade, thus gaining many opportunities to discuss ideas with him.


1996 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 421-442 ◽  
Author(s):  
Craig S. Neumann ◽  
Elaine F. Walker ◽  
Jay Weinstein ◽  
Chris Cutshaw

This study examined the relationship between psychotic patients' insight into their mental illness and current symptoms, competency to stand trial, and willingness to use the insanity defense. Inpatients with psychotic disorders were grouped by whether they exhibited insight into their mental status (n=18) or denied being mentally ill (n=13). The majority of all patients, regardless of insight status, failed at least one item on a 16-item competency exam. However, the majority of insightful subjects (77%) were willing to consider using the insanity defense, while only a minority (31%) of the non-insightful subjects were willing to consider such a defense. Using the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS), univariate analyses indicated that the insightful subjects manifested significantly more Anxiety-Depression and less Thought Disturbance than the non-insightful subjects. Although there was no relationship between insight and performance on the competency exam, there were significant inverse correlations between competency scores and ratings on the BPRS symptom factors.


Thomas Szasz ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 189-210
Author(s):  
Neil Pickering

Szasz stoutly opposed the use of the insanity defense. This chapter considers the persuasiveness of Szasz’s arguments against it, which fall into three broad categories: (1) arguments that the insanity defense is immoral; (2) arguments that it relies on a nonexistent entity, namely mental illness; and (3) arguments that the sciences of psychiatry offer no grounds for supporting it. Each category of argument is explored in its various forms. The most persuasive type of argument is found to be the third. Unlike the other two, it does not require us to buy into strong and broad beliefs which are indeed characteristically Szaszian (such as that mental illness is a myth), but which lack widespread acceptance. In contrast, Szasz’s argument that the sciences associated with psychiatry (such as psychology) do not offer grounds for the existence of the insanity defense appeals to a commonly held and highly plausible multifactorial account of the causes of human behavior. In short, analysed carefully, Szasz’s writing provides more persuasive grounds for taking exception to the insanity defense than his own best-known views offer.


This anthology takes a multidisciplinary approach to examining the legacy of the controversial psychiatrist and libertarian philosopher Thomas Szasz (1920-2012), whose mordant criticism of psychiatry challenged the very concept of mental illness and the practice of coercive psychiatric treatment and some tenets of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. The international spectrum of contributors represents a wide variety of viewpoints in psychiatry, philosophy, and the history of ideas. They discuss the viability of interpretations of mental illness, especially with reference to specific conditions such as schizophrenia; the legal and ethical implications of Szasz’s thought, particularly for the insanity defense; several aspects of the suicide debate; questions of accountability, responsibility, and psychopathy; thinkers who influenced him; and his influences on others.


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