Paradoxes of the 30s Soviet Discourse: From the Biblical Metaphor to the Ideology Representation of the Leader

The study first raised the question of using biblical metaphors in the process of establishing Soviet ideology and creating a cult of the leader of the Soviet people. Authors tested the story “Blizzard” by Georgian writer Shalva Dadiani in the context of Georgian cultural mentality and studied the ideology function of the biblical metaphor “The Pillar of Light” in the discourse of Georgian Soviet prose. An analysis of the text proved that in Georgian culture, the basic concepts-metaphors of Christian Doctrine were an effective weapon of Soviet propaganda. At Bible the “The Pillar of Fire”, “The Pillar of Cloud” and “The Pillar of Light” are theophany – the manifestations of the presence of the God. The biblical metaphor transformed into an ideology representation of the Soviet Leader and in the text of the Shalva Dadiani this is an allegory of the New Messiah – Stalin. As a result, with the help of biblical metaphors were formed a new ideological concept (the Soviet leader is the Messiah of the New Doctrine) and the new metaphorical model of Soviet reality. Thus, by transferring the basic values of the traditional Christian conceptual sphere to the Soviet ideological one, a new ideological concept is created and a new metaphorical model of Soviet reality is formed. This achieved a double goal: the inviolability of the Soviet ideologeme was confirmed on an emotional level, and at the same time the respect and trust in the Church that had been carried for many generations was undermined – it was transferred to the new teaching and its adherents.

Self-Government in Late 1980s Czechoslovakia: The Slovak Philosopher Miroslav Kusý against the Communist Party1

Self-government is one of the most popular terms in left-wing political thought. In the second half of the twentieth century, it was used and discussed both in Western liberal democracies and in the communist bloc. The Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev used this notion from the mid-1980s onwards, forming part of his wider policy of perestroika. Although the Czechoslovak leaders were not interested in political reforms and were largely sceptical about economic changes, the Soviet example resonated with the public and impacted on official discussion in Czechoslovakia. In this context, the Czechoslovak parliament adopted the Act on State Enterprise in July 1988, which was preceded by the discussion of the Proposal on the Act on State Enterprise (1987). This article draws attention to Czechoslovak dissident milieus and the response to the parliament’s proposal. It focuses on the Slovak philosopher Miroslav Kusý (1931-2019), who articulated the most substantial critique of the official plans. While accepting the principle of self-government, he argued that the proposal was subject to fundamental misinterpretations. In assessing his arguments, the article traces a particular intervention within the wider debates on state socialism in the 1980s.

Tony goes out into the world: The official travels abroad of the President of Czechoslovakia, Antonín Novotný (1953–68)

The long-term First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and later also President of the Republic, Antonín Novotný (1904–75), was popularly known as “Nice Tony”. As a communist politician and statesman, Novotný was well known as a great disciple and follower of Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev, famous for his personal and very contact-oriented diplomacy. The main contours of several of Novotný's official visits have already been analysed from political and diplomatic history perspectives. Based on archival research and available memoirs, this article tries to reconstruct the still non-visible and unknown view of transport history and, consequently, traveling and tourism history. It outlines the general contours and several aspects of V.I.P. communists’ international travels on the cases of several trips abroad which took place during the 1950s and 1960s of the Cold War era.

The Image of N. M. Yadrintsev in the Post-war Soviet Press

Цель статьи — реконструировать образ Н. М. Ядринцева на страницах периодической печати 1950–1980-х годов. Актуальность исследования заключается в изучении формирования коллективной идентичности через обращение к историческим личностям, их биографиям и образам. На основе коммеморации значимых для сообщества исторических личностей формируется чувство общности, которое способствует сплочению его членов. Предметом исследования стало изучение мемориализации Н. М. Ядринцева на страницах советской периодической печати. Автор приходит к выводам об устойчивости образа Н. М. Ядринцева на страницах прессы, о появлении новых характеристик образа лидера сибирского областничества, возникших в результате цензурных ограничений и потребностей социальных групп советского общества второй половины ХХ века. The aim of the article is to reconstruct the image of N. M. Yadrintsev on the pages of the periodical press in the 1950s–1980s. The relevance of the research is accounted for by the fact that it investigates the development of collective identity through the study of prominent historical figures, their biographies and images. By commemorating socially significant historical figures, a nation increases its national awareness and integrity. The object of the research is the investigation of N. M. Yadrintsev’s image as represented on the pages of the Soviet printed media. The author underlines the continuous appearance of N. M. Yadrintsev’s image on the pages of the Soviet printed media. The author states that in the second half of the 20th century, due to constraints imposed by censorship and the needs of different social groups there appeared new characteristics of an image of a Soviet leader in Siberia.

Los Cuatro Generales

This chapter looks at Marshal Tito's power in the secret sphere that was based on the revolutionary cadres from the Spanish Civil War. It describes Tito's own four Spanish generals, namely Enrique Líster Forján, Juan Modesto, Antonio Cordon, and José Manuel Tagüeña Lacorte. It also talks about General Líster, who was born in Cuba but went to the Soviet Union to receive military training in 1932. The chapter discusses Moscow's accusation that Tito was repatriating important cadres after the defeat of the Republican army and about 440,000 people crossed the Pyrenees. It explains that the 1944 Churchill–Stalin Agreement sealed the fate of revolution in Europe as the Soviet leader ordered all the guerrillas to demobilize.

Operation “Denver”

This second part of a two-part article moves ahead in showing how the East German Ministry for State Security (Stasi) came to play a key role in the disinformation campaign launched by the Soviet State Security Committee (KGB) in 1983 regarding the origins of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). The KGB launched the campaign itself, but in the mid-1980s it sought to widen the effort by enlisting the cooperation of intelligence services in other Warsaw Pact countries, especially the Stasi. From the autumn of 1986 until November 1989, the Stasi played a central role in the disinformation campaign. Despite pressure from the U.S. government and a general inclination of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to curtail the campaign by the end of 1987, both the KGB and the USSR's official Novosti press agency continued until 1989 to spread false allegations that HIV was a U.S. biological weapon. Even after the KGB curtailed its disinformation in 1989, the Stasi continued to disseminate falsehoods, not least because it had successfully maintained plausible deniability regarding its role in the campaign. The Stasi worked behind the scenes to support the work of Soviet–East German scientists Jakob Segal and Lilli Segal and to facilitate dissemination of the Segals’ views in West Germany and Great Britain, especially through the leftwing media, and to purvey broader disinformation about HIV/AIDS by attacking U.S. biological and chemical weapons in general.

Turkish Grand National Assembly and Azerbaijani relations in the national struggle period (1920-1923)

In this study, the political relations between the Atatürk Era, the Turkish Grand National Assembly and Azerbaijan are analyzed. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, the Turkish Grand National Assembly was established under the leadership of Great Leader Mustafa Kemal Pasha Atatürk. Historical developments between Turkey and the historical importance of the study period and brother country Azerbaijan are discussed in depth. Azerbaijan Soviet leader Neriman Nerimanov’s rational and logical real politics of the Soviet leader Vladimir Ilyich Lenin Russia Period to persuade him to help Turkey are examined on the basis of the archive records.

19. The Decline of the Cold War, 1985–9

This chapter examines the decline of the Cold War during the period 1985–9. It begins with a discussion of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s ‘new diplomacy’, a more flexible, less ideological foreign policy based on his belief that ‘a less confrontational stance towards the outside world would provide greater security than endless rearming’. It then considers Gorbachev’s reforms, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty signed in December 1987 by Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan, and US–Soviet relations under George H. W. Bush and Gorbachev. It also analyses the end of the Cold War in less developed countries such as Afghanistan, Angola, and Cambodia, before concluding with an assessment of the demise of Soviet communism in Eastern Europe.

Joseph Stalin and the development of Tank Forces of the Red Army in the 1930’s - early 1940’s

The author attempts to analyze the totality of ideas and opinions of I.V. Stalin on the development of tank weapons in the 1930s. Documents of RGASPI and RGVA archives were used as the sources. Influenced by a series of ‘military alarms,’ Stalin began to closely engage with issues of tank construction in the late 1920s, and initiated a large-scale program for equipping the Red Army with tanks. The program was to ensure the military-technical superiority of the USSR over its likely opponents, with the goal to compensate for the overall backlog. As the USSR was unable to create its own modern tanks, in 1930 the Soviet leadership purchased several dozen military vehicles abroad. Stalin personally controlled the procurement process, often intervening in the process; he also attended demonstrations of tests vehicles and decided on the number of tanks that were to be produced. At the same time he closely followed the technical innovations in foreign armies. The study of Stalin’s interest in tanks reveals that in the early 1930s, the Soviet leader thought of the tank weapon as an ‘asymmetrical alternative’ to overcome the broader gap in preparation for war. The present article analyses how Stalin read the documents that were sent to him; this analysis demonstrates that Stalin was more likely to seek confirmation for his existing views than to actually use the documents for coming to new conclusions. In general, Stalin’s ideas and opinions on tank issues were based on political, economic and logical considerations rather than on military expertise. One case in point is his support for M.N. Tukhachevskii when the latter called for the massive production of surrogate tanks based on tractors. In the mid-1930s, when the army had already received thousands of new tanks, Stalin shifted his emphasis from issues of equipment to the quality of the personnel, while at the same time demanding a simplification of machinery down to the level of a ‘crewman with skills that are just medium or even lower.’ But on the eve of the war, the Soviet leader again returned to the need for a qualitative and numerical growth of armored forces. Finally, Stalin analysed how tank forces were used during the Winter War against Finland and in the first years of war in Europe, but he remained unable to assess the strike potential of this weapon and its role in the future war with Nazi Germany.