electoral vote
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Diksi ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-188
Author(s):  
Ikha Adhi Wijaya ◽  
Annas Annas ◽  
Sumarlam Sumarlam

(Title: The Evaluation of Trump’s Political Perspectives at The  “Save America Rally”). This paper explores Trump speech in online media CBC news entitled “Live Coverage: Protesters Swarm Capitol, Abruptly Halting Electoral Vote Count” in the point of view of discourse analysis. This research belongs to qualitative research. The method used to analyze is distributional and referential method. It analyzed Trump ideology’s Perspectives through structure manifested by Emotive words, phrases, sentences from his speech, specifically it explored from critical discourse analysis conducted by Teun A .Van Dijk.  It resulted and indicated that Trump conveyed his political will by protesting the result of the ballots. He said there was fraud in the middle of the election. In fact, instead of protesting the election, he also conveyed the autocritics towards the government (himself). Key Words:  speech, Trumps, critical discourse analysis, ideology


2021 ◽  
pp. 35-35
Author(s):  
Betty M. See
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-6
Author(s):  
Richard F. Potthoff

ABSTRACT Apparently unnoticed by its advocates, a prominent effort to improve the troubled US presidential-election system—the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC)—is on a collision course with another effort at electoral change—“ranked-choice voting” (RCV, known previously by less ambiguous names). The NPVIC is a clever device intended, without constitutional amendment, to elect as president the nationwide popular-vote winner (i.e., the plurality-vote winner) rather than the electoral-vote winner. Election results in 2000, 2016, and 2020 enhanced its support. However, the (constitutional) ability of even one state to replace its plurality voting with another voting system causes the popular-vote total posited for the NPVIC to be undefined, thereby rendering the NPVIC unusable. Maine and Alaska recently switched from plurality voting to RCV for presidential elections. Consequently, tangled results and turmoil could occur with the NPVIC. To improve presidential elections, replacing plurality voting with other systems appears to be more sensible than pursuing the NPVIC.


2021 ◽  
pp. 63-90
Author(s):  
Charles S. Bullock ◽  
Karen L. Owen

Georgia requires a majority vote to win a special election. Had a candidate in the April jungle primary polled a majority, that would have sufficed. But no candidate won outright, so the top two finishers, Democrat Jon Ossoff and Republican Karen Handel, advanced to a runoff held nine weeks later. Chapter 3 details each campaign’s activities and the substantial sums of money infused into the contest, making it the most expensive House race in the United States. Yet, in the end even with the initial electoral vote and fundraising advantages to Ossoff, significant voter turnout, and what many believed a divided and disgruntled GOP, the contest became largely a standard partisan face-off.


2021 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 98-99
Author(s):  
Teresa Pinheiro

Review of: Dictatorship and the Electoral Vote: Francoism and the Portuguese New State Regime in Comparative Perspective, 1945-1975, Carlos Domper Lasús (2020) Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 267 pp., ISBN 978-1-84519-987-6, h/bk, £75.00


Author(s):  
Kyle Haynes

This article argues that the effect of a democratic leader’s electoral margin of victory on their conflict behaviour once in office is highly dependent upon the state’s institutional structure. I show that, uniquely in parliamentary democracies, governments that win a larger share of the vote are significantly less likely to initiate disputes abroad. Such governments entail broad coalitions that, combined with the ever-present possibility of governmental collapse and new elections, require leaders to pursue a more cautious, lowest-common-denominator foreign policy. This effect is significantly stronger for right-wing governments. Conversely, in presidential democracies, I find that electoral vote share has no effect on a leader’s subsequent conflict propensity. Vote shares thus function very differently in parliamentary and presidential systems, with important implications for conflict behaviour abroad.


2020 ◽  
Vol 117 (45) ◽  
pp. 27940-27944 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert S. Erikson ◽  
Karl Sigman ◽  
Linan Yao

Donald Trump’s 2016 win despite failing to carry the popular vote has raised concern that 2020 would also see a mismatch between the winner of the popular vote and the winner of the Electoral College. This paper shows how to forecast the electoral vote in 2020 taking into account the unknown popular vote and the configuration of state voting in 2016. We note that 2016 was a statistical outlier. The potential Electoral College bias was slimmer in the past and not always favoring the Republican candidate. We show that in past presidential elections, difference among states in their presidential voting is solely a function of the states’ most recent presidential voting (plus new shocks); earlier history does not matter. Based on thousands of simulations, our research suggests that the bias in 2020 probably will favor Trump again but to a lesser degree than in 2016. The range of possible outcomes is sufficiently wide, however, to even include some possibility that Joseph Biden could win in the Electoral College while barely losing the popular vote.


2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Suhardiman Syamsu ◽  
Reksa Burhan ◽  
Ade Irma Surani Haliq

AbstractThe regional expansion of the Luwu Raya becomes campaign issue in the election for governor in South Sulawesi. Based on theory, regional expansion is an implementation of the transition of government from centralization to decentralization. Decentralization is a new chapter for the implementation of regional governance in Indonesia. This view believes that the ongoing transition will accelerate regional expansion, which in turn will contribute significantly to the performance of government in the regions. However, this study has a different opinion. The practice of decentralization does not easily support the regional expansion. Researchers focus on the relationship between elites and explore the dynamics between local elites in the discourse of regional expansion. This research took place in Luwu, South Sulawesi using a qualitative approach. The method of data collection was done through direct observation and interviews. Local leaders and elites who were involved either directly or indirectly became key informants. In addition, the data obtained from this study also comes from official government documents and reports, such as BPS periodical reports and official reports that have been released by several agencies. This article found that the planning for regional expansion was actually complicated after the transition of government administration. The practice of decentralization has not only changed the administrative implementation but also arrange political reforms that impact on the implementation of local politics. This research finds the phenomenon of the competition of political influence in electoral vote districts as a manifestation of local political practices that are intertwined with the issue of regional expansion.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory D. Webster

Because of increasingly skewed populations among the 50 United States, the Electoral College is increasingly more likely to produce a winner with a minority of the popular vote. Not only has the Electoral College become a less accurate reflection of the popular vote over time, but it also suppresses the voting power of racial and ethnic minorities in U.S. presidential elections. First, as a consequence of the winner-take-all Electoral College system, states with smaller populations are allotted disproportionately high weights, such that their per-capita voting power per electoral vote is substantially greater than that of states with larger populations. For example, in 2004, residents of the least-populous state, Wyoming (164,594 people per electoral vote), had over 3.74 times the electoral power of residents in the most-populous state, California (615,848 people per electoral vote). Second, states with larger populations have a larger percentage of ethnic minorities (r = .43, p = .002). Third, if one controls for population differences, the Whiter a state is, the more electoral votes it receives. Fourth, the Whiter a state is, the more electoral power it has in terms of a lower population-per-electoral-vote ratio (r = -.37, p = .008; r = -.52, p < .001 if outlier Hawaii, with only 23% non-Hispanic/Latino Whites, is excluded). Thus, the red-versus-blue dichotomy engendered by the winner-take-all Electoral College system not only disenfranchises opinion minorities, but also systemically disenfranchises racial and ethnic minorities seeking to stake a claim on the presidential political landscape. [Abstract written August 4, 2020.]


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Audrey Lynn

Debates over the merits of the Electoral College historically have been characterized by philosophical arguments and arcane statistical models. In light of growing efforts to undermine or discard the electoral system, the nation needs objective answers about how the Electoral College affects presidential elections. Using accessible quantitative techniques, this Article answers three essential questions: what was the electoral system intended to do, what has it done, and what is the best (or worst) it can do? It answers these questions using a unique approach that measures the electoral system’s success and potential in terms that correspond to its raison d'être, parameterizing the problem in terms of satisfaction and population instead of voters. Also in contrast to traditional expositions, this Article dispenses with “highly stylized” and voter-based statistical models. It instead correctly recognizes the Electoral College as a discrete mathematical system and applies much simpler and more meaningful descriptive and predictive techniques to actual election data. The result is that the system’s effect on elections is quantified, related to historical data, and reliably forecast for the foreseeable future. This is the type of substantive analysis long needed to confirm or disprove the system’s merits. Part I first examines records of the Constitutional Convention seeking to determine what the Framers’ purpose was in choosing the algorithm they did. Concluding that their purpose was to provide a president who would be representative of people across the country, the Article proceeds with a focus on people and places to examine whether the system has achieved its goal. Beginning with the first election in which there was a registered popular vote, Part II briefly describes the few discrepancies there have been between the popular and electoral vote in order to fairly characterize the basis for controversy. Its novel contribution, however, is to propose and apply a framework for assessing whether the Electoral College results in an effective expression of the will and interests of the People that is consistent with the legitimizing principles of our government. Part III concludes with a mathematical analysis that proves that there are specific, calculable limitations on the size and distribution of a prevailing minority and illustrates that there is a continuing likelihood that winning candidates will be selected by states comprising a majority of the population.


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