“We Will be Two Ismails”

2017 ◽  
pp. 315-326
Author(s):  
Isabella Ginor ◽  
Gideon Remez
Keyword(s):  
Prime Minister ◽  
Soviet Leader ◽  
Henry Kissinger ◽  
Richard Nixon ◽  
Anwar Sadat

The failure of US President Richard Nixon to make good on his post-reelection vow to press Israel was evident when Prime Minister Golda Meir, visiting Washington in the spring of 1973, offered no concessions in return for continued arms supply. Reports from “Mossad spy” Ashraf Marwan and others of imminent Egyptian attack led Israel to call a costly alert in April; US statesman Henry Kissinger took credit for getting the Soviets to make Egyptian President Anwar Sadat delay the offensive until after a summit with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in California in June. But evidence shows that the ultimate timing of a joint offensive with Syria in October had already been determined. While Sadat’s envoy Hafez Ismail impressed Kissinger with peace proposals in Washington, War Minister Ahmed Ismail shuttled between Moscow and Damascus to coordinate war plans and weapons supplies. At the summit in August, Brezhnev took a belligerent stance. The USSR’s support for the impending attack was exemplified by delivery of Scud missiles with Soviet operators, and participation in the final councils of war.

Deception-on-Nile, July 1972

2017 ◽  
pp. 281-292
Author(s):  
Isabella Ginor ◽  
Gideon Remez
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Long Range ◽  
Henry Kissinger ◽  
The Us ◽  
Anwar Sadat ◽  
Double Agent ◽  
The Cold War

This chapter continues description of the disinformation campaign mounted by Egypt and the USSR to implant the deceptive impression that all Soviet advisers were expelled by President Anwar Sadat in July 1972 as part of a rift with Moscow and a shift to the US camp in the Cold War. The advisers were recalled en masse to Cairo, which had to be noticed by foreign observers, but soon were unobtrusively reposted to Egyptian formations where they continued preparations for an anti-Israeli offensive and induction of offensive weapons such as long-range bombers which supposedly had been refused by the Soviets. Among other components of this deception, supposed Israeli spy Ashraf Marwan is documented as falsely advising an MI6 agent that all Soviets were gone and Egypt would revert to procurement of British weapons – which reinforces evidence that he was actually an Egyptian double agent. US statesman Henry Kissinger assisted the ruse by feigning surprise at Sadat’s move, which had actually been coordinated with him at the Moscow Summit, and concealing this from others in the administration as well as from Israel.

Collapse of the Consensus and the Struggle for Coherence, 1969–1970

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Cameron
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
The United States ◽  
Ballistic Missile ◽  
Defense System ◽  
Missile Defense ◽  
Henry Kissinger ◽  
Richard Nixon ◽  
The Us ◽  
Ballistic Missile Defense ◽  
Nuclear Arms Control

This chapter shows how Richard Nixon and his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, were forced to change their strategy for nuclear arms control based on the collapse of the US congressional consensus behind nuclear superiority. Nixon entered office with strong convictions on the importance of nuclear superiority for supporting the United States’ national security commitments. Nixon also saw US technological advantages in ballistic missile defenses as one of the main bargaining chips to cap the growth of Soviet offensive forces at the upcoming Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. This strategy for détente was thrown into disarray, however, when Congress signaled its lack of support for a new ballistic missile defense system and the strategy of nuclear superiority. Nixon and Kissinger then changed tack, attempting to conclude a quick arms limitation agreement through backchannel negotiations with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. This initiative failed, weakening the American hand at the formal talks.

The Nixon Years

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry Riley
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
National Security ◽  
Financial Resources ◽  
Food Aid ◽  
Henry Kissinger ◽  
White House ◽  
War Of Independence ◽  
Richard Nixon ◽  
Policy Goals ◽  
National Security Adviser

The administration of President Richard Nixon presents several examples of how Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, used food aid as a tool to advance foreign policy goals that Congress was attempting to foreclose. This chapter discusses two such examples: (1) food aid to Thailand in 1971, intended to free other financial resources in support of Southeast Asian military purchases, and (2) White House intervention in food aid decisions involving East Pakistan/Bangladesh and India in the months after Pakistani leader General Yahya Kahn unleased military reprisals against East Pakistan that led to the latter’s war of independence and a consequent flood of millions of East Pakistani refugees into India. Nixon’s support of Yahya Kahn and reluctance to assist India and the food aid-related repercussions of that support are described in this chapter.

Jockeying and Posturing

2017 ◽  
pp. 255-262
Author(s):  
Isabella Ginor ◽  
Gideon Remez
Keyword(s):  
Henry Kissinger ◽  
Anwar Sadat

Through the spring of 1972, US adviser Henry Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin continued “back channel” discussion of the Soviet offer to withdraw regular forces from Egypt as part of and interim settlement with Israel. Meanwhile, Egyptian crews completed training for operation of the SAM array that the Soviet personnel had manned, which enabled beginning a handover that would ease political difficulties caused for Egyptian President Anwar Sadat by these troops’ presence. Around a visit by Sadat to Moscow in April and a subsequent one to Egypt by Soviet Defense Minister Andrey Grechko, reports were spread about discord due to Soviet denial of Egyptian demands for offensive weapons. In fact, cooperation continued, including MiG-25 flights over Sinai to provide intelligence for a future offensive; renewed Israeli attempts to intercept them failed.

Mideast Peace: The Best of Chances

Worldview ◽  
1978 ◽  
Vol 21 (6) ◽  
pp. 14-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Bruzonsky ◽  
Joseph Sisco
Keyword(s):  
Prime Minister ◽  
State Department ◽  
The State ◽  
Critical Position ◽  
Labor Party ◽  
Important Time ◽  
Anwar Sadat

AbstractWhen you served in the State Department, did you ever envision that within a few years we would have either Menachem Begin as the Israeli prime minister or an Anwar Sadat recognizing Israel in a dramatic visit to Jerusalem?I never assumed that the situation would develop in such a way that the Likud party would supplant the Labor party in the leadership of Israel. But I think a more interesting response to your question is that Menachem Begin himself never expected to be prime minister. I spoke with him shortly after he became prime minister and we focused, very briefly, on the matter. He had been in opposition twenty-nine years and now found himself in this very critical position at a very important time.

The United States and the Kurds: A Cold War Story

2010 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 63-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas Little
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Henry Kissinger ◽  
Covert Action ◽  
Richard Nixon ◽  
Iraqi Kurdistan ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Kurdish Issue ◽  
The U.S

In a prolonged quest for independence after 1945, Kurdish nationalists reportedly sought help from U.S. officials who viewed the Kurdish issue through a Cold War prism and who regarded the Kurds as querulous mountain tribes useful primarily in keeping the Soviet Union and its Arab clients off balance. Recently declassified documents shed new light on three key episodes in this story: first, the secret encouragement provided by Washington to Kurds opposed to Iraq's Abdul Karim Qassim, who tilted toward Moscow after seizing power in 1958; second, the covert action launched by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger in Iraqi Kurdistan after Saddam Hussein allied himself with the USSR in 1972; and third, the half-hearted U.S. attempts to foment regime change in Iraq in the early 1990s. In each case, the U.S. government stirred up anti-Arab resentments among the Kurds, helped ignite an insurrection, and then pulled the plug when events spiraled out of control. U.S. duplicity plus Kurdish factionalism equaled tragedy in the mountains of Kurdistan.

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