The Mainstreaming of the White Nationalist Movement

Hard White ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 72-96
Author(s):  
Richard C. Fording ◽  
Sanford F. Schram

Chapter 4 documents the rise of the Tea Party movement (TPM) and how it evolved into an attractive vehicle for the expression of outgroup hostility and the pursuit of racist policy priorities. We show that the TPM not only mobilized a significant number of previously inactive white racial conservatives but also co-opted a significant portion of the white nationalist movement, especially the traditional white supremacist groups such as the Ku Klux Klan. In many ways the TPM set the stage for Trump by bringing more white racists and racial conservatives into electoral politics. Yet this newly energized constituency lacked a national leader. Trump’s emergence as a presidential candidate thus represents the second critical change in the political opportunity structure. With Trump, white racial extremists and racial conservatives now had a national leader who spoke directly to their outgroup hostility and their anger.

Hard White ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard C. Fording ◽  
Sanford F. Schram

This chapter frames the book’s analysis and provides an overview of the subsequent chapters. It explains how racism today is manifested most significantly in white “outgroup hostility” toward Latinos and Muslims as well as African Americans. It highlights the importance of race-baiting elites in exploiting a transformed media landscape to stoke white outgroup hostility and thereby mainstream racism in American politics today. The chapter introduces and defines a number of key terms, including “racialized political narratives” that operate to racialize selected groups of people to be constructed as threatening “outgroups” in opposition to whites as the “ingroup.” It emphasizes that the “political opportunity structure” for white racial extremists became more open, especially with the rise of the Tea Party movement, leading to their increased participation in conventional politics. The chapter argues that these factors had already converged prior to 2016 for Donald Trump to exploit in winning the presidency, thereby accelerating the mainstreaming of racism in American politics by putting it at the center of public policymaking in the White House.


Hard White ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 47-71
Author(s):  
Richard C. Fording ◽  
Sanford F. Schram

Chapter 3 traces the rise of the modern white nationalist movement and the process by which it was mainstreamed in American politics. The chapter describes the ideology of white nationalists and the variety of racialized political narratives utilized by movement leaders to foster white racial consciousness. These narratives became increasingly resonant among white racists due to observable increases in racial diversity, which was portrayed as a threat to white supremacy. Nonetheless, because of the relatively closed nature of the political opportunity structure, white racists had few vehicles open to them to express their frustration. From the 1980s until the election of Obama in 2008, white racists became increasingly disillusioned with contemporary politics. Most white racists sat out of politics altogether as an increasingly angry minority fueled a rapid growth in white nationalist groups that were relegated to the extremist fringe.


Author(s):  
Richard C. Fording ◽  
Sanford F. Schram

This book analyzes data from a variety of sources to understand the mainstreaming of racism today, putting this research in a historical context. With issues of globalization, immigration, and demographic diversification achieving greater public salience, racism is now more likely to manifest itself in the form of a generalized ethnocentrism that expresses “outgroup hostility” toward a diverse set of groups, including Latinos and Muslims as well as African Americans. Changes in both structure and agency have facilitated the mainstreaming of racism today. Changes in the “political opportunity structure,” as witnessed by the rise of the Tea Party Movement, enabled the mainstreaming of white extremists into the Republican Party and established the basis for an electoral politics focused on giving voice to white people more generally acting on their outgroup hostility. Changes in the political opportunity structure were matched by the appearance of a charismatic leader in the person of Donald Trump, who made great use of a transformed media landscape to stoke white people’s outgroup hostility. Trump won the presidency by strategically deploying his demagoguery to mobilize white nonvoters in swing states, with the end result greatly accelerating the mainstreaming of racism and placing it at the center of policymaking in the White House. Providing extensive empirical evidence, this book documents how the mainstreaming of racism today began before Trump started to run for the presidency but then increased under his leadership and that it is likely to be a troubling presence in U.S. politics for some time to come. The findings provided create the basis for suggestions on how to push racism back to the margins of American politics.


Contention ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 21-52
Author(s):  
Matthew S. Williams

Political opportunity structure (POS) refers to how the larger social context, such as repression, shapes a social movement’s chances of success. Most work on POS looks at how movements deal with the political opportunities enabling and/or constraining them. This article looks at how one group of social movement actors operating in a more open POS alters the POS for a different group of actors in a more repressive environment through a chain of indirect leverage—how United Students Against Sweatshops (USAS) uses the more open POS on college campuses to create new opportunities for workers in sweatshop factories. USAS exerts direct leverage over college administrators through protests, pushing them to exert leverage over major apparel companies through the licensing agreements schools have with these companies.


Author(s):  
David J. Hess

The chapter focuses on the processes of industrial change in relationship to social movements. It builds on two literatures, one on institutional logics and the other on industrial transitions, and shows similarities and differences between the two literatures. It then examines the problem of resistance from industrial regime organizations or incumbent. Empirical material is based on the case of regime resistance to energy transition policies in the U.S., where the incumbent organizations have closed down the political opportunity structure for policy reform. It then draws on research that discusses three strategies that industrial transition coalitions can use to overcome regime resistance: countervailing industrial power (finding allies in neighboring industries), ideological judo (using regime ideology and frames to advance transition policies), and dual-use design (building coalitions by redefining energy transition policies in terms of a different institutional logic).


Author(s):  
Diana Fu ◽  
Greg Distelhorst

How does China manage political participation? This chapter analyzes changing opportunities for participation in the leadership transition from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping. Contentious political participation—where individuals and independent organizations engage in protest and other disruptive behavior—has been further curtailed under Xi’s leadership. Yet institutional participation by ordinary citizens through quasi-democratic institutions appears unaffected and is even trending up in certain sectors. Manipulation of the political opportunity structure is likely strategic behavior on the part of authoritarian rulers, as they seek to incorporate or appease the discontented. The political opportunity structure in non-democracies is therefore multifaceted: one channel of participation can close as others expand.


2019 ◽  
Vol 113 (2) ◽  
pp. 569-583 ◽  
Author(s):  
ARTURAS ROZENAS ◽  
YURI M. ZHUKOV

States use repression to enforce obedience, but repression—especially if it is violent, massive, and indiscriminate—often incites opposition. Why does repression have such disparate effects? We address this question by studying the political legacy of Stalin’s coercive agricultural policy and collective punishment campaign in Ukraine, which led to the death by starvation of over three million people in 1932–34. Using rich micro-level data on eight decades of local political behavior, we find that communities exposed to Stalin’s “terror by hunger” behaved more loyally toward Moscow when the regime could credibly threaten retribution in response to opposition. In times when this threat of retribution abated, the famine-ridden communities showed more opposition to Moscow, both short- and long-term. Thus, repression can both deter and inflame opposition, depending on the political opportunity structure in which post-repression behavior unfolds.


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