Perceptual Variation and Relativism

Author(s):  
John Morrison

There is variation in how people perceive colors and other secondary qualities. The challenge of perceptual variation is to say whose perceptions are accurate. According to Sextus, Protagoras’ response is that all of our perceptions might be accurate. As this response is traditionally developed, it is difficult to explain color illusion and color constancy. This difficulty is due to a widespread assumption called perceptual atomism. This chapter argues that, if we want to develop Protagoras’ response, we need to give up perceptual atomism. It ends with a brief sketch of an alternative called perceptual structuralism.

2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-62
Author(s):  
Adam Weiler Gur Arye

The paper focuses on Reid's unique epistemological distinction between the primary and the secondary qualities and examines it in relation to other facets of his philosophy: his stance vis-à-vis the scientific inquiries of secondary qualities; his aesthetics; his analysis of the perception of the primary quality of hardness; his theory of learning. An inquiry into the primary/secondary distinction which takes into account such a broad context will reveal it to be far more sophisticated, dynamic and flexible than an analysis of the distinction which solely takes into consideration the passages in which the Scottish philosopher directly and straightforwardly introduces it.


2020 ◽  
Vol 64 (5) ◽  
pp. 50411-1-50411-8
Author(s):  
Hoda Aghaei ◽  
Brian Funt

Abstract For research in the field of illumination estimation and color constancy, there is a need for ground-truth measurement of the illumination color at many locations within multi-illuminant scenes. A practical approach to obtaining such ground-truth illumination data is presented here. The proposed method involves using a drone to carry a gray ball of known percent surface spectral reflectance throughout a scene while photographing it frequently during the flight using a calibrated camera. The captured images are then post-processed. In the post-processing step, machine vision techniques are used to detect the gray ball within each frame. The camera RGB of light reflected from the gray ball provides a measure of the illumination color at that location. In total, the dataset contains 30 scenes with 100 illumination measurements on average per scene. The dataset is available for download free of charge.


2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 113-123
Author(s):  
G. I. Rozhkova ◽  
E. N. Iomdina ◽  
O. M. Selina ◽  
A. V. Belokopytov ◽  
P. P. Nikolayev

Author(s):  
Joshua Gert

This chapter presents an account of color constancy that explains a well-known division in the data from color-constancy experiments: So-called “paper matches” exhibit a much higher level of constancy than so-called “hue-saturation matches.” It argues that the visual representation of objective color is the representation of something associated with a function from viewing circumstances to color appearances. Thus, a relatively robust constancy in the representation of objective color is perfectly consistent with a relatively less robust level of constancy in color appearance. The account also endorses Hilbert’s idea that we can represent the color of the illumination on a surface as well as the color of the surface itself. Finally, the chapter addresses an objection to the hybrid view that notes our capacity to make very fine-grained distinctions between the objective colors of surfaces.


Author(s):  
Barry Stroud

This chapter challenges the notion that the colours we believe to belong to the objects we see are ‘secondary’ qualities of those objects. Such a notion is endorsed by John McDowell, who has explained why he thinks the author is wrong to resist it. McDowell recognizes that the author’s focus on the conditions of successfully unmasking the metaphysical status of the colours of things is a way of trying to make sense of whatever notion of reality is involved in it. However, the author argues that the notion of reality he is concerned with is ‘independent reality’, not simply the general notion of reality. He also contends that an exclusively dispositional conception of an object’s being a certain colour cannot account for the perceptions we have of the colours of things.


2012 ◽  
Vol 34 (5) ◽  
pp. 918-929 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Gijsenij ◽  
T. Gevers ◽  
J. van de Weijer

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