Behavioral Economics in Plea-Bargain Decision-Making: Beyond the Shadow-of-Trial Model

Legal scholars have long assumed that plea bargains are contracts negotiated between rational actors who adhere to the dictates of the normative shadow-of-trial model. The two key features that rational actors presumably haggle over in the shadow of trial are the criminal charge (and associated sentence) and the probability of trial conviction. The behavioral economics theory of discounting, however, offers a theoretical foundation for testing the shadow-of-trial model. This article summarizes findings from experimental discounting studies in behavioral economics and psychological science – showing that these paradigms can be successfully applied to the plea-bargaining decision context wherein the likelihood of trial is uncertain and delayed, and the plea bargain is relatively certain and immediate. We suggest that the implications of applying discounting to plea bargaining are three-fold: (1) empirical evidence suggests that the shadow-of-trial model is too narrow; (2) the discounting of non-monetary losses may involve slightly different psychological processes than contexts involving monetary outcomes; and (3) probability of conviction and delay until trial constitute situational features that elicit guilty pleas despite a defendant’s factual innocence.

COLABORAÇÃO PREMIADA E SUA APLICABILIDADE NO ORDENAMENTO JURÍDICO BRASILEIRO COM O ADVENTO DA LEI 12.850/2013 LEI DO COMBATE AO CRIME ORGANIZADO

The Awarded Collaboration is part of a new phase of procedural development in the criminal legal scenario, which has brought benefits in the fight against organized crime and systemic corruption implanted in the country, for decades. This article aims to analyze in the scope, the winning collaboration and its applicability in the Brazilian legal system with the advent of Law 12.850 / 2013 (Law to Combat Organized Crime). This research is scientific and will be of a qualitative approach aiming to generate knowledge for the elaboration of the monographic text as a course conclusion work, through the deductive approach method, it corresponds to the discursive extraction of knowledge from general premises applicable to concrete hypotheses, once that the researcher will establish relations from the general to the particular, based on logical reasoning, arrive at the truth of what he proposes. Anyway, what we have with the awarded plea bargain (awarded collaboration) in the form of Law 12.850 / 2013, is a very powerful and efficient instrument to fight organized crime, be it low-caste organized crime to high-caste organized crime, and mainly organized crime cast in the walls of the National Congress and the Planalto Palace, as seen with the results of the “lava jet” task force.

The Legal Impact of Plea Bargain in Settlement of High Profile Financial Criminal Cases in Nigeria

Plea bargain has been globally accepted as a useful criminal prosecutorial tool in accelerating the prosecution of minor criminal cases. However, it has been observed that the introduction of a plea bargain into the Nigerian criminal justice system tends to aid the ruling class in looting from the public treasury and escaping justice. Given these legal anomalies, the study used online survey questionnaires sent to four hundred and five respondents (randomly selected) residing in Nigeria in ascertaining the Nigerian citizens view on the legal effect of using a plea bargain in resolving high profile financial crime cases. Descriptive and analytical statistics were used to analyse the respondents’ responses. The study, therefore, found that though plea bargain is a useful criminal prosecutorial tool in resolving minor criminal cases, it is unsuitable in resolving high profile criminal financial cases as it tends to involve a hide and seek game which makes a mockery of the Nigeria Legal System. It is, therefore, concluded and recommended that the concept of a plea bargain in Nigeria legal system should not be used in resolving high-profile criminal financial cases, as it tends to give leverage to those looting public funds.

Take the plea: the factors that influence innocent individuals to accept plea bargains

Recently, plea bargaining has emerged as a factor that contributes to wrongful convictions. When a Crown offers a reduced sentence or lesser charge to a defendant in exchange for a guilty plea, there is the potential for innocent defendants to plead guilty. However, little is known about the factors that are influencing innocent defendants to accept plea bargains. The current study aimed to investigate the role of false evidence, risk, and modality on an innocent participant’s likelihood of accepting or rejecting a plea bargain. In a laboratory, innocent participants (N = 174) were accused of collaborating with another participant (confederate) on a problem solving task, and offered a plea bargain. Results showed that when participants were told there was an 80% chance of sanctions if they rejected the plea, they were more likely to admit guilt, and accept the plea. Additionally, participants who were high in compliance, high in fantasy proneness, or were younger, were more likely to accept the plea bargain. Implications of these findings for innocent defendants are discussed.

Take the plea: the factors that influence innocent individuals to accept plea bargains

Recently, plea bargaining has emerged as a factor that contributes to wrongful convictions. When a Crown offers a reduced sentence or lesser charge to a defendant in exchange for a guilty plea, there is the potential for innocent defendants to plead guilty. However, little is known about the factors that are influencing innocent defendants to accept plea bargains. The current study aimed to investigate the role of false evidence, risk, and modality on an innocent participant’s likelihood of accepting or rejecting a plea bargain. In a laboratory, innocent participants (N = 174) were accused of collaborating with another participant (confederate) on a problem solving task, and offered a plea bargain. Results showed that when participants were told there was an 80% chance of sanctions if they rejected the plea, they were more likely to admit guilt, and accept the plea. Additionally, participants who were high in compliance, high in fantasy proneness, or were younger, were more likely to accept the plea bargain. Implications of these findings for innocent defendants are discussed.

Debundling accountability: prosecutor and public defender elections in Florida

I explore the impact of public defender and prosecutor elections using caseload data from Florida. While most states within the US use popular elections to select and retain prosecutors, public defenders are typically appointed positions. Florida is novel in that for both positions, popular, partisan elections are used to select the office’s leader. I first document important distortions in pre-trial case handling. A public defender re-election is associated with an increase in the proportion of cases resolved via plea bargaining, while prosecutor re-elections are associated with less plea bargaining. At the trial phase, I present evidence that public defender re-elections are associated with a decrease in the proportion of jury trials that result in a conviction, while a prosecutor re-election coincides with an increase in the conviction rate. The results are consistent with voters holding both elected officials accountable for doing their job. Public defenders obtain plea bargains at a higher rate and secure acquittals for their clients when up for re-election. Prosecutors do not plea bargain as much and win at trial when up for re-election.