Conclusion

Author(s):  
Daniel Maria Klimek

The concluding section considers the epistemological, hermeneutical, and ontological contributions that the Medjugorje studies make to debates on religious and mystical experiences. Epistemologically, the Medjugorje studies show that it is erroneous to perceive all extraordinary religious experiences through a reductionist interpretation that denigrates such experiences into a natural or pathological understanding. Hermeneutically, the Medjugorje studies show how important it is to have a method that is inductive and constructive-relational in terms of approaching religious experiences. Ontologically, the Medjugorje studies point to the limitations of a metaphysic of naturalism in interpreting reality and to the need to consider other modes of understanding, beyond a narrow materialist or rationalist worldview. The Medjugorje studies bring much-needed reconciliation between the worlds of science and religion, as in Medjugorje immense scientific study has been used to support the integrity of religious visionaries and their extraordinary religious experiences.

PhaenEx ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 38-51
Author(s):  
Iris Hennigfeld

In my paper, I want to focus not only on the notions of givenness and evidence in Husserl’s phenomenology, but also on phenomenological work “after” Husserl. I will elaborate on how these phenomenological key ideas can methodologically be made fruitful, especially for an investigation into religious phenomena. After giving an outline of Husserl’s notions of (self-)givenness, evidence, and original intuition (I), I want to portray key elements of Steinbock’s discovery of a generative dimension in Husserl’s phenomenology and show how this approach correlates to the field of religious experiences (II). Subsequently, I want to focus on Steinbock’s book Phenomenology of Mysticism: The Verticality of Religious Experience (2007), and elucidate how for Steinbock different historical examples of mystical experiences can serve as leading clues for the revelation of the essential, eidetic structures of “vertical experiences”—or, phenomenologically speaking, the eidos of religious experience, which turns out to be “epiphany” (III). The expression “verticality,” as opposed to “horizontality,” denotes the existential and dynamic dimension of experiences which are oriented toward a new height (religiously or morally) “beyond” ourselves.


Author(s):  
Ruth Anna Putnam

The American William James was motivated to philosophize by a desire to provide a philosophical ground for moral action. Moral effort presupposes that one has free will, that the world is not already the best of all possible worlds, and, for maximum effort, according to James, the belief that there is a God who is also on the side of good. In his famous, often misunderstood paper ‘The Will to Believe’, James defended one’s right to believe in advance of the evidence when one’s belief has momentous consequences for one’s conduct and success, and a decision cannot be postponed. One such belief is the belief in objective values. Generally, a belief is objective if it meets a standard independent of the believer’s own thought. In morals, objective values emerge from each person’s subjective valuings, whatever their psychological source, when these valuings become the values of a community of persons who care for one another. Still, even in such a community there will be conflicting claims, and the obligations generated by these claims will need to be ranked and conflicts resolved. James’ solution is to say that the more inclusive claim – the claim that can be satisfied with the lesser cost of unsatisfied claims – is to be ranked higher. This is not to be mistaken for utilitarianism: James is not a hedonist, and it is not clear what he means by the most inclusive claim. A concern for others makes sense only if there are others who inhabit with us a common world. Pragmatism, which he co-founded with C.S. Peirce, and radical empiricism provide James’ answer to those who would be sceptics concerning the existence of the common-sense world. Pragmatism is both a theory of meaning and a theory of truth. As a theory of meaning it aims at clarity; our thoughts of an object are clear when we know what effects it will have and what reactions we are to prepare. As a theory of truth, pragmatism makes clear what is meant by ‘agreement’ in the common formula that a belief is true if it agrees with reality. Only in the simplest cases can we verify a belief directly – for example, we can verify that the soup is too salty by tasting it – and a belief is indirectly verified if one acts on it and that action does not lead to unanticipated consequences. Contrary to a widespread misunderstanding, this does not mean that James defines truth as that which is useful; rather, he points out that it is, in fact, useful to believe what is true. James rejects the dualism of common sense and of many philosophers, but he is neither a materialist nor an idealist, rather what he calls a ‘pure experience’ (for example, your seeing this page) can be taken as an event in your (mental) history or as an event in the page’s (physical) history. But there is no ‘substance’ called ‘pure experience’: there are only many different pure experiences. You and I can experience the same page, because an event in your mental history and an event in mine can be taken to be events in the same physical history of the page; James may even have been tempted to say that a pure experience can be taken to belong to more than one mental history. According to James, pragmatism mediates the so-called conflict between science and religion. James took religious experiences very seriously both from a psychologist’s perspective and as evidence for the reality of the divine.


Author(s):  
Daniel Maria Klimek

The chapter considers the ideological biases that have formed in academic culture against taking mystical experiences and similar phenomena seriously. An in-depth analysis of Ann Taves’s “naturalistic” approach to religious experiences shows how seemingly “neutral” secular approaches, while criticizing metaphysical hermeneutics, are not free of their own metaphysical and philosophical assumptions. The work of several scholars from various fields, theologian John Milbank, historian Brad Gregory, religion scholar Robert Orsi, psychiatrist Bruce Greyson, is considered in articulating how one worldview, a philosophy of secular naturalism, guides academic discourse across disciplines at the expense of another worldview, an ontology of the supernatural. The myth of “secular neutrality” is exposed by these scholars. The chapter concludes with the call for cultivating a new method for the study of religious experiences, an interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary approach that considers the potential integrity of extraordinary religious experiences and a more holistic understanding of knowledge.


Author(s):  
Terence Keel

Chapter 5 provides a summary of the major claims of the book. It also explains how the conflict thesis for representing the relationship between science and religion fails to capture how Christian intellectual history has been key to the formation of the race concept in modern science. Citing recent data from a 2015 Pew Research Survey, this chapter argues that the conflict thesis remains a fixture in the minds of Americans, which has consequences for shifting public perceptions about the assumed secularity of the scientific study of race. It closes with a call for recognizing that the scientific study of race is involved in providing a solution to the existential dilemma of defining what it means to be human. This solution is neither value-free nor detached from the cultural and religious inheritance that has fastened itself to the work of Euro-American scientists who study race.


2011 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-117 ◽  
Author(s):  
STEPHEN S. BUSH

AbstractThe constructivist position, that mystical experiences are determined by the experiencer's cultural context, is now more prevalent among scholars of religion than the perennialist position, which maintains that mystical experiences have a common core that is cross-culturally universal. In large part, this is due to the efforts of Wayne Proudfoot in his widely accepted book,Religious Experience. In this article, I identify some significant unresolved issues in Proudfoot's defence of constructivism. My aim is not to defend perennialism, but to specify some objections to the constructivist thesis that constructivists need to address more adequately.


1992 ◽  
Vol 75 (2) ◽  
pp. 568-570 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. A. Persinger

Vingiano's (1992) challenge concerning the relationship between right hemisphericity, low self-esteem, mystical experiences, and religiosity can be clarified by the concept of vectorial hemisphericity. Ontogenetic intrusions of right-hemispheric processes into the left hemispheric sense of self should be experienced most frequently as an apprehensive “presence” that results in lower self-esteem. Because transient above-normal left-hemispheric activity enhances positive affect and the sense of self, concurrent right-hemispheric intrusions are experienced as mystical experiences. Religiosity would be the consequence of persistent above-normal left-temporofrontal activation that encourages the delusion. Hence, extreme conditions, such as left lateralized temporal-lobe epileptic foci, encourage both mystical and religious experiences.


1998 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 235-251 ◽  
Author(s):  
JEROME GELLMAN

This paper replies to Evan Fales' sociological explanation of mystical experience in two articles in Religious Studies vol. 32 (143–63 and 297–313). In these papers Fales applies the ideas of I. M. Lewis on spirit possession to show how mystical experiences can be accounted for as vehicles for the acquisition of political power and social control. The rebuttal of Fales contains three main elements: (a) the presentation of specific examples of theistic mystical experience from Christianity and Judaism which provide counter-examples to Fales' theory; (b) the presentation of some general objections to its plausibility; and (c) an argument for the conclusion that the burden of proof lies with naturalistic, reductionist explanations of religious experiences rather than with theistic interpretations of those experiences.


Author(s):  
Daniel Maria Klimek

Cognitive sciences like neuroscience have been used to study more common, cultivated, or induced religious experiences like states of meditation or prayer; however, in Medjugorje, it is the first time that spontaneous and extraordinary mystical experiences, such as visionary experiences in the form of Marian apparitions, have been studied by neuroscience as they are transpiring: pointing to Medjugorje’s uniqueness and importance. The chapter systematically considers the prominent interpretations of scholars who have tried to re-diagnose and explain extraordinary religious experiences as cases of epileptic seizures, hysteria, or hallucination, observing the work of Jean-Martin Charcot, Michael P. Carroll, Richard Dawkins, Andrew Newberg, and concluding with an analysis of Sigmund Freud’s interpretation of the “oceanic feeling” (i.e., mystical experience) and of his understanding of religion as a neurosis. The chapter explains how the scientific studies in Medjugorje substantially challenge the universal applicability of such reductionist theories.


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