Reid's Primary/Secondary Quality Distinction in a Broad Context

2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-62
Author(s):  
Adam Weiler Gur Arye

The paper focuses on Reid's unique epistemological distinction between the primary and the secondary qualities and examines it in relation to other facets of his philosophy: his stance vis-à-vis the scientific inquiries of secondary qualities; his aesthetics; his analysis of the perception of the primary quality of hardness; his theory of learning. An inquiry into the primary/secondary distinction which takes into account such a broad context will reveal it to be far more sophisticated, dynamic and flexible than an analysis of the distinction which solely takes into consideration the passages in which the Scottish philosopher directly and straightforwardly introduces it.

Author(s):  
Lisa Downing

By focusing on the First Dialogue’s use of ‘sensible quality’ rather than ‘idea’, we can draw out some important morals that allow us to better appreciate its actual accomplishments. Whereas the Principles is an attack on materialist mechanism primarily via its representative theory of perception, the First Dialogue is an attack on materialist mechanism primarily via its primary/secondary-quality distinction. Viewing the First Dialogue in this light allows us to see it as more effective and insightful than we otherwise might, although it also requires us to acknowledge that Hylas is never as philosophically naïve as Berkeley sometimes seems to suggest.


1978 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 207-218
Author(s):  
Arthur R. Greenberg

In recent years renewed interest in Thomas Reid's philosophy has led to fruitful discussion of Reid's theories of sensation and perception. Although certain aspects of these topics can be discussed without setting out Reid's version of the primary-secondary quality distinction, the ultimate evaluation of Reid's work on both sensation and perception requires discussion of his views on primary and secondary qualities. Current Reid literature virtually ignores this important topic. This paper is an attempt to remedy this situation. In addition to setting out Reid's position on primary and secondary qualities I will discuss Reid's curious relation to the New Science of his day and will explain how Reid thought he could reintroduce the primary-secondary quality distinction despite Berkeley's attacks on the doctrine.In both of his major works, An Inquiry Into The Human Mind (1764), and Essays On The Intellectual Powers Of Man (1785), Thomas Reid was intent upon examining the philosophical problems of human knowledge. In the Inquiry perception received his exclusive attention. In the Essays other cognitive operations were examined as well. The impetus for these investigations was provided by Reid's negative assessment of the achievements of his philosophical predecessors.


2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 159-177 ◽  
Author(s):  
Randi Saloman

Dublin's Gresham Hotel, where Gabriel and Gretta Conroy end their evening in Joyce's most famous short story, has a fascinating history. It was founded in 1817 by Thomas Gresham, who began life as a foundling rescued from the steps of London's Royal Exchange and was thereby given the name of the Renaissance statesman who built that exchange. This sixteenth-century Thomas Gresham was even better known, however, for his eponymous ‘Gresham's Law’. Both Gresham's Law and the hotel setting and history enter into and help to shape ‘The Dead’. Questions of value and valuing suggested by Gresham's Law are shown to be more complicated than they initially appear, as they intersect with the various forms of hospitality traced in the story. The ‘secondary’ quality of the famous Dublin hotel (built by the second, unknown Thomas Gresham) underscores – and ultimately redeems – the theme of secondariness that runs through ‘The Dead’.


Dialogue ◽  
1984 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 281-303 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arnold I. Davidson ◽  
Norbert Hornstein

Recent interpretations of Locke's primary/secondary quality distinction have tended to emphasize Locke's relationship to the corpuscularian science of his time, especially to that of Boyle. Although this trend may have corrected the unfortunate tendency to view Locke in isolation from his scientific contemporaries, it nevertheless has resulted in some over- simplifications and distortions of Locke's general enterprise. As everyone now agrees, Locke was attempting to provide a philosophical foundation for English corpuscularianism and one must therefore look not only at the current scientific hypotheses but also at the nature of the philosophical foundation Locke was attempting to erect. In particular, Locke made an attempt, based on epistemological principles, to give a philosophical justification of atomistic corpuscularianism. Moreover, he was not content to give this justification post hoc—the epistemological foundation was prior to, and determined the framework for, the details of the correct scientific theory. Locke's epistemology made legitimate an atomistic theory, one making crucial use of the notion of solidity in the definition of the elementary particles, although it did not prejudge the details of this theory.


2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 47-76
Author(s):  
Elżbieta Łukasiewicz ◽  

2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorgen Sandemose

<p>In the course of the first section, I make an attempt to define the most important actual implications of the theme that the anthology in question sets out to explore. In the next, I give a sketch of the three different modes of movement of logical thought present in Hegel’s <em>Science of Logic</em>, of their interrelation, and make a general criticism of the way that theme is handled in the book. In the third section, I stress the importance of an adequate understanding of the structure of the categories with which Hegel’s logical investigation takes its beginning. In the course of the two following sections, the interrelation between the themes of Hegel’s subjective logic and Marx’s commodity analysis are put into focus. The concluding section limits itself to giving an overview of the quality of the book in question, adding some words on the political significance of such literature in a broad context.</p>


Author(s):  
Christopher A. Shrock

This chapter defends the interpretation of Reid put forth in Chapter 4. Reid's primary/secondary quality distinction is epistemic rather than metaphysical, conceptual rather than phenomenological, and causal in a loose and lawlike sense. Since such a reading is at odds with every other reading of Reid on this matter, rival interpretations receive extensive treatment as well.


2019 ◽  
pp. 260-310
Author(s):  
Peter S. Fosl

Chapter Seven undertakes to articulate Hume’s scepticism with regard to the third dimension of the Pyrrhonian Fourfold—technê. More particularly, the chapter examines the instruments he deploys against dogmatism, that is his technologies of doubt. The chapter devotes special attention to Hume’s sceptical arguments regarding the epistemic capacities of reason and the senses, especially in regard to the primary/secondary quality distinction and what Hume calls ‘false philosophy.’ The text argues that Hume is an entirely radical sceptic who refuses all epistemic and metaphysical claims, including those related to personal identity, the immateriality of the soul, hidden substances, energies, and powers, including the causal power. The chapter explains what exactly counts for Hume as dogmatism and what is not consistent with scepticism. The chapter explores the import to empiricism of Hume’s Copy Principle.


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