The Migrant Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights

Author(s):  
Marie-Bénédicte Dembour

Summarising a comprehensive review of six decades of case law published elsewhere, this chapter points out that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) often privileges state sovereignty over migrants’ rights. This often leads to a deficit in protection whose origin can be traced to the so-called ‘Strasbourg reversal’ and the historical creation of jurisprudential lines which, in time, result in intellectually logical but ethically objectionable findings by the Court. Case law related to situations where migrants are left to live in perpetual limbo and immigration detention are provided as illustration. The chapter ends by highlighting jurisprudential avenues which the Court could adopt in order to remedy the identified shortcomings.

Author(s):  
Ksenija Turković

The administrative detention of migrant children, and the conditions of deprivation of liberty, pose serious challenges to the realisation of their rights. The present chapter discusses the concept of vulnerability and the principle of the best interests of the child, and their legal consequences, for the effective respect, protection, and fulfilment of the human rights of migrant children in the context of immigration detention. In doing so, it gives a short overview of the developments in the Court’s case law related to detention of migrant children. Using the Court’s concepts of vulnerability, the best interests of the child, and circumscribed child’s autonomy, as well as taking inspiration from other international instruments and EU law, this chapter attempts to demonstrate where the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case law on the detention of migrant children in particular under Articles 3, 5, and 8 of the ECHR could grow further, and the opportunities for such growth, as well as the barriers to it.


2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 236-259 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lorena Bachmaier

The present study analyses the approach the European Court of Human Rights’ to negotiated criminal justice and plea agreements in its landmark case, Natsvlishvili v Georgia. At the sight of the US Supreme Court case law and the practice of plea bargaining in the United States, I will argue why the institutional context and other external elements should be taken into account to determine if the guilty plea system has become coercive. I will further question if the approach of the ECtHR, applying strictly the criteria set out by the US Supreme Court should be followed when defining European standards on plea agreements.


Author(s):  
María Díaz Crego

En febrero del año 2006, el TS modificaba la forma de cómputo de la redención de penas por el trabajo, regulada en el ya derogado Código Penal de 1973. Esa modificación tenía consecuencias muy importantes para algunos de los condenados bajo el imperio de ese Código, que vieron cómo se alargaba su tiempo de permanencia en prisión hasta en 15 años. Las relevantes consecuencias derivadas de la aplicación de la llamada «doctrina Parot» llevaron a muchos de los reclusos afectados ante el TC y el TEDH. Sin embargo, los pronunciamientos de estos dos tribunales han sido divergentes: si bien el TC ha estimado muy pocos de los recursos de amparo interpuestos, el TEDH parece haber rechazado de forma frontal la doctrina introducida por el TS. En este marco, el presente trabajo analiza las decisiones de estos dos tribunales y trata de determinar cómo deben actuar las autoridades españolas tras la condena a España en el caso Del Río Prada, a fin de resolver el problema de fondo planteado por la aplicación de la doctrina Parot a una gran cantidad de reclusos.In February 2006, the Spanish Supreme Court modified its case-law regarding some provisions of the abrogated Criminal Code of 1973 that allowed the early release of prisoners if they worked while serving their sentence and they demonstrated good conduct. This change in the Spanish Supreme Court case-law had relevant consequences for some convicted prisoners as it meant an important extension of imprisonment years. Many of the prisoners affected by this new case-law appealed against the decisions extending their time in prison before the Spanish Constitutional Court and, after that, before the European Court of Human Rights. In this context, the main aim of this paper is to analyse the decisions adopted by these Courts while reviewing the Spanish Supreme Court case law, and to determine what the Spanish authorities must do after the European Court decision in «Del Río Prada», the sole case in which the European Court has examined the Spanish Supreme Court case-law.


Author(s):  
Luis López Guerra

En estrecha conexión con la crisis económica, se ha presentado un considerable número de demandas ante el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos solicitando la protección de derechos económicos y sociales. Aún cuando el Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos se ocupa de los llamados derechos «de la primera generación», la jurisprudencia del Tribunal, a partir de Airey c. Irlanda ha mantenido que no existe una completa separación entre derechos civiles y derechos sociales. Aplicando esta jurisprudencia, el Tribunal, en los últimos años, ha emitido diversas sentencias en que se considera que los derechos del Convenio también imponen obligaciones a los estados en materias de relevancia económica y social, como la cuantía de las pensiones, el derecho a la vivienda familiar o el tratamiento de los inmigrantes.Closely related to the economic crisis, a considerable number of requests for protection of economic and social rights have been filed at the European Court of Human Rights. Although the European Convention on Human Rights addresses the so-called «first generation» rights, Court case law since Airey vs. Ireland has maintained that a complete separation of civil and social rights cannot be made. In applying that case law, over the last few years the Court has issued several judgments underscoring that Convention rights also impose obligations on the States in matters of economic and social relevance, such as the amount of pensions, the right to a family home or the treatment of immigrants.


Author(s):  
Francisco Javier García Roca

The established case-law of European Court of Human Rights on margin of national appretiation is one of the capital criteria for reviewing the decision made by national authorities after a superficial examination of the facts. Its application is very imprecise and discretionary, producing sometimes unpredictable, astonishing even contradictory effects. It corresponds more to the justice of case than a genuine general legal doctrine. Its current ground should be more in the considerable cultural pluralism of the peoples that take part of the Council of Europe than in the national (state) sovereignty, in view of the context of European integration, because the realities of the suppositions of fact should be integrated in the rights. But the Court itself and the scientific academic doctrine should make an effort in substituting this tool for other more accurate legal technique that may fulfil similar aims.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 (22) ◽  
pp. 38
Author(s):  
Hope Davidson

<p>Faced with the difficulty of reconciling the tensions between the need for treatment, and respecting patients’ rights, case law suggests that the courts in Ireland have tended to maintain a deferential approach to the medical profession and not to give voice to the significant rights protections set out in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) and instead view the legislation in this area, the Mental Health Act 2001 through a paternalistic prism. This has given rise to what seems at first glance to be the extraordinary logic in what is now the leading, and only, Irish Supreme Court case in the area, E.H. v Clinical Director St Vincent’s Hospital. This case states that a voluntary patient is not a voluntary patient in so far as one ordinarily understands the word. In the Supreme Court, Kearns J, said:</p><p><br />‘The terminology adopted in s.2 of the Act ascribes a very particular meaning to the term ‘voluntary patient’. It does not describe such a person as one who freely and voluntarily gives consent to an admission order.’</p><p><br />This suggests an interpretation of the 2001 Act which is not immediately reconcilable with the considerable body of jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.</p>


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuliya Samovich

The manual is devoted to making individual complaints to the European Court of human rights: peculiarities of realization of the right to appeal, conditions of admissibility and the judicial procedure of the European Court of Human Rights. The author analyses some “autonomous concepts” used in the court's case law and touches upon the possibility of limiting the right to judicial protection. The article deals with the formation and development of the individual's rights to international judicial protection, as well as the protection of human rights in universal quasi-judicial international bodies and regional judicial institutions of the European Union and the Organization of American States. This publication includes a material containing an analysis of recent changes in the legal regulation of the Institute of individual complaints. The manual is recommended for students of educational organizations of higher education, studying in the areas of bachelor's and master's degree “Jurisprudence”.


2014 ◽  
pp. 33-48
Author(s):  
Przemysław Florjanowicz-Błachut

The core function of the judiciary is the administration of justice through delivering judgments and other decisions. The crucial role for its acceptance and legitimization by not only lawyers, but also individulas (parties) and the hole society plays judicial reasoning. It should reflect on judge’s independence within the exercise of his office and show also judicial self-restraint or activism. The axiology and the standards of proper judicial reasoning are anchored both in constitutional and supranational law and case-law. Polish Constitutional Tribunal derives a duty to give reasoning from the right to a fair trial – right to be heard and bring own submissions before the court (Article 45 § 1 of the Constitution), the right to appeal against judgments and decisions made at first stage (Article 78), the rule of two stages of the court proceedings (Article 176) and rule of law clause (Article 2), that comprises inter alia right to due process of law and the rule of legitimate expactation / the protection of trust (Vertrauensschutz). European Court of Human Rights derives this duty to give reasons from the guarantees of the right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 6 § 1 of European Convention of Human Rights. In its case-law the ECtHR, taking into account the margin of appreciation concept, formulated a number of positive and negative requirements, that should be met in case of proper reasoning. The obligation for courts to give sufficient reasons for their decisions is also anchored in European Union law. European Court of Justice derives this duty from the right to fair trial enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Standards of the courts reasoning developed by Polish constitutional court an the European courts (ECJ and ECtHR) are in fact convergent and coherent. National judges should take them into consideration in every case, to legitimize its outcome and enhance justice delivery.


2014 ◽  
pp. 13-31
Author(s):  
Katarzyna Grzelak-Bach

Following a brief introduction of article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the author begins by analyzing case law from the European Court of Human Rights regarding the legal reasoning in judicial proceedings. The main premise of this paper is to present a formula for preparing legal reasoning in administrative court proceedings. The author draws attention to the role of judges who, in the process of adjudication, should apply creative interpretation of the rules of law, when they see errors or omissions in legislative provisions, or blatant violations of the European legal order. The conclusion of those deliberations finds, that the process of tailoring the approach to meet Strasbourg’s requirements should, on a basic level, be at the discretion of judges rather than the legislators.


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