S5 as the Logic of Metaphysical Modality: Two Arguments for and Two Arguments against

2020 ◽  
pp. 141-148
Author(s):  
Bob Hale
Keyword(s):  
Logical Necessity ◽  
Metaphysical Modality ◽  
Absolute Necessity ◽  
Michael Dummett ◽  
Timothy Williamson ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Nathan Salmon

Two arguments for S5 being the logic of metaphysical modality are favourably discussed: one from the logic of absolute necessity, one from Timothy Williamson. Two arguments against S5 being the logic of metaphysical modality are discussed and rebuffed: one from Nathan Salmon against S4, and thereby S5, being the logical of metaphysical modality; and one from Michael Dummett against the B principle for metaphysical modality. In the Appendix, some comments are offered on the logics of ‘true in virtue of the nature of’, and its relation to logical necessity. It is argued that the logic both of ‘true in virtue of the nature of x’ and of essentialist logical necessity is S5.

Assertion: The Constitutive Norms View

2019 ◽  
pp. 57-73
Author(s):  
Mona Simion ◽  
Christoph Kelp
Keyword(s):  
Final Section ◽  
Speech Act ◽  
Knowledge Norm ◽  
Knowledge Account ◽  
Timothy Williamson ◽  
Constitutive Norms ◽  
Constitutive Norm ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Philosophical Questions ◽  
Better Than

Two important philosophical questions about assertion concern its nature and normativity. This article defends the optimism about the constitutive norm account of assertion and sets out a constitutivity thesis that is much more modest than that proposed by Timothy Williamson. It starts by looking at the extant objections to Williamson’s Knowledge Account of Assertion (KAA) and argues that they fail to hit their target in virtue of imposing implausible conditions on engaging in norm-constituted activities. Second, it makes a similar proposal and shows how it does better than the competition. It suggests that Knowledge Norm of Assertion (KNA) is not constitutive of the speech act of assertion in the same way in which rules of games are constitutive, and thus KAA comes out as too strong. The final section embarks on a rescue mission on behalf of KAA; it puts forth a weaker, functionalist constitutivity thesis. On this view, KNA is etiologically constitutively associated with the speech act of assertion, in virtue of its function of generating knowledge in hearers.

Philosophy’s Future as a Problem-Solving Discipline

2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 292-312
Author(s):  
Richard Kamber ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Problem Solving ◽  
Experimental Philosophy ◽  
Philosophical Problem ◽  
Michael Dummett ◽  
Timothy Williamson ◽  
Philosophical Methods

Scientists often reach provisional agreement solutions to problems central to their disciplines, whereas philosophers do not. Although philosophy has been practiced by outstanding intellects for over two thousand years, philosophers have not reached agreement, provisional or otherwise, on the solution or dissolution of any central philosophical problem by philosophical methods. What about philosophy’s future? Until about 1970, philosophers were generally optimistic. Some pinned their hopes on revolution in methodology, others on reform of practice. The case for gradual reform still finds articulate advocates in philosophers like Michael Dummett and Timothy Williamson, but many philosophers today suspect that perennial disagreement may be inescapable. I consider three explanations for the inescapability of perennial disagreement—Richard Rorty’s relativism, Colin McGinn’s skepticism, and Nicholas Rescher’s pluralism—and find each wanting. I argue that a better explanation is the resistance of philosophers to commit, as scientists do, to formulating testable theories and collecting data to help decide between competing theories. I close by proposing that experimental philosophy, a movement still in its infancy, holds the promise of reuniting philosophy with science and moving philosophers closer to agreement on the solution of its central problems.

Fellow Travelers

2019 ◽  
pp. 150-172
Author(s):  
Palle Yourgrau
Keyword(s):  
Derek Parfit ◽  
Kit Fine ◽  
Timothy Williamson ◽  
David Kaplan ◽  
Nonexistent Objects ◽  
The Dead ◽  
Nathan Salmon

A synoptic account of the ontology of death developed in the book is offered, according to which the dead (and the unborn) are seen to be nonexistent objects that possess being but lack existence, and that retain their essential natures as living beings that are now no longer actually alive. This approach has points of contact with the approaches offered by several other philosophers, only one of whom, however, is engaged in the philosophy of death, which helps to confirm the thesis that philosophers of death have failed to take into account the insights achieved in other branches of philosophy. The approach taken by each of these “fellow travelers”—Niall Connolly, Timothy Williamson, Nathan Salmon, Kit Fine, David Kaplan, Derek Parfit—is considered, in turn, and the places where there is agreement, and also disagreement, with the views advanced in this study are delineated.

scholarly journals Model-Theoretic Accounts of Logical Consequence - Themes from Etchemendy

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Kasper Højbjerg Christensen
Keyword(s):  
Standard Model ◽  
Model Theory ◽  
Logical Consequence ◽  
Kripke Semantics ◽  
Logical Necessity ◽  
Representational Model ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
In Virtue Of

<p>This thesis is a discussion and continuation of a project started by John Etchemendy with his criticism of Tarski's account of logical consequence. To this end the two central concepts of the thesis are those of an interpretational and representational model-theoretic account of logical consequence, respectively.  The first chapter introduces Etchemendy's criticism of Tarski's account of logical consequence, a criticism which turns essentially on an interpretation of Tarski according to which his proposed account gives rise to a purely interpretational model-theoretic account of logical consequence. Consequently there must be a representational aspect to our model-theoretic definition of logical consequence.  The second chapter introduces Etchemendy's notion of logical consequence: that of being truth preserving in virtue of the semantics of the involved terms. While this notion is representational, we argue that Etchemendy's notion of a categorematic treatment of terms reintroduces an interpretational aspect back into the model theory. The chapter investigates the resulting notion, compares it to other notions in the literature, and presents certain results that can be proved, under certain conditions, about this notion in relation to the notion of being truth preserving in virtue of the semantics of all terms.  Chapter three of the thesis is concerned with the question of how a standard model, seen as a domain and an interpretation function, manages to capture the different notions of model-theoretic consequence. As we explain, this question is most pressing when we want our models to both represent and interpret, and we will present a theory which allows us to see the models as both representing non-actual possibilities as well as provide interpretations for the terms.  The fourth chapter applies the lessons of the preceeding chapters to argue that Kripke Semantics can be seen as capturing the notion of being truth preserving in all possibilities under all interpretations of the non-logical terminology in the case where our language is augmented with an operator, ⃞, to represent logical necessity. We will argue this point by contrasting it with, though not necessarily disagreeing with, claims made by various authors to the effect that Kripke Semantics is not the appropriate semantics when our language contains an operator for logical necessity.</p>

Comments on Fabrice Correia’s “More on the Reduction of Necessity to Essence”

2020 ◽  
pp. 466-470
Author(s):  
Kit Fine
Keyword(s):  
Logical Necessity ◽  
Metaphysical Necessity ◽  
Original Contribution ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Conceptual Necessity ◽  
Conceptual Foundations ◽  
In Virtue Of

I have long admired Fabrice Correia’s work on the conceptual foundations of metaphysics and his present chapter is a characteristically judicious and original contribution to the subject. He is principally concerned with certain reductive theses that I propounded in “Essence and Modality” (EM; 1994). These are that a metaphysical necessity is a proposition true in virtue of the nature of all objects, that a conceptual necessity is a proposition true in virtue of the nature of all concepts, and that a logical necessity is a proposition true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts. Given that there are different notions of what it is for a proposition to be true in virtue of the nature of some objects, Correia’s interest is in what notion or notions of this sort might underwrite these various reductive claims and, to this end, he is prepared in principle to relinquish any other desiderata one might wish to impose upon these notions....

Anti-realist Semantics: the Role of Criteria

1982 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
pp. 225-248
Author(s):  
Crispin Wright
Keyword(s):  
Good Evidence ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Traditional View ◽  
Theoretical Physics ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Michael Dummett ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
In Virtue Of

§I. Anti-realism of the sort which Michael Dummett has expounded takes issue with the traditional idea that an understanding of any statement (here, declarative sentence) is philosophically correctly analysed as involving grasp of conditions necessary and sufficient for its truth. Many kinds of statement to which, as we ordinarily think, we attach a clear sense would have to be represented, according to this tradition, as possessing verification-transcendent truth-conditions; if true that is to say, they would be so in virtue of circumstances of a type transcending our range of possible awareness. Exactly where to draw the boundaries of our possible awareness might be controversial; but there is clearly no being aware, in the relevant sense, of the kind of state of affairs which would make true a generalization of theoretical physics, an assertion about James II weight on his twenty-eighth birthday, a claim about what would have happened if Edward Heath had not sought a fresh mandate during the miners' strike, or—from your point of view—the statement that my left ear aches. In each of these kinds of case the traditional view, while granting that we (or you) cannot experience the truth-conferring states of affairs as such, would nevertheless credit us with a clear conception of the type of thing they would be. To be sure, there is then no possibility of a straightforward construal of this conception as a recognitional capacity. But the traditional view tends to conceal from itself the problematic status which the alleged grasp of truth-conditions therefore assumes by working with the picture that the ‘conception’ is indirectly recognitional, that it issues in a cluster of unproblematic recognitional capacities; in particular, the ability to recognize what is or is not good evidence for the relevant statement and the ability to recognize its logical relations to other statements.

Anti-realist Semantics: the Role of Criteria

1982 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
pp. 225-248 ◽  
Author(s):  
Crispin Wright
Keyword(s):  
Good Evidence ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Traditional View ◽  
Theoretical Physics ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Michael Dummett ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
In Virtue Of

§I. Anti-realism of the sort which Michael Dummett has expounded takes issue with the traditional idea that an understanding of any statement (here, declarative sentence) is philosophically correctly analysed as involving grasp of conditions necessary and sufficient for its truth. Many kinds of statement to which, as we ordinarily think, we attach a clear sense would have to be represented, according to this tradition, as possessing verification-transcendent truth-conditions; if true that is to say, they would be so in virtue of circumstances of a type transcending our range of possible awareness. Exactly where to draw the boundaries of our possible awareness might be controversial; but there is clearly no being aware, in the relevant sense, of the kind of state of affairs which would make true a generalization of theoretical physics, an assertion about James II weight on his twenty-eighth birthday, a claim about what would have happened if Edward Heath had not sought a fresh mandate during the miners' strike, or—from your point of view—the statement that my left ear aches. In each of these kinds of case the traditional view, while granting that we (or you) cannot experience the truth-conferring states of affairs as such, would nevertheless credit us with a clear conception of the type of thing they would be. To be sure, there is then no possibility of a straightforward construal of this conception as a recognitional capacity. But the traditional view tends to conceal from itself the problematic status which the alleged grasp of truth-conditions therefore assumes by working with the picture that the ‘conception’ is indirectly recognitional, that it issues in a cluster of unproblematic recognitional capacities; in particular, the ability to recognize what is or is not good evidence for the relevant statement and the ability to recognize its logical relations to other statements.

scholarly journals Model-Theoretic Accounts of Logical Consequence - Themes from Etchemendy

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Kasper Højbjerg Christensen
Keyword(s):  
Standard Model ◽  
Model Theory ◽  
Logical Consequence ◽  
Kripke Semantics ◽  
Logical Necessity ◽  
Representational Model ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
In Virtue Of

<p>This thesis is a discussion and continuation of a project started by John Etchemendy with his criticism of Tarski's account of logical consequence. To this end the two central concepts of the thesis are those of an interpretational and representational model-theoretic account of logical consequence, respectively.  The first chapter introduces Etchemendy's criticism of Tarski's account of logical consequence, a criticism which turns essentially on an interpretation of Tarski according to which his proposed account gives rise to a purely interpretational model-theoretic account of logical consequence. Consequently there must be a representational aspect to our model-theoretic definition of logical consequence.  The second chapter introduces Etchemendy's notion of logical consequence: that of being truth preserving in virtue of the semantics of the involved terms. While this notion is representational, we argue that Etchemendy's notion of a categorematic treatment of terms reintroduces an interpretational aspect back into the model theory. The chapter investigates the resulting notion, compares it to other notions in the literature, and presents certain results that can be proved, under certain conditions, about this notion in relation to the notion of being truth preserving in virtue of the semantics of all terms.  Chapter three of the thesis is concerned with the question of how a standard model, seen as a domain and an interpretation function, manages to capture the different notions of model-theoretic consequence. As we explain, this question is most pressing when we want our models to both represent and interpret, and we will present a theory which allows us to see the models as both representing non-actual possibilities as well as provide interpretations for the terms.  The fourth chapter applies the lessons of the preceeding chapters to argue that Kripke Semantics can be seen as capturing the notion of being truth preserving in all possibilities under all interpretations of the non-logical terminology in the case where our language is augmented with an operator, ⃞, to represent logical necessity. We will argue this point by contrasting it with, though not necessarily disagreeing with, claims made by various authors to the effect that Kripke Semantics is not the appropriate semantics when our language contains an operator for logical necessity.</p>

scholarly journals Thought Experiments and Knowledge of Metaphysical Modality

2016 ◽  
Vol 93 (4) ◽  
pp. 525-547
Author(s):  
Benoit Gaultier
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Thought Experiment ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Metaphysical Modality ◽  
Timothy Williamson ◽  
The World ◽  
Ordinary Knowledge

According to Timothy Williamson, philosophy is not a mere conceptual investigation and does not involve a specific cognitive ability, different in nature from those involved in acquiring scientific or ordinary knowledge of the world. The author holds that Williamson does not succeed in explaining how it is possible for us to acquire, through thought experiments, the type of knowledge that, according to him, philosophy predominantly aims to acquire—namely, knowledge of metaphysical modality. More specifically, the author considers in detail Russell’s stopped clock and Locke’s prince and the cobbler thought experiments, and argues that Williamson has not shown how the kind of thought experiment of which they are instances, and which is typically encountered in philosophy, can be the instrument of knowledge of metaphysical modality that he takes this kind of thought experiment to be. More positively, the author advances that the modal conclusions of such thought experiments are drawn through conceptual investigation.

What Is an Institution?

2007 ◽  
pp. 5-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Searle
Keyword(s):  
Physical Structure ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Collective Intentionality ◽  
Institutional Facts ◽  
Institutional Fact ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Creation ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Typical Point

The author claims that an institution is any collectively accepted system of rules (procedures, practices) that enable us to create institutional facts. These rules typically have the form of X counts as Y in C, where an object, person, or state of affairs X is assigned a special status, the Y status, such that the new status enables the person or object to perform functions that it could not perform solely in virtue of its physical structure, but requires as a necessary condition the assignment of the status. The creation of an institutional fact is, thus, the collective assignment of a status function. The typical point of the creation of institutional facts by assigning status functions is to create deontic powers. So typically when we assign a status function Y to some object or person X we have created a situation in which we accept that a person S who stands in the appropriate relation to X is such that (S has power (S does A)). The whole analysis then gives us a systematic set of relationships between collective intentionality, the assignment of function, the assignment of status functions, constitutive rules, institutional facts, and deontic powers.

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