Metaphysical Grounding

Philosophy ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Raven

Metaphysical ground is supposed to be a distinctive metaphysical kind of determination. It is or underwrites constitutive explanations. These explanations answer questions asking in virtue of what something is so. For example, suppose that an act is pious just in case it is loved by the gods. Following Socrates, one might still ask whether an act is pious because the gods love it or whether it is loved by the gods because it is pious. This may be interpreted as a question of ground. Then, one answer is that what the gods love grounds what is pious. And an alternative answer is that what is pious grounds what the gods love. Either way, Socrates’s question concerns what something’s being pious consists in, or what it holds in virtue of, or what grounds it. Once one has the notion of ground, one will likely find it involved in many of philosophy’s big questions. In ethics, the question might be whether an action’s maximizing goodness grounds its rightness. In epistemology, the question might be whether a process producing a belief grounds its justification. In language, the question might whether what a speaker means in uttering a sentence grounds its meaning. In law, the question might be whether social and institutional facts ground the legal facts. In metaphysics, the question might be whether physical facts ground all the rest. In mind, the question might be whether a representation’s content grounds its phenomenal character. The list could go on. The extraordinary range and ambition of these questions of ground explains continued interest in them. But only recently have some philosophers viewed these questions as concerning ground as such. This growing self-consciousness is moving more philosophers to view ground as a topic worthy of study. Much of the recent literature on ground has focused on exploring its structure (Structure) and its connections to other notions (Connections). These explorations spring from the hope that clarifying ground will help clarify the big questions it helps express. Some of the literature on ground explores these applications to the big questions (Applications). But there are also skeptics who challenge ground’s grand pretensions. Some of these skeptics doubt ground’s usefulness for clarifying the big questions. Other skeptics doubt that ground is even intelligible. This has led to a vigorous debate over whether ground deserves the attention it receives (Skepticism and Anti-Skepticism).

2007 ◽  
pp. 5-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Searle

The author claims that an institution is any collectively accepted system of rules (procedures, practices) that enable us to create institutional facts. These rules typically have the form of X counts as Y in C, where an object, person, or state of affairs X is assigned a special status, the Y status, such that the new status enables the person or object to perform functions that it could not perform solely in virtue of its physical structure, but requires as a necessary condition the assignment of the status. The creation of an institutional fact is, thus, the collective assignment of a status function. The typical point of the creation of institutional facts by assigning status functions is to create deontic powers. So typically when we assign a status function Y to some object or person X we have created a situation in which we accept that a person S who stands in the appropriate relation to X is such that (S has power (S does A)). The whole analysis then gives us a systematic set of relationships between collective intentionality, the assignment of function, the assignment of status functions, constitutive rules, institutional facts, and deontic powers.


Author(s):  
Antti Kauppinen

Affective experiences motivate and rationalize behaviour in virtue of feeling good or bad, or their valence. It has become popular to explain such phenomenal character with intentional content. Rejecting evaluativism and extending earlier imperativist accounts of pain, I argue that when experiences feel bad, they both represent things as being in a certain way and tell us to see to it that they will no longer be that way. Such commands have subjective authority by virtue of linking up with a relevant background concern. The imperative content explains but doesn’t constitute world-directed motivation. It also rationalizes action indirectly, by giving rise to an affective seeming that represents the situation as calling for the authoritatively commanded behaviour. One experience feels worse than another if its content tells us to bear a higher opportunity cost to comply with the command. Finally, experience-directed motivation is contingent on our being attitudinally (dis)pleased with the character of our experience.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Seokman Kang

[ACCESS RESTRICTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI AT AUTHOR'S REQUEST.] "This monograph mainly concerns two distinctive features of visual experience. First, visual experience has its own phenomenal dimension. Following the familiar terminology in the literature, I refer to this unique experiential feature as phenomenal character. The phenomenal character of a visual experience is typically taken to be the sui generis property that it has in virtue of being a particular kind of conscious mental state. As Thomas Nagel once put it, 'ocean organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism--something it is like for the organism' (1974, p. 436). Since then, the phenomenal character of an experience has often been construed as a subjective feel of some sort that manifests itself to the subject when he undergoes the experience that carries it. Alex Byrne thus proposes that 'the phenomenal character of an experience e is a property, specifically a property of e: that property that types e according to what it's like to undergo e' (2002)."--Chapter 1.


Author(s):  
Farid Masrour

Philosophical interest in unity of consciousness goes back at least to Kant. A recent revival of interest among analytic philosophers of mind focuses on unity of consciousness, construed as phenomenal unity. This chapter will survey some of the issues and questions that have been central to this recent work before sketching an alternative to what may be seen as a dominant, though implicit, tendency in the recent literature on unity: to formulate the idea that phenomenal unity is a natural feature of consciousness in terms of what the chapter will term the Unity Thesis. According to this thesis, all synchronous experiences of a conscious subject at a moment are phenomenally unified with each other. The chapter then rebuts another trend in recent literature: the tendency to understand phenomenal unity as obtaining in virtue of a type of oneness or singularity. The chapter advances an alternative that sees phenomenal unity as obtaining in virtue of connectivity conditions over relations among phenomenal experiences.


2017 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 235-254 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. P. Smit ◽  
Filip Buekens

Declarations like “this meeting is adjourned” make certain facts the case by representing them as being the case. Yet surprisingly little attention has been paid to the mechanism whereby the utterance of a declaration can bring about a new state of affairs. In this paper, we use the incentivization account of institutional facts to address this issue. We argue that declarations can serve to bring about new states of affairs as their utterance have game theoretical import, typically in virtue of the utterer signaling a commitment to act in an incentive-changing way.


Mind ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 128 (512) ◽  
pp. 1013-1044 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luca Barlassina ◽  
Max Khan Hayward

AbstractExperiences like pains, pleasures, and emotions have affective phenomenal character: they feel pleasant or unpleasant. Imperativism proposes to explain affective phenomenal character by appeal to imperative content, a kind of intentional content that directs rather than describes. We argue that imperativism is on the right track, but has been developed in the wrong way. There are two varieties of imperativism on the market: first-order and higher-order. We show that neither is successful, and offer in their place a new theory: reflexive imperativism. Our proposal is that an experience P feels pleasant in virtue of being (at least partly) constituted by a Command with reflexive imperative content (1), while an experience U feels unpleasant in virtue of being (at least partly) constituted by a Command with reflexive imperative content (2): More of P!Less of U!If you need a slogan: experiences have affective phenomenal character in virtue of commanding us Get more of me! Get less of me!


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-182
Author(s):  
Christos Kyriacou ◽  

Recent literature has paid considerable attention to evolutionary debunking arguments. But the cogency of evolutionary debunking arguments is compromised by a problem for such arguments that has been somewhat overlooked, namely, what we may call ‘the demarcation problem.’ This is the problem of asking in virtue of what regulative metaepistemic norm evolutionary considerations either render a belief justified, or debunk it as unjustified. In this paper, I present and explain why in the absence of such a regulative metaepistemic norm any appeal to evolutionary considerations (in order to justify or debunk a belief) is bound to be ad hoc and question-begging and, therefore, ultimately unjustified.


Author(s):  
D. E. Speliotis

The interaction of electron beams with a large variety of materials for information storage has been the subject of numerous proposals and studies in the recent literature. The materials range from photographic to thermoplastic and magnetic, and the interactions with the electron beam for writing and reading the information utilize the energy, or the current, or even the magnetic field associated with the electron beam.


Author(s):  
L. F. Allard ◽  
E. Völkl ◽  
T. A. Nolan

The illumination system of the cold field emission (CFE) Hitachi HF-2000 TEM operates with a single condenser lens in normal imaging mode, and with a second condenser lens excited to give the ultra-fine 1 nm probe for microanalysis. The electron gun provides a guaranteed high brightness of better than 7×l08 A/cm2/sr, more than twice the guaranteed brightness of Schottky emission guns. There have been several articles in the recent literature (e.g. refs.) which claim that the geometry of this illumination system yields a total current which is so low that when the beam is spread at low magnifications (say 10 kX), the operator must “keep his eyes glued to the binoculars” in order to see the image. It is also claimed that this illuminating system produces an isoplanatic patch (the area over which image character does not vary significantly) at high magnification which is so small that the instrument is ineffective for recording high resolution images.


2012 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 69-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pamela A. Smith

In this article, I will review the available recent literature about the aging population with autism, a patient group that researchers know little about and a group that is experiencing a growing need for support from communication disorders professionals. Speech-language pathologists working with geriatric patients should become familiar with this issue, as the numbers of older patients with autism spectrum disorders is likely to increase. Our profession and our health care system must prepare to meet the challenge these patients and residents will present as they age.


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