Fellow Travelers

2019 ◽  
pp. 150-172
Author(s):  
Palle Yourgrau

A synoptic account of the ontology of death developed in the book is offered, according to which the dead (and the unborn) are seen to be nonexistent objects that possess being but lack existence, and that retain their essential natures as living beings that are now no longer actually alive. This approach has points of contact with the approaches offered by several other philosophers, only one of whom, however, is engaged in the philosophy of death, which helps to confirm the thesis that philosophers of death have failed to take into account the insights achieved in other branches of philosophy. The approach taken by each of these “fellow travelers”—Niall Connolly, Timothy Williamson, Nathan Salmon, Kit Fine, David Kaplan, Derek Parfit—is considered, in turn, and the places where there is agreement, and also disagreement, with the views advanced in this study are delineated.

2019 ◽  
pp. 14-37
Author(s):  
Palle Yourgrau

Kant famously declared that existence is not a (real) predicate. This famous dictum has been seen as echoed in the doctrine of the founders of modern logic, Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell, that existence isn’t a first-order property possessed by individuals, but rather a second-order property expressed by the existential quantifier. Russell in 1905 combined this doctrine with his new theory of descriptions and declared the paradox of nonexistence to be resolved without resorting to his earlier distinction between existence and being. In recent years, however, logicians and philosophers like Saul Kripke, David Kaplan, and Nathan Salmon have argued that there is no defensible reason to deny that existence is a property of individuals. Kant’s dictum has also been re-evaluated, the result being that the paradox of nonexistence has not, after all, disappeared. Yet it’s not clear how exactly Kripke et al. propose to resolve the paradox.


2019 ◽  
pp. 173-194
Author(s):  
Palle Yourgrau

It is pointed out that some important issues in ethics, for example, abortion, contraception, and questions about future populations, require a rational metaphysical foundation, whereas, all too often, philosophers working in the field of ethics have based their accounts on shaky metaphysical premises in which no consideration is made of the unborn and the dead, whose reality has been too quickly dismissed. Some examples of this fact are offered, including the curious example of Derek Parfit, who has argued both for and against taking into consideration, in one’s ethical deliberations, possible persons who might or might not exist, depending on the decisions we make. The study concludes with an examination the role one’s attitude to death plays in the good life by looking at the example of how Socrates famously approached the prospect of his own death.


2020 ◽  
pp. 141-148
Author(s):  
Bob Hale

Two arguments for S5 being the logic of metaphysical modality are favourably discussed: one from the logic of absolute necessity, one from Timothy Williamson. Two arguments against S5 being the logic of metaphysical modality are discussed and rebuffed: one from Nathan Salmon against S4, and thereby S5, being the logical of metaphysical modality; and one from Michael Dummett against the B principle for metaphysical modality. In the Appendix, some comments are offered on the logics of ‘true in virtue of the nature of’, and its relation to logical necessity. It is argued that the logic both of ‘true in virtue of the nature of x’ and of essentialist logical necessity is S5.


Author(s):  
Palle Yourgrau

The dead are gone. They count for nothing. Yet if we count the dead, their number is staggering. And they account for most of what’s great about civilization. Compared to the greatness of the dead, the accomplishments of the living are paltry. Which is it then: are the dead still there to be counted or not? And if they’re still there, where, exactly, is “there”? We’re confronted with the ancient paradox of nonexistence bequeathed us by Parmenides. The mystery of death is the mystery of nonexistence. A successful attempt to provide a metaphysics of death, then, must at the same time resolve the paradox of nonexistence. That is the aim of this study. At the same time, the ontology of death, i.e. of ceasing to exist, must serve as an account of birth, i.e. coming to exist, and the primary thesis of this book is that this requires expanding one’s ontology beyond existence and nonexistence to include what underlies both, namely, “being.” The dead, along with the unborn, are nonexistent objects which retain their identity before, during, and after their transition to, and from, existence. The nonexistent are what are “there” that can be counted when we count the dead. The dead and the unborn are thus the same kind of beings as the living. What separates the living from the dead is only their existence.


2019 ◽  
pp. 38-72
Author(s):  
Palle Yourgrau

Since, as most philosophers of death agree, death implies nonexistence (the corpse is not the dead person, who is essentially a living being), it follows that the mystery of death is due in no small part to the paradox of nonexistence. Failing to recognize this, philosophers of death have failed to engage with the literature on the logic of nonexistence, and thus have failed to appreciate Russell’s 1902 distinction between existence and being in relation to the ontology of death. By contrast, it is maintained here that the dead are nonexistent objects that have forfeited their existence, but not their being. More generally, one of the principal goals of this study is to draw attention to the fact that the left hand of philosophy has ignored what the right hand is doing. The mysteries of death and nonexistence, which should have been approached together, have been kept apart.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 103-111
Author(s):  
Andrey K. Babin ◽  
Andrew R. Dattel ◽  
Margaret F. Klemm

Abstract. Twin-engine propeller aircraft accidents occur due to mechanical reasons as well as human error, such as misidentifying a failed engine. This paper proposes a visual indicator as an alternative method to the dead leg–dead engine procedure to identify a failed engine. In total, 50 pilots without a multi-engine rating were randomly assigned to a traditional (dead leg–dead engine) or an alternative (visual indicator) group. Participants performed three takeoffs in a flight simulator with a simulated engine failure after rotation. Participants in the alternative group identified the failed engine faster than the traditional group. A visual indicator may improve pilot accuracy and performance during engine-out emergencies and is recommended as a possible alternative for twin-engine propeller aircraft.


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