Conclusion

2021 ◽  
pp. 215-218
Author(s):  
Ann Whittle

The conclusion summarizes the book’s key themes and argument. In addition, the limits of the conclusion is highlighted. If the argument offered is correct, then contextualism is a foundational element within a theory of freedom and moral responsibility, but it is not a complete theory in and of itself. In particular, the theory leaves unresolved the question of what it is an agent deserves. Does an agent deserve blame in light of their wrongdoing? Are punitive sanctions appropriate? Despite these limitations, however, the significant implications of the argument for how we should go about thinking about these difficult questions are outlined.

2003 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 381-390 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gordon G. Sollars

Abstract:It has been suggested that a new form of moral responsibility, labeled “social products liability,” is relevant to business ethics. In particular, this kind of responsibility might justify recent legal claims against firearm manufacturers. This paper argues that, as it has been presented, social products liability must rest upon utilitarian considerations or on a deeper, more complete theory of moral responsibility. In the first case, a new form of responsibility seems unnecessary, since liability could be directly apportioned on utilitarian grounds. In the second case, proponents of social products liability face the tasks of presenting the more complete theory and then anchoring social products liability to it.


DeKaVe ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Arief Agung Suwasono

Television is a medium that delivers meaning through various type of text television conveys information that promotes moral responsibility and social solidarity. In spite of the fact that television is one of capitalism product, its programs can generate social commitment and solidarity reflecting human moral values.Keyword : Television, Fetisme


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammad Ali

This paper proposes a Gadenkan experiment named “Observer’s Dilemma”, to investigate the probabilistic nature of observable phenomena. It has been reasoned that probabilistic nature in, otherwise uniquely deterministic phenomena can be introduced due to lack of information of underlying governing laws. Through theoretical consequences of the experiment, concepts of ‘Absolute Complete’ and ‘Observably Complete” theories have been introduced. Furthermore, nature of reality being ‘absolute’ and ‘observable’ have been discussed along with the possibility of multiple realities being true for observer. In addition, certain aspects of quantum mechanics have been interpreted. It has been argued that quantum mechanics is an ‘observably complete’ theory and its nature is to give probabilistic predictions. Lastly, it has been argued that “Everettian - Many world” interpretation of quantum mechanics is very real and true in the framework of ‘observable nature of reality’, for humans.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
James R. Beebe

If a person requires a tissue donation in order to survive, many philosophers argue that whatever moral responsibility a biological relative may have to donate to the person in need will be grounded at least partially, if not entirely, in the biological relations the potential donor bears to the recipient. Such views tend to ignore the role played by a potential donor’s unique ability to help the person in need and the perceived burden of the donation type in underwriting such judgments. If, for example, a sperm donor is judged to have a significant moral responsibility to donate tissue to a child conceived with his sperm, we argue that such judgments will largely be grounded in the presumed unique ability of the sperm donor to help the child due to the compatibility of his tissues with those of the recipient. In this paper, we report the results of two main studies and three supplementary studies designed to investigate the comparative roles that biological relatedness, unique ability to help, and donation burden play in generating judgments of moral responsibility in tissue donation cases. We found that the primary factor driving individuals’ judgments about the moral responsibility of a potential donor to donate tissue to someone in need was the degree to which a donor was in a unique ability to help. We observed no significant role for biological relatedness as such. Biologically related individuals were deemed to have a significant moral responsibility to donate tissue only when they are one of a small number of people who have a relatively unique capacity to help. We also found that people are less inclined to think individuals have a moral responsibility to donate tissue when the donation is more costly to make. We bring these results into dialogue with contemporary disputes concerning the ethics of tissue donation.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
James R. Beebe

If a person requires an organ or tissue donation to survive, many philosophers argue that whatever moral responsibility a biological relative may have to donate to the person in need will be grounded at least partially, if not entirely, in biological relations the potential donor bears to the recipient. We contend that such views ignore the role that a potential donor’s unique ability to help the person in need plays in underwriting such judgments. If, for example, a sperm donor is judged to have a significant moral responsibility to donate tissue to a child conceived with his sperm, we think this will not be due to the fact that the donor stands in a close biological relationship to the recipient. Rather, we think such judgments will largely be grounded in the presumed unique ability of the sperm donor to help the child due to the compatibility of his tissues and organs with those of the recipient. In this paper, we report the results of two studies designed to investigate the comparative roles that biological relatedness and unique ability play in generating judgments of moral responsibility in tissue donation cases. We found that biologically related individuals are deemed to have a significant moral responsibility to donate tissue only when they are one of a small number of people who have the capacity to help.


1996 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 42-58
Author(s):  
Abdelwahab M. Elmessiri

EpilogueGeoffrey Chaucer’s ‘The Frankeleyn’s Tale” and Bertold Brecht’sThe Exception and the Rule seem to have very little in common. Chaucer’smedieval narrative poem tries to follow the norms of its genre andfulfiil the reader’s expectations, whereas Brecht’s modernist experimentalplay violates many of the rules of drama laid down by Aristotle and otherclassical critics. It deliberately shocks the reader out of any facile identificationwith the characters as well as any willing suspension of disbelief.But despite their many obvious differences, this study argues that theirsimilarities are quite relevant and significant. Both works deal with thethemes of human freedom, moral responsibility, and ability to transcend.These are among the major themes of literature throughout time-butthey have acquired particular poignancy in our modern time with the riseand gradual unfolding of what I term the “Paradigmatic sequence of secularization.”Since the terms “paradigm” and “secularism” are alreadyquite problematic, and to talk of “a paradigmatic sequence of secularization”is even more so, some kind of clarification and even redefinition isin order.ParadigmsWhen a critic singles out two literary works for comparison, thechoice is not guided by some universally established objective rules, butrather dictated by a certain set of assumptions, norms, criteria, biases, andso on. When he/she engages in the critical act itself, pointing out structuraland thematic relations (of similarity and dissimilarity), he/she does ...


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