Access to Basic Goods

2020 ◽  
pp. 121-152
Author(s):  
Sophia Moreau

Chapter Four, “Access to Basic Goods,” turns to a third way in which discriminatory practices can wrong people: they can leave them without access to resources or social institutions that are “basic” in the sense that access to them is necessary for these people if they are to participate fully and equally in their society. The author explains that to identify a good as “basic” in this sense is not to claim that it is objectively good or that it is necessary for all groups in that society. The author argues that certain goods can be seen as basic only from the perspective of the person or group who lacks that good, and that it is therefore very important to look to the discriminatee’s particular situation, needs, and values. The chapter then explains the importance of this form of wrongful discrimination and gives examples of cases that are best understood in this way, including the fight for same sex marriage and for women’s freedom to breastfeed in public. The author also argues that there is a distinctive kind of wrongness involved when discrimination leaves someone without access to a basic good, different from the wrongs explored in other chapters of the book.

2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary Lilienthal

AbstractThis paper by-passes the various public tropes, such as “marriage equality”, and concentrates on determining whether or not a same-sex marriage law would be sophistically effective in Australia. It revives the ancient Greek sophistical rhetorical skill of proposing a law, and applies it as a critical context to the topic of legislating for same-sex marriage. The objective is to assess whether or not a same-sex marriage law will be effective in its legislative objects. It proposes to discuss whether the parliament could introduce such a law so that the law’s objects were achieved effectively in the public mind. Argument will try to show that introducing a law to create same-sex marriage would fail because of subsisting priestly legislation on the subject of marriage. Its two hypotheses are that the canon law and other English priestly legislation restrict the scope of marriage regulation, and marriage could not be re-defined to cover same-sex marriage. Sections of the paper examining the law historically employ the historiographical method of identifying underlying norms, the effect of which is occasional reverse chronologies. The article’s conclusion will assert that a statute for legal and duly registered same-sex marriage likely would be, according to sophistical rhetorical reasoning, a fiction misrepresenting the truth of the subsisting legal and social institutions of marriage.


2020 ◽  
pp. 23-48
Author(s):  
Sandra Patton-Imani

I draw on the voices of the mothers we interviewed to discuss the lived experience of citizenship exploring in particular, the ways a range of lesbian-headed families have been positioned in a context of inconsistent and swiftly changing laws regulating same-sex marriage and adoption. I consider citizenship and belonging through parents’ stories about interacting with social institutions (e.g., churches), government agencies (e.g., the Veteran’s Administration), state and federal laws governing marriage and domestic partnership, and the child welfare system (e.g., transracial adoption). I conclude with a structural critique of marriage as a patriarchal institution, grounded in the voices of mothers I spoke with. Through this discussion of citizenship, I explore the complexities of embracing a systemic criticism of marriage, while simultaneously desiring the legalization of same-sex marriage in order to gain access to family protections.


2011 ◽  
Vol 16 (1, 2 & 3) ◽  
pp. 2007
Author(s):  
Matthew Hennigar

For several years now, I have been doing work on litigation surrounding same-sex mar- riage (SSM), and when I present my research (both at conferences and informally over drinks), I am almost invariably asked how court decisions legalizing SSM1 will affect the laws against polygamy. As a recent article in the To- ronto Star observed,2 gay marriage is often seen as a “slippery slope” to polygamy; some argue that it opens the jurisprudential door to other fundamental challenges to the traditional, mo- nogamous definition of marriage.3 For example, it is true that the Supreme Court of Canada de- cisively rejected the government’s argument in the SSM cases that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms4 was not intended to revo- lutionize fundamental social institutions. Re- cent developments in British Columbia appear likely to put this contention to the test.


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