James, William (1842–1910)

Author(s):  
Ruth Anna Putnam

The American William James was motivated to philosophize by a desire to provide a philosophical ground for moral action. Moral effort presupposes that one has free will, that the world is not already the best of all possible worlds, and, for maximum effort, according to James, the belief that there is a God who is also on the side of good. In his famous, often misunderstood paper ‘The Will to Believe’, James defended one’s right to believe in advance of the evidence when one’s belief has momentous consequences for one’s conduct and success, and a decision cannot be postponed. One such belief is the belief in objective values. Generally, a belief is objective if it meets a standard independent of the believer’s own thought. In morals, objective values emerge from each person’s subjective valuings, whatever their psychological source, when these valuings become the values of a community of persons who care for one another. Still, even in such a community there will be conflicting claims, and the obligations generated by these claims will need to be ranked and conflicts resolved. James’ solution is to say that the more inclusive claim – the claim that can be satisfied with the lesser cost of unsatisfied claims – is to be ranked higher. This is not to be mistaken for utilitarianism: James is not a hedonist, and it is not clear what he means by the most inclusive claim. A concern for others makes sense only if there are others who inhabit with us a common world. Pragmatism, which he co-founded with C.S. Peirce, and radical empiricism provide James’ answer to those who would be sceptics concerning the existence of the common-sense world. Pragmatism is both a theory of meaning and a theory of truth. As a theory of meaning it aims at clarity; our thoughts of an object are clear when we know what effects it will have and what reactions we are to prepare. As a theory of truth, pragmatism makes clear what is meant by ‘agreement’ in the common formula that a belief is true if it agrees with reality. Only in the simplest cases can we verify a belief directly – for example, we can verify that the soup is too salty by tasting it – and a belief is indirectly verified if one acts on it and that action does not lead to unanticipated consequences. Contrary to a widespread misunderstanding, this does not mean that James defines truth as that which is useful; rather, he points out that it is, in fact, useful to believe what is true. James rejects the dualism of common sense and of many philosophers, but he is neither a materialist nor an idealist, rather what he calls a ‘pure experience’ (for example, your seeing this page) can be taken as an event in your (mental) history or as an event in the page’s (physical) history. But there is no ‘substance’ called ‘pure experience’: there are only many different pure experiences. You and I can experience the same page, because an event in your mental history and an event in mine can be taken to be events in the same physical history of the page; James may even have been tempted to say that a pure experience can be taken to belong to more than one mental history. According to James, pragmatism mediates the so-called conflict between science and religion. James took religious experiences very seriously both from a psychologist’s perspective and as evidence for the reality of the divine.

Prospects ◽  
1987 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. 293-320
Author(s):  
Michael Lopez

Recent literary theory has questioned the way we look at a text as the product of an individual “author.” But for William James—who was, like Emerson, a thoroughly nineteenth-century mind-any utterance, even the most complicated philosophical system, was at bottom the expression of the personality of the author. The history of philosophy, James believed, was in essence the “clash of human temperaments,” and temperament seems to gravitate to either the “idealistic” or what James denned as the “materialistic” pole:Idealism will be chosen by a man of one emotional constitution, materialism by another.… [I]dealism gives to the nature of things such kinship with our personal selves. Our own thoughts are what we are most at home with, what we are least afraid of. To say then that the universe is essentially thought, is to say that I myself, potentially at least, am all. There is no radically alien corner, but an all-prevading intimacy. … That element in reality which every strong man of common-sense willingly feels there because it calls forth powers that he owns-the rough, harsh, sea-wave, north-wind element, the denier of persons, the democratizer-is banished because it jars too much on the desire for communication. Now, it is the very enjoyment of this element that throws many men upon the materialistic or agnostic hypothesis, as a polemic reaction against the contrary extreme. They sicken at a life wholly constituted of intimacy. There is an overpowering desire at moments to escape personality, to revel in the action of forces that have no respect for our ego, to let the tides flow, even though they flow over us. The strife of these two kinds of mental temper will, I think, always be seen in philosophy. Some men will keep insisting on the reason, the atonement, that lies in the heart of things, and that we can act with; others, on the capacity of brute fact that we must react against.


2008 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 177-185 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susanna L. Blumenthal

The authors of these insightful and stimulating commentaries all express skepticism about the role I assign to the Scottish Common Sense philosophy in my historical analysis, though their reasons for doing so are strikingly at odds with each other. Sarah Seo and John Witt concede the importance of the Common Sense philosophy at a theoretical level, even as they call attention to certain “competitor theories” of human nature, noting that these darker views of the self may have proved more influential in the framing of the American constitution. However, they go on to contend that all of this philosophizing about the human mind was actually of little consequence in the everyday adjudication of civil and criminal liability, as judges found more practical means of resolving “the otherwise intractable questions of moral responsibility” left unanswered by the Scottish philosophy. John Mikhail, by contrast, appears to be far more sanguine about the tractability of these questions, from a philosophical standpoint, going so far as to suggest that they were more or less resolved by British moralists before the Scottish Common Sense school even came into being. What truly set the Common Sense philosophers apart from their predecessors, and ought to determine their place in this history of ideas, Mikhail concludes, was the manner in which they contributed to the scientific process of tracing out the inner structure and innate capacities of “the moral mind”—a topic that is currently of intense interest in the cognitive and brain sciences.


2014 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-259 ◽  
Author(s):  
SEAN DYDE

AbstractThis article examines the history of two fields of enquiry in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Scotland: the rise and fall of the common sense school of philosophy and phrenology as presented in the works of George Combe. Although many previous historians have construed these histories as separate, indeed sometimes incommensurate, I propose that their paths were intertwined to a greater extent than has previously been given credit. The philosophy of common sense was a response to problems raised by Enlightenment thinkers, particularly David Hume, and spurred a theory of the mind and its mode of study. In order to succeed, or even to be considered a rival of these established understandings, phrenologists adapted their arguments for the sake of engaging in philosophical dispute. I argue that this debate contributed to the relative success of these groups: phrenology as a well-known historical subject, common sense now largely forgotten. Moreover, this history seeks to question the place of phrenology within the sciences of mind in nineteenth-century Britain.


2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 171
Author(s):  
Nasiruddin .

<p><em>Discuss the issue of science and religion, we would come to the discussion of the interaction of science and religion at the same time meaningful symbolic level. In geneologis we can see the complexity of the interaction of religion and science in the debate between faith dimension textually understood and understand the marginalizing science because of religious doctrine often considered incompatible with the common sense arguments. Though science and religion born from the same womb that is the "experience" of humanity. Up to now, there are still strong presumption in the wider community who say that "religion" and "science" are two entities that can not be met. Both have their respective areas, separated from each other, both in terms of formal object-material, research methods, criteria of truth, the role played by scientists.</em></p><p><strong><em> </em></strong></p><p><strong><em>Key words</em></strong><em> : Integration, </em><em>interaction</em><em> </em><em>of science and religion</em><em></em></p>


2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-40
Author(s):  
Béla Mester

Abstract The topic of the present article is the destruction of the common sense tradition linked to the urbanity of philosophy, which had deep roots both in the European and Hungarian traditions. This destruction was based on Hegelian ideas by János Erdélyi as an argument of the greatest philosophical controversy of the Hungarian philosophical life in the 1850s. In Erdélyi’s argumentation, the turn from the supposed urbanity to the supposed rurality of the common sense has a fundamental role. The idea of the rurality of the common sense has an influence on the Hungarian intellectual history of the next centuries, as well.


2018 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-73
Author(s):  
Paul Redding

AbstractOne prominent feature of analytic metaphysics in the second half of the twentieth century was the revival of metaphysical debate over modality, and in this paper I suggest that a particular position that emerged within this debate, ‘modal actualism’, bears a striking resemblance to the way that Hegel discusses modal notions in the final chapter of Book 2 of the Science of Logic, ‘Wirklichkeit’ or ‘Actuality’. Modal actualists opposed David Lewis’s counter-intuitive claims about the existence of alternate possible worlds, and aimed to reconcile the reality of alternate possibilities with the common-sense idea of the actual world as all there is. Like Hegel in the chapter ‘Actuality’, they thus argue that possible alternatives to the actual world must, somehow, exist within the actual world. Here I approach these issues via the ideas of John N. Findlay who, in the 1950s, had attempted to reintroduce Hegel into an Anglophone philosophical culture, but who also influenced the later development of modal actualism via his influence on the modal logician, Arthur Prior. Like certain actualists, Findlay distinguished between two modes of predication in order to distinguish, but relate, judgements about the actual from those about the possible. This predicative dualism is strikingly similar to the way Hegel distinguishes two types of predication in his treatment of judgement in Book 3 of the Science of Logic. Reading Hegel’s dualistic account of judgement structure against this background enables us to see how it was meant to provide a logical framework for the ‘actualist’ metaphysics he earlier sketched in the chapter, ‘Actuality’.


Author(s):  
Philip Kitcher

William James envisaged pragmatism as a reform of philosophy. Like his fellow pragmatist John Dewey, he held that the history of philosophy often shows how questions, once relevant and exciting, inspire a sequence of derivative and ever-narrower inquiries, in which the original point becomes lost. To read James’s pragmatism in this way distinguishes it from the reforming efforts of the logical positivists, whose concerns with “cognitive significance” and “meaningful language” neither he nor Dewey shared. Viewed in this light, James’s version of Charles Sanders Peirce’s pragmatic maxim, his theory of truth, and his interest in reconciling the claims of science and religion take on new significance. His discussions point toward a road less traveled, one that twentieth-century Anglophone philosophy did not take.


2013 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 83-100
Author(s):  
Adam Mesiarkin

The concept of Slavic solidarity is taken by some political or ideological movements as obviosity. In its later tradition it is based mainly on the language and cultural solidarity emphasised by romantic (and earlier) literature. The very origin of closeness of nowadays (and historical) Slavic nations is there traced to assumed bio-historical root. From the perspective of scientific analysis the examination of the whole term Slav should be done at first place. In medieval Polish and Bohemian chronicles we can observe a growing phenomenon of the identification with wider name Slav and with the common history of Slavs as well. In the Chronicle of Greater Poland, followed by chronicle of the Pulkava of Radenin and with the work of Jan Długosz was defined the model of biblical genealogy of Slavic nations. The solidarity was based mainly on the perception of similar languages and geographical closeness and was transformed in a literary way into blood relations. Reflection of this literary concept in foreing affairs is hardly to declare, but some dynastical representatives used the intelectual concept in a literary propaganda of their goals.


Author(s):  
Colwyn Trevarthen ◽  
Aline-Wendy Dunlop ◽  
Jonathan Delafield-Butt

Our contributors offer inspiring stories—from a psychology of early childhood and teaching experience that appreciates the spiritual values that young children affirm in shared enjoyment of life. We confirm that every child has motives of an affectionate learner, seeking companions for an active and imaginative life. Each boy and girl, with their individual characters and interests, wants to take part in the ‘common sense’ world of a community with its treasured moral and artistic values, sharing joy in the discovery of a natural and meaningful world. They do not just need to be taught how to use material possessions, and how to obey social and cultural rules. We seek principles for early education and care to support responsive teachers in the years before formal school begins. Scotland’s kindergarten tradition and its contemporary policies for transition to school offer a distinguished history of curriculum reformation, following the spirit of the child.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document