Belief and Judgment
I develop an account of belief by way of discussing the following five interrelated truths: (i) to believe that p is to represent p as true; (ii) truth is a standard by which beliefs are assessed; (iii) a certain sense of the question ‘Why?’ has application to beliefs; (iv) beliefs are governed by the law of non-contradiction; and (v) a belief is the sort of thing one can bring to mind. To believe, I argue, is to represent a proposition as what one should represent as true. Paradigmatic beliefs (which I call judgments) are governed metaphysically, and not just normatively, by the law of non-contradiction. One cannot clearly and distinctly at once represent as true both a proposition and its contrary. I respond to a variety of objections to this position, including—at length—the objection that the account is undermined by the beliefs of non-human animals and human infants.