Leapfrogging on Steroids

Author(s):  
John A. Mathews

Accounts of economic development as catch-up, via technological leverage and leapfrogging, have been successfully applied to explain cases of catch-up by East Asian countries, from Japan through Korea to Taiwan, Singapore, and others. Now in the twenty-first century it is the turn of emerging industrializing giants, led by China, but with India, Brazil, and others also looking to catch up, drawing as much as possible from the prior experiences and strategies of East Asia. But these emerging giants are looking to industrialize in fundamentally different circumstances from those that applied in earlier cases as industrialization powered by fossil fuels and linear resource flows is no longer feasible, not just because countries have pledged to reduce carbon emissions, but because at the scale required for the industrialization of China, India and others, fossil fuels present insuperable energy and resource security problems. They confront geopolitical limits to growth that demand alternative green strategies if they are to be evaded. The argument is developed in this chapter that green development strategies are the only feasible strategies for such countries to enable them to bring their industrialization processes to fruition. This chapter outlines the issues and options open to them, and evaluates the strategies pursued so far, demonstrating how they necessitate a break with the path dependence inherited from earlier patterns of industrialization. Green growth strategies turn out to be a strategic necessity; they promise to become the developmental norm in the twenty-first century, enabling the more recent industrial arrivals to leapfrog their predecessors.

Author(s):  
Anthony McMichael

Trends In Global Greenhouse emissions during the first two de­cades of this twenty- first century are leading us to a much hotter world by 2100, perhaps 3°C– 4°C above the late- twentieth- century average temperature and hotter than at any time in the last 20– 30 million years. Further, the rate of heating would be about 30 times faster than when Earth emerged from the most recent ice age, between 17,000 and 12,000 years ago. At that speed, environ­mental changes may outstrip the capacity of many species to evolve and adapt. Having once relied on fires in caves, humans in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries increasingly began to burn fossil fuels to release vastly more energy— and, inadvertently, vastly more carbon dioxide. About 600 billion metric tons of that invisible, stable, and odorless gas have been emitted since 1750, about two- thirds of which will persist in the atmosphere for centuries. The resulting 40 percent increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration is the main cause of human- driven climate change. We have wrapped another heat- retaining blanket around the planet, causing warming of Earth’s surface at a rate that far outpaces nature’s rhythms. Humans have lived in climatically congenial times for the past 11,000 years of the Holocene geological epoch compared with the rigors of the preceding ice age. Figure 1.1 shows the world’s estimated aver­age surface temperature over that era, and the right- hand side of the graph shows the likely global warming by 2100 averaged across many published modeled projections. The difference between the peak tem­perature of 7,000 years ago and the nadir of the Little Ice Age 350 years ago is 0.7°C. By early in this twenty- first century, the global average temperature had edged higher than for the past 11,000 years— by 0.6°C in six decades. If the world’s temperature were to rise by 3°C– 4°C within just three generations, our descendants might struggle to remain healthy, raise families, and survive within stable societies. I am certainly not the first to say this … A 4°C temperature increase probably means a global carrying capacity below 1 billion people.


2019 ◽  
pp. 310-320
Author(s):  
Arkebe Oqubay ◽  
Kenichi Ohno

Historically, latecomer countries have moved up the development ladder by learning from forerunners and adopting what has been learned to their specific starting conditions and resource endowment. However, it has always been puzzling and difficult to understand why some nations managed to learn and emulate technologies and catch-up successfully while others encounter difficulties and remain lagging behind despite the opportunities to learn from or even copy others. To a large extent, these variations are influenced by the long-term strategies and types of policies that countries pursue to initiate economic development and kick-start the process of technological learning and industrialization. This volume has attempted to shed light on the ‘how’ aspect of the learning and catch-up processes and the potential for late-latecomer countries to promote technological learning and catch-up. The combination of theoretical perspectives and empirical evidence in this volume provides a particular contribution to the ongoing debate on the dynamics of learning and catch-up. This chapter looks into the future and considers the implications of its key findings for late-latecomer countries learning and catching up in the twenty-first century. The discussion focuses on the key dynamics of technological learning; industrial policy and manufacturing as prime drivers of learning and catch-up; and finally, catch-up and the scope for policy space in the twenty-first century.


2019 ◽  
Vol 163 (3) ◽  
pp. 1569-1586 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steef V. Hanssen ◽  
Vassilis Daioglou ◽  
Zoran J. N. Steinmann ◽  
Stefan Frank ◽  
Alexander Popp ◽  
...  

AbstractIn the twenty-first century, modern bioenergy could become one of the largest sources of energy, partially replacing fossil fuels and contributing to climate change mitigation. Agricultural and forestry biomass residues form an inexpensive bioenergy feedstock with low greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, if harvested sustainably. We analysed quantities of biomass residues supplied for energy and their sensitivities in harmonised bioenergy demand scenarios across eight integrated assessment models (IAMs) and compared them with literature-estimated residue availability. IAM results vary substantially, at both global and regional scales, but suggest that residues could meet 7–50% of bioenergy demand towards 2050, and 2–30% towards 2100, in a scenario with 300 EJ/year of exogenous bioenergy demand towards 2100. When considering mean literature-estimated availability, residues could provide around 55 EJ/year by 2050. Inter-model differences primarily arise from model structure, assumptions, and the representation of agriculture and forestry. Despite these differences, drivers of residues supplied and underlying cost dynamics are largely similar across models. Higher bioenergy demand or biomass prices increase the quantity of residues supplied for energy, though their effects level off as residues become depleted. GHG emission pricing and land protection can increase the costs of using land for lignocellulosic bioenergy crop cultivation, which increases residue use at the expense of lignocellulosic bioenergy crops. In most IAMs and scenarios, supplied residues in 2050 are within literature-estimated residue availability, but outliers and sustainability concerns warrant further exploration. We conclude that residues can cost-competitively play an important role in the twenty-first century bioenergy supply, though uncertainties remain concerning (regional) forestry and agricultural production and resulting residue supply potentials.


Authored by eminent scholars, the volume aims to generate interest and debate among policymakers, practitioners, and researchers on the complexity of learning and catch-up, particularly for twenty-first century late-late developers. The volume explores technological learning at the firm level, policy learning by the state, and the cumulative and multifaceted nature of the learning process, which encompasses learning by doing, by experiment, emulation, innovation, and leapfrogging. Why is catch-up rare? And why have some nations succeeded while others failed? What are the prospects for successful learning and catch-up in the twenty-first century? These are pertinent questions that require further research and in-depth analysis. The World Bank estimates that out of the 101 middle-income economies in 1960, only thirteen became high income by 2008. This volume examines how nations learn by reviewing key structural and contingent factors that contribute to dynamic learning and catch-up. Rejecting both the one-size-fits-all approach and the agnosticism that all nations are unique and different, the volume uses historical as well as firm-level, industry-level, and country-level evidence and experiences to identify the sources and drivers of successful learning and catch-up and the lessons for late-latecomer countries. Building on the latecomer-advantage perspective, the volume shows that what is critical for dynamic learning and catch-up is not learning per se but the intensity of learning, robust industrial policies, and the pace and direction of learning. Equally important are the passion to learn, long-term strategic vision, and understanding the context in which successful learning occurs.


2019 ◽  
pp. 63-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mariana Mazzucato

Innovation has not only a rate but also a direction: the twenty-first century is becoming increasingly defined by the need to respond to major social, environmental, and economic challenges. This chapter looks at how innovation policy can be reframed around ‘missions’, to guide both innovation policy and industrial strategies around key societal challenges facing countries. This means changing the focus from technologies and sectors to problems that different sectors (across manufacturing and services), actors (public and private), and disciplines are required to solve together. The chapter first reviews the characteristics of mission-oriented programmes before looking at key features of those programmes that can provide lessons.


2022 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
David Consiglio

Abstract For centuries, farmers have needed fertilizers rich in nitrogen to increase crop yields. This need led to one of the most unusual wars in history: a war over fossilized bird droppings. Twentieth century chemists solved the problem of mass-producing nitrogen fertilizer, but their solution required enormous amounts of energy. Twenty-first century chemists now face the challenge of producing nitrogen fertilizer without the need for energy provided by fossil fuels.


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