The Jeffersonian Electoral College in the Nineteenth Century

2020 ◽  
pp. 49-88
Author(s):  
Edward B. Foley
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
American History ◽  
Majority Rule ◽  
Manifest Destiny ◽  
Electoral College ◽  
Andrew Jackson ◽  
Winner Take All ◽  
Take All

The Jeffersonian Electoral College performed as expected until, after the rise of Andrew Jackson, plurality winner-take-all became the prevailing method among states for appointing electors. Even then, the Jeffersonian Electoral College has usually operated consistently with the compound version of majority rule that the Jeffersonians had in mind. Using a mathematical measure, one can identify which elections clearly comply with the Jeffersonian conception of compound majority rule and which, by contrast, require further analysis to confirm their conformity to majoritarian principles. Undertaking this analysis, only two elections in nineteenth century—1844 and 1884—clearly contravene the Jeffersonian expectation for how the system was supposed to work. Of the two, the so-called accident of 1844 was hugely consequential for the rest of American history: the winner, James Polk, took the nation to war against Mexico in order to expand territory, particularly for slavery, according to his vision of Manifest Destiny.

Conclusion

2020 ◽  
pp. 169-178
Author(s):  
Edward B. Foley
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Majority Rule ◽  
Presidential Elections ◽  
The United States ◽  
Party Competition ◽  
Civic Culture ◽  
Electoral College ◽  
American Democracy ◽  
Winner Take All ◽  
Take All

Election College reform should be considered in the context of overall concerns about American democracy. Civic culture is essential, as is strengthening democratic institutions. While the United States must address other institutional weaknesses, including gerrymandering, the power of the presidency requires urgent attention to the current deficiency of the Electoral College. The problem is that plurality winner-take-all permits the kind of accident that occurred in 1844, where the winner is not the candidate preferred by a majority of voters in enough states for an Electoral College majority. Insofar as this kind of accident may have happened again in 2016, recognizing this institutional problem requires a different analysis and solution than if a majority of Americans want to elect a president with anti-democratic tendencies. Currently, there is a mismatch between America’s expectation of two-party competition and the multicandidate reality of contemporary presidential elections. Majority rule is necessary to realign reality and expectations.

A Feasible Reform

2020 ◽  
pp. 155-168
Author(s):  
Edward B. Foley
Keyword(s):  
New Hampshire ◽  
Majority Rule ◽  
Rust Belt ◽  
Ballot Initiatives ◽  
Popular Vote ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Future ◽  
Winner Take All ◽  
To Receive ◽  
Take All

Each state already has the constitutional power to require that candidates win a majority of the popular vote to receive all of the state’s electoral votes. Each state could adopt the kind of runoff that New Hampshire used in the past, or instant runoff voting. There is no need for a multistate compact. If only two or three states had used runoffs, or instant runoff voting, in 2016—for example, Florida and Michigan, or the three Rust Belt states of Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania—and if Clinton had won those runoffs, then she would have been president. In the future, it might be a Republican candidate who prevails in runoffs in pivotal states but would lose using plurality winner-take-all. States with ballot initiatives can use them to require majority rule for appointing electors as long as they leave the specific details to legislation.

The Jeffersonian Electoral College in the Twenty-First Century

2020 ◽  
pp. 110-118
Author(s):  
Edward B. Foley
Keyword(s):  
First Century ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Electoral College ◽  
Rust Belt ◽  
Hillary Clinton ◽  
Donald Trump ◽  
Jacksonian Era ◽  
2016 Election ◽  
Winner Take All ◽  
Take All

The 2016 election is, at a minimum, problematic from a Jeffersonian perspective, like 1992, and may have been another systemic malfunction, like 2000. Donald Trump received 107 of his 304 electoral votes in states where he won less than 50 percent of the popular vote—failing to achieve the kind of compound majority-of-majorities consistent with the Jeffersonian vision of how the system should work. 2016 illustrates the system’s inability to handle third-party and independent candidates, like Gary Johnson and Jill Stein, an inability caused by the addition of plurality winner-take-all in the Jacksonian era. It is unknowable whether Trump or Hillary Clinton would have won runoffs in the three pivotal Rust Belt states of Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania. But if Clinton had won runoffs there (and in the states where she was only a plurality winner), then she would have won the Electoral College with an appropriately Jeffersonian majority-of-majorities.

scholarly journals Swing States, the Winner-Take-all Electoral College, and Fiscal Federalism

2017 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher M. Duquette ◽  
Franklin G . Mixon ◽  
Richard J. Cebula
Keyword(s):  
Fiscal Federalism ◽  
Electoral College ◽  
Winner Take All ◽  
Take All

Electoral College Winner's Advantage

2009 ◽  
Vol 42 (02) ◽  
pp. 353-357 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack E. Riggs ◽  
Gerald R. Hobbs ◽  
Todd H. Riggs
Keyword(s):  
Presidential Election ◽  
Electoral College ◽  
Popular Vote ◽  
Electoral Vote ◽  
Winner Take All ◽  
Take All ◽  
Margin Of Victory

Compared to the popular vote, the Electoral College magnifies the perception of the winner's margin of victory. In this analysis, a method of quantifying the magnitude of the advantage given to the winner due to the Electoral College's two electoral vote add-on and winner-take-all methodologies is presented. Using the electoral vote distribution that was present in the 2000 U.S. presidential election, we analyzed one million random two-candidate simulated elections. The results show that the net effect of the Electoral College is to give the winning candidate an average 29.45 electoral vote advantage per election due to the winner-take-all methodology. This winner's advantage includes an average 0.42 electoral vote advantage given to the winner per election due to the two electoral vote add-on.

The 3/2's Rule in Presidential Campaigning

1974 ◽  
Vol 68 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven J. Brams ◽  
Morton D. Davis
Keyword(s):  
District Of Columbia ◽  
Electoral College ◽  
Popular Vote ◽  
Presidential Candidates ◽  
Main Effect ◽  
Optimal Allocations ◽  
Presidential Campaigning ◽  
Zero Sum ◽  
Winner Take All ◽  
Take All

The purpose of this article is to assess the effect of the winner-take-all feature of the Electoral College on the allocation of resources by candidates to the states in a presidential campaign. Conceptualizing the campaign as a two-person zero-sum infinite game, it is found that the main effect of this feature is to induce candidates to allocate campaign resources roughly in proportion to the 3/2's power of the electoral votes of each state, which creates a peculiar bias that makes voters living in the largest states as much as three times as attractive campaign targets as voters living in the smallest states. Empirically, it is shown that the 3/2's rule explains quite well the time allocations of presidential and vice-presidential candidates in the 1960, 1964, 1968, and 1972 campaigns; for presidential campaigns in 1976 and 1980, optimal allocations are indicated for all fifty states and the District of Columbia. A comparison with optimal allocations under a system of direct popular-vote election of the president reveals that such a system would be less susceptible to manipulative strategies than the Electoral College as well as being compatible with the egalitarian principle of “one man, one vote.”

The Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative Electoral Incentives

2001 ◽  
Vol 91 (1) ◽  
pp. 225-239 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alessandro Lizzeri ◽  
Nicola Persico
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Electoral College ◽  
The Public ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Pork Barrel ◽  
College System ◽  
Winner Take All ◽  
Take All

Politicians who care about the spoils of office may underprovide a public good because its benefits cannot be targeted to voters as easily as pork-barrel spending. We compare a winner-take-all system—where all the spoils go to the winner—to a proportional system—where the spoils of office are split among candidates proportionally to their share of the vote. In a winner-take-all system the public good is provided less often than in a proportional system when the public good is particularly desirable. We then consider the electoral college system and show that it is particularly subject to this inefficiency. (JEL D82, L15)

scholarly journals Avoiding silent opera: the ‘grand’ performing right at work in nineteenth century Paris

2021 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 183-200
Author(s):  
Staffan Albinsson
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
Primary Data ◽  
Financial Success ◽  
National Assembly ◽  
Paris Opera ◽  
Box Office ◽  
Opera House ◽  
Winner Take All ◽  
New System ◽  
Take All

AbstractThe music industry has been made possible through performing rights based on a law introduced by the post-revolutionary French national assembly in 1791. However, it took until the mid-nineteenth century until a system of royalty collection was established in France (and another half a century or more in other countries). In France, this new system for non-dramatic performing rights was preceded by royalty regulations in theatres. This study describes how nineteenth century composers were compensated for their work in the Paris Opera through this performing right for drama, known as the ‘grand right’. The tariff-based compensation method had been put in place by a royal réglement in 1713. It created a classic winner-take-all phenomenon in which composers such as Auber, Meyerbeer, and Halévy thrived in the nineteenth century. A contributing fact was the opera house programming which, contrary to the programming of today, favoured new pieces. ‘Grand opéras’ were à la mode and they contributed to the financial success of their composers. However, these operas eventually lost their attraction. In 1884, the Paris Opera adopted a compensation system based on a percentage of box office revenues. The study is based on primary data for 1810–1866.

An Exploration of Alternatives

2020 ◽  
pp. 135-154
Author(s):  
Edward B. Foley
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Amendment ◽  
Electoral College ◽  
Foreseeable Future ◽  
Popular Vote ◽  
Winner Take All ◽  
Take All

A constitutional amendment to replace the Electoral College is not feasible, at least for the foreseeable future. The National Popular Vote Interstate Compact plan, as a method of nullifying the Electoral College without a constitutional amendment, is a seriously flawed idea for several reasons, the most significant of which is that it would award the presidency to a plurality winner of the national popular vote. Thus, if there were a three-way split in the popular vote—for example, 43 percent, 42 percent, 15 percent—the compact would award the presidency to the candidate with 43 percent even though 57 percent of the electorate strongly opposed that candidate. The fear that an independent candidate could cause Trump’s re-election even when roughly 60 percent of voters oppose this, because the opposition is split among two (or more) candidates, applies equally to the existing system and the compact. Litigation is unlikely to eliminate plurality winner-take-all. States must act.

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