Temporal Neutrality and the Bias Toward the Future

2021 ◽  
pp. 85-114
Author(s):  
Samuel Scheffler

Many philosophers have held that rationality requires one to have an equal concern for all parts of one’s life. In the view of these philosophers, temporal neutrality is a requirement of rationality. Yet Derek Parfit has argued that most of us are not, in fact, temporally neutral. We exhibit a robust bias toward the future. Parfit maintains that this future-bias is bad for us, and that our lives would go better if we were temporally neutral. Like other neutralists, he also believes that the bias is irrational, however widespread and robust it may be. This article assesses these criticisms and offers a qualified defense of the bias toward the future.

Think ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 12 (35) ◽  
pp. 101-108
Author(s):  
Clement Dore

In the final chapter of his book, The View from Nowhere, the American philosopher, Thomas Nagel, writes as follows about death:We do not regard the period before we were born in the same way we regard the prospect of death, yet most of the things that can be said about death are equally true of the former. Lucretius thought this showed that it was a mistake to regard death as an evil. But I believe it is an example of a more general future-past asymmetry... [Derek] Parfit has explored the asymmetry in connection with other values such as... pain. The fact that a pain (of ours) is in prospect rather than in the past has a very great effect on our attitude toward it, and this effect cannot be regarded as irrational... [the former asymmetry] can't be accounted for in terms of some other difference between past and future nonexistence, any more than the asymmetry in the case of pain can be accounted for in terms of some other differences between past and future pains, which makes the latter worse than the former.Nagel is maintaining in this quote that it is rational for a person to view pains which he is apt to experience in the future in a manner different from the way in which he views pains which he has experienced in the past. Nagel is saying that it is rational for a person to think of his future pains as more undesirable than his past ones. And Nagel claims that there is a similar asymmetry between a rational person's attitude towards a past in which he did not exist and a time in the future when he will not exist. In Nagel's view, just as a rational person will think of pains which he will experience as more undesirable than pains which he had in the past, he will think of his not existing in the future as much more undesirable than his not having existed in the past.


2021 ◽  
pp. 31-66
Author(s):  
Ingmar Persson

In On What Matters Derek Parfit adopts Henry Sidgwick’s idea of a duality of practical reason consisting in there being personal reasons to care about our own well-being as well as moral reasons to care about everyone else’s well-being. But this sits ill with his well-known claim in Reasons and Persons that personal identity is not what matters. For this implies that were we to divide into two individuals, we would have the same reasons to care about these individuals as ourselves, though they are distinct from us. It is suggested that this is because we empathize with them in the same way as with ourselves in the future, ‘from the inside’, and that considerations of justice do not apply to them because their wills are too dependent on our wills.


2019 ◽  
Vol 70 (278) ◽  
pp. 178-198
Author(s):  
Bastian Steuwer

Abstract Derek Parfit famously argued that personal identity is not what matters for prudential concern about the future. Instead, he argues what matters is Relation R, a combination of psychological connectedness and continuity with any cause. This revisionary conclusion, Parfit argued, has profound implications for moral theory. It should lead us, among other things, to deny the importance of the separateness of persons as an important fact of morality. Instead, we should adopt impersonal consequentialism. In this paper, I argue that Parfit is mistaken about this last step. His revisionary arguments about personal identity and rationality have no implications for moral theory. We need not decide whether Relation R or personal identity contain what matters if we want to retain the importance of the separateness of persons.


1961 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
pp. 29-41
Author(s):  
Wm. Markowitz
Keyword(s):  

A symposium on the future of the International Latitude Service (I. L. S.) is to be held in Helsinki in July 1960. My report for the symposium consists of two parts. Part I, denoded (Mk I) was published [1] earlier in 1960 under the title “Latitude and Longitude, and the Secular Motion of the Pole”. Part II is the present paper, denoded (Mk II).


1978 ◽  
Vol 48 ◽  
pp. 387-388
Author(s):  
A. R. Klemola
Keyword(s):  

Second-epoch photographs have now been obtained for nearly 850 of the 1246 fields of the proper motion program with centers at declination -20° and northwards. For the sky at 0° and northward only 130 fields remain to be taken in the next year or two. The 270 southern fields with centers at -5° to -20° remain for the future.


Author(s):  
Godfrey C. Hoskins ◽  
Betty B. Hoskins

Metaphase chromosomes from human and mouse cells in vitro are isolated by micrurgy, fixed, and placed on grids for electron microscopy. Interpretations of electron micrographs by current methods indicate the following structural features.Chromosomal spindle fibrils about 200Å thick form fascicles about 600Å thick, wrapped by dense spiraling fibrils (DSF) less than 100Å thick as they near the kinomere. Such a fascicle joins the future daughter kinomere of each metaphase chromatid with those of adjacent non-homologous chromatids to either side. Thus, four fascicles (SF, 1-4) attach to each metaphase kinomere (K). It is thought that fascicles extend from the kinomere poleward, fray out to let chromosomal fibrils act as traction fibrils against polar fibrils, then regroup to join the adjacent kinomere.


Author(s):  
Nicholas J Severs

In his pioneering demonstration of the potential of freeze-etching in biological systems, Russell Steere assessed the future promise and limitations of the technique with remarkable foresight. Item 2 in his list of inherent difficulties as they then stood stated “The chemical nature of the objects seen in the replica cannot be determined”. This defined a major goal for practitioners of freeze-fracture which, for more than a decade, seemed unattainable. It was not until the introduction of the label-fracture-etch technique in the early 1970s that the mould was broken, and not until the following decade that the full scope of modern freeze-fracture cytochemistry took shape. The culmination of these developments in the 1990s now equips the researcher with a set of effective techniques for routine application in cell and membrane biology.Freeze-fracture cytochemical techniques are all designed to provide information on the chemical nature of structural components revealed by freeze-fracture, but differ in how this is achieved, in precisely what type of information is obtained, and in which types of specimen can be studied.


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