A Recommitment to Majority Rule

Author(s):  
Edward B. Foley

States should adopt a majority-rule requirement for participating in the Electoral College, meaning specifically that no state should award all its Electoral College votes to any candidate who fails to receive a majority of the state’s popular vote. There are a variety of ways that states can satisfy this majority-rule requirement. One option is to hold a runoff after the November election if no candidate receives a majority of the popular vote. Another option is to hold a preliminary vote in advance of the November election, perhaps on or around Labor Day, so that only two candidates appear on the November ballot. A third option would be to adopt instant runoff voting, which is a species of ranked-choice balloting that permits a runoff to be conducted simultaneously with the initial vote. A proportional system, which divided a state’s electoral votes among candidates, would also comply with the majority-rule requirement.

Author(s):  
Edward B. Foley

Each state already has the constitutional power to require that candidates win a majority of the popular vote to receive all of the state’s electoral votes. Each state could adopt the kind of runoff that New Hampshire used in the past, or instant runoff voting. There is no need for a multistate compact. If only two or three states had used runoffs, or instant runoff voting, in 2016—for example, Florida and Michigan, or the three Rust Belt states of Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania—and if Clinton had won those runoffs, then she would have been president. In the future, it might be a Republican candidate who prevails in runoffs in pivotal states but would lose using plurality winner-take-all. States with ballot initiatives can use them to require majority rule for appointing electors as long as they leave the specific details to legislation.


Author(s):  
George C. Edwards

This chapter focuses on contingent elections. If the presidential and vice presidential candidates fail to receive a simple majority of electoral college votes, the Twelfth Amendment provides that the House of Representatives chooses the president and the Senate chooses the vice president in a process known as “contingent” election (contingent upon the absence of a majority in the electoral college). There have been two contingent elections for president in U.S. history, following the elections of 1800 and 1824. Very minor shifts of popular votes in the nation, however, would have sent a number of other elections to the Congress for a decision. In the House, where each state must vote as a unit, a majority of 26 or more votes is required to elect a president; in the Senate, a majority of 51 or more votes is required to elect a vice president. Although a superficial reading of these rules suggests the operation of majority rule, the chapter maintains that this process actually represents the most egregious violation of democratic principles in the American political system.


2012 ◽  
Vol 45 (04) ◽  
pp. 655-662 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carl E. Klarner

The election forecasts presented in this article indicate that control of the White House after the 2012 election is a tossup, that control of the US House will likely remain in Republican hands, and that although closely fought, the Republicans have the edge for control of the US Senate. These forecasts were made on July 15, 2012. Obama was predicted to receive 51.3% of the two-party popular vote, 301 electoral votes, and to have a 57.1% chance of winning the Electoral College. The year 2012 was forecast to be one of stasis for the US House, with almost no change in the number of seats controlled by the Republicans: they were forecast to pick up two seats, and to have a 75.6% chance of maintaining their majority. Lastly, the Republicans were predicted to pick up five seats in the US Senate and have about a 61.6% chance of attaining majority control.


Author(s):  
George C. Edwards

This chapter traces the origins of the electoral college. The Constitution's framers chose a unique and complex method of selecting the president—one that clearly violates fundamental tenets of political equality and majority rule. As such, this chapter considers the historical motivations behind the founding of electoral colleges, such as slavery, legislative intrigue, population differences, and voter parochialism. Afterward, it argues that most of the motivations behind the creation of the electoral college are irrelevant today and can be easily dismissed. In addition, the broad thrust of constitutional revision over the past two centuries has been in the direction of democratization and majority rule.


Author(s):  
Edward B. Foley

The Jeffersonian Electoral College performed as expected until, after the rise of Andrew Jackson, plurality winner-take-all became the prevailing method among states for appointing electors. Even then, the Jeffersonian Electoral College has usually operated consistently with the compound version of majority rule that the Jeffersonians had in mind. Using a mathematical measure, one can identify which elections clearly comply with the Jeffersonian conception of compound majority rule and which, by contrast, require further analysis to confirm their conformity to majoritarian principles. Undertaking this analysis, only two elections in nineteenth century—1844 and 1884—clearly contravene the Jeffersonian expectation for how the system was supposed to work. Of the two, the so-called accident of 1844 was hugely consequential for the rest of American history: the winner, James Polk, took the nation to war against Mexico in order to expand territory, particularly for slavery, according to his vision of Manifest Destiny.


2018 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabrice Barthélémy ◽  
Mathieu Martin ◽  
Ashley Piggins

ABSTRACTDonald J. Trump won the 2016 US presidential election with fewer popular votes than Hillary R. Clinton. This is the fourth time this has happened, the others being 1876, 1888, and 2000. In earlier work, we analyzed these elections (and others) and showed how the electoral winner can often depend on the size of the US House of Representatives. This work was inspired by Neubauer and Zeitlin (2003, 721–5) in their paper, “Outcomes of Presidential Elections and the House Size.” A sufficiently larger House would have given electoral victories to the popular vote winner in both 1876 and 2000. An exception is the election of 1888. We show that Trump’s victory in 2016 is like Harrison’s in 1888 and unlike Hayes’s in 1876 and Bush’s in 2000. This article updates our previous work to include the 2016 election. It also draws attention to some of the anomalous behavior that can arise under the Electoral College.


2020 ◽  
Vol 117 (45) ◽  
pp. 27940-27944 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert S. Erikson ◽  
Karl Sigman ◽  
Linan Yao

Donald Trump’s 2016 win despite failing to carry the popular vote has raised concern that 2020 would also see a mismatch between the winner of the popular vote and the winner of the Electoral College. This paper shows how to forecast the electoral vote in 2020 taking into account the unknown popular vote and the configuration of state voting in 2016. We note that 2016 was a statistical outlier. The potential Electoral College bias was slimmer in the past and not always favoring the Republican candidate. We show that in past presidential elections, difference among states in their presidential voting is solely a function of the states’ most recent presidential voting (plus new shocks); earlier history does not matter. Based on thousands of simulations, our research suggests that the bias in 2020 probably will favor Trump again but to a lesser degree than in 2016. The range of possible outcomes is sufficiently wide, however, to even include some possibility that Joseph Biden could win in the Electoral College while barely losing the popular vote.


Author(s):  
Edward B. Foley

The Electoral College governing America today was adopted by Thomas Jefferson’s supporters, after the 1800 election almost derailed his presidency. The Jeffersonians were motivated by majority rule. Given the emergence of two-party competition between Federalists and themselves, the Jeffersonians intended the Electoral College to award the presidency to the majority party. Given the federal structure of the United States, they envisioned the Electoral College as implementing a compound form of majority rule: a candidate would win by amassing a majority of electoral votes from states where the candidate’s party was in the majority.


The Forum ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 345-373
Author(s):  
Jillian Evans ◽  
Brian J. Gaines

Abstract Advocates of the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC) promise that it can deliver plurality electoral rule (“first past the post”) for presidential elections, at the national level, without amending the Constitution or abolishing the Electoral College. They also contend that the plan has seen bipartisan support and will pass on the strength of such cross-party attraction. In fact, the NPVIC remains a polarizing scheme, strongly appealing to most Democrats and strongly repellant to most Republicans. In turn, it is extremely unlikely that sufficiently many states will join the Compact for it to reach the next stage of legal testing.


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