scholarly journals Cuando Parot llegó a Estrasburgo = When Parot arrived to Strasbourg

Author(s):  
María Díaz Crego

En febrero del año 2006, el TS modificaba la forma de cómputo de la redención de penas por el trabajo, regulada en el ya derogado Código Penal de 1973. Esa modificación tenía consecuencias muy importantes para algunos de los condenados bajo el imperio de ese Código, que vieron cómo se alargaba su tiempo de permanencia en prisión hasta en 15 años. Las relevantes consecuencias derivadas de la aplicación de la llamada «doctrina Parot» llevaron a muchos de los reclusos afectados ante el TC y el TEDH. Sin embargo, los pronunciamientos de estos dos tribunales han sido divergentes: si bien el TC ha estimado muy pocos de los recursos de amparo interpuestos, el TEDH parece haber rechazado de forma frontal la doctrina introducida por el TS. En este marco, el presente trabajo analiza las decisiones de estos dos tribunales y trata de determinar cómo deben actuar las autoridades españolas tras la condena a España en el caso Del Río Prada, a fin de resolver el problema de fondo planteado por la aplicación de la doctrina Parot a una gran cantidad de reclusos.In February 2006, the Spanish Supreme Court modified its case-law regarding some provisions of the abrogated Criminal Code of 1973 that allowed the early release of prisoners if they worked while serving their sentence and they demonstrated good conduct. This change in the Spanish Supreme Court case-law had relevant consequences for some convicted prisoners as it meant an important extension of imprisonment years. Many of the prisoners affected by this new case-law appealed against the decisions extending their time in prison before the Spanish Constitutional Court and, after that, before the European Court of Human Rights. In this context, the main aim of this paper is to analyse the decisions adopted by these Courts while reviewing the Spanish Supreme Court case law, and to determine what the Spanish authorities must do after the European Court decision in «Del Río Prada», the sole case in which the European Court has examined the Spanish Supreme Court case-law.

2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 236-259 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lorena Bachmaier

The present study analyses the approach the European Court of Human Rights’ to negotiated criminal justice and plea agreements in its landmark case, Natsvlishvili v Georgia. At the sight of the US Supreme Court case law and the practice of plea bargaining in the United States, I will argue why the institutional context and other external elements should be taken into account to determine if the guilty plea system has become coercive. I will further question if the approach of the ECtHR, applying strictly the criteria set out by the US Supreme Court should be followed when defining European standards on plea agreements.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 (22) ◽  
pp. 38
Author(s):  
Hope Davidson

<p>Faced with the difficulty of reconciling the tensions between the need for treatment, and respecting patients’ rights, case law suggests that the courts in Ireland have tended to maintain a deferential approach to the medical profession and not to give voice to the significant rights protections set out in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) and instead view the legislation in this area, the Mental Health Act 2001 through a paternalistic prism. This has given rise to what seems at first glance to be the extraordinary logic in what is now the leading, and only, Irish Supreme Court case in the area, E.H. v Clinical Director St Vincent’s Hospital. This case states that a voluntary patient is not a voluntary patient in so far as one ordinarily understands the word. In the Supreme Court, Kearns J, said:</p><p><br />‘The terminology adopted in s.2 of the Act ascribes a very particular meaning to the term ‘voluntary patient’. It does not describe such a person as one who freely and voluntarily gives consent to an admission order.’</p><p><br />This suggests an interpretation of the 2001 Act which is not immediately reconcilable with the considerable body of jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.</p>


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-79
Author(s):  
Lucia Smolková

This paper analyses the case law of the Slovak Constitutional Court and the Slovak Supreme Court dealing with inspections conducted by selected Slovak administrative bodies – especially by the administrative bodies in the area of foodstuffs administration – where inspected companies complain that their rights guaranteed by the Slovak Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights, namely the protection of their business premises, have been violated. The paper thus also deals with and analyses the related case law of the European Court of Human Rights and its (non)-application by the Slovak judicial bodies in their decision-making practice.


2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (100) ◽  
pp. 441
Author(s):  
María del Mar Navas Sánchez

Resumen:Este artículo aborda el probablemente más controvertido supuesto relativo a la relación dialéctica entre las libertades de expresión e información y el derecho fundamental a la propia imagen. El que tiene como titular de este último derecho a quien puede ser considerado, en general, como un personaje público. Lo hace, además, desde una doble perspectiva. Por un lado, se muestra la evolución experimentada en el régimen jurídico del derecho a la propia imagen de este tipo de personas desde que en 1978 y de manera novedosa nuestra Constitución reconociera por vez primera el derecho a la propia imagen comoun derecho fundamental autónomo y diferenciado de la intimidad en el artículo 18.1 CE hasta nuestros días. Se trata de un proceso que ha venido marcado por varios hitos: la aprobación en 1982 de una norma (la Ley Orgánica 1/1982, de 5 de mayo, de protección civil del derecho al honor, a la intimidad y a la propia imagen) en la que el legislador establece pautas muy concretas acerca del modo en que han de resolverse este tipo de conflictos; la intensidad con la que esta Ley ha condicionado la jurisprudencia de los jueces y tribunales de la jurisdicción ordinaria, particularmente del Tribunal Supremo; y, finalmente, el importante papel desempeñado por la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional que, prescindiendo de las prescripciones legislativas y operando conforme a categorías constitucionales, ha terminado por erigir, en un proceso que, a su vez, hemos diferenciado en dos etapas, al interés público presente en las imágenes controvertidas, en el elemento decisivo para resolver este tipo de conflictos. Pero por otro, además, se presta especial atención a las recíprocas relaciones que a propósito de este supuesto se han establecido a lo largo de estas décadas entre las jurisprudencias de los Tribunales Constitucional,  Supremo y de Estrasburgo. En este sentido, nos ha parecido especialmenteinteresante fijarnos no solo en el modo en que el Tribunal Constitucional se ha servido del canon europeo (art. 10.2 CE) para construir su propia doctrina sobre el derecho fundamental a la propia imagen de los personajes públicos, sino también y muy particularmente, en la forma en que esta doctrina del Tribunal Constitucional ha sido seguida o no por el Tribunal Supremo y, por tanto, en el modo en que este último se ha sentido vinculado, si es que lo ha hecho, a la misma, dando así cumplimiento a su obligación constitucional (art. 5.1 LOPJ).Summary:1. Introduction. 2. The little, but adequate, express influence of the european canon in the first constitutional case law on the fundamental right to own´s image. 3. The fundamental right to their own image of public figures in the constitutional case law prior to STC 19/2014. Its almost null follow-up by the supreme court. 4. The fundamental right to their own image of public figures in the latest constitutional case law. Its —now yes— reception by the supreme court. 5. The relationship of constitutional case law with that of the European Court of Human Rights on this specific right, seen through STC 19/2014. 6. Conclusions.Abstract:This paper tackles the probably more controversial case concerning the dialectical relation between the freedoms of expression and information and the fundamental right to the own image. The one that refers to so-called «public figures». It does so from a dual perspective. On the one hand, it shows the evolution experienced in the right to their image of this type of people since Spanish Constitution, in 1978, recognized for the first time the right to own image as a fundamental right autonomous and different from the right to a private life (art. 18.1) to the present day. This is a process that has been marked by several landmarks: the adoption in 1982 of a rule (Organic Law 1/1982, of May 5, on civil protection of the right to reputation, privacy and own image) inwhich the legislator lays down very specific guidelines as to how such conflicts should be resolved; the intensity with which this Law has conditioned the case law of judges and courts of ordinary jurisdiction, particularly the Supreme Court; and finally, the important role played by the case law of the Constitutional Court, which, regardless of the legislative requirements and taking constitutional categories as references, has finally established, in a process that we have differentiated in two stages, the public interest of the images (or, in other words, the contribution made by photos to a debate of general interest) in the decisive element to solve this type of conflicts. But on the other hand, special attention is also paid to the reciprocal relations that have been established over these decades among the case law of the Constitutional, Supreme and Strasbourg Courts. On this regard, we have found particularly interesting to look not only at the way in which the Constitutional Court has used the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (Article 10.2 Spanish Constitution) to establish its own doctrine on the fundamental right to their image of public figures, but also, especially, in the way in which this doctrine of the Constitutional Court has been followed or not by the Supreme Court and therefore if the latter has fulfilled its constitutional obligation (Article 5.1 Organic Law of the Judiciary).


Teisė ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 217-229
Author(s):  
Laura Mickevičiūtė

Taking into consideration the amendments of Article 226 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, the temporal rules of the criminal law, and the content of the principle nullum crimen sine lege (no crime without law), this article assesses the Lithuanian Supreme Court case-law, according to which the provision of the alleged influence feature in Article 226(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania has only been explained but not given a new feature of the corpus delicti of passive trading influence.


Author(s):  
Elizabeth Macdonald ◽  
Ruth Atkins ◽  
Jens Krebs

This chapter looks at the need for certainty and formalities in contracting. It explores case law which illustrates, on the one hand, that a willingness of the parties to make a contract does not necessarily amount to a legally binding agreement, whilst on the other hand, there is potential for the court to fill in any gaps to give effect to agreements. The issues surrounding an agreement which is expressed to be ‘subject to contract’ are explored in light of the recent Supreme Court case of RTS Flexible Systems Ltd. The reasons for when contract formalities may be required are also noted. There is also discussion of electronic contracting, in relation to the introduction of the Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Transactions Regulations (2016/696).


2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (12) ◽  
pp. 1499-1520 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peer Zumbansen

On 14 October 2004, theBundesverfassungsgericht(BVerfG – German Federal Constitutional Court) voided a decision by theOberlandesgericht(Higher Regional Court) Naumburg, finding a violation of the complainant's rights guaranteed by theGrundgesetz(German Basic Law). The Decision directly addresses both the observation and application of case law from the European Court of Human Rights under the Basic Law's “rule of law provision” in Art. 20.III. While there is a myriad of important aspects with regard to this decision, we may limit ourselves at this point to the introductoryaperçucontained in the holdings of the case. One of them reads as follows:Zur Bindung an Gesetz und Recht (Art. 20 Abs. 3 GG) gehört die Berücksichtigung der Gewährleistungen der Konvention zum Schutze der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten und der Entscheidungen des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte im Rahmen methodisch vertretbarer Gesetzesauslegung. Sowohl die fehlende Auseinandersetzung mit einer Entscheidung des Gerichtshofs als auch deren gegen vorrangiges Recht verstoßende schematische “Vollstreckung” können gegen Grundrechte in Verbindung mit dem Rechtsstaatsprinzip verstoßen


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