Proposed Solutions for Rising Drug Prices

2021 ◽  
pp. 38-61
Author(s):  
Neumann Peter J. ◽  
Cohen Joshua T. ◽  
Ollendorf Daniel A
Keyword(s):  
Collective Bargaining ◽  
Generic Drug ◽  
New Drugs ◽  
Patient Access ◽  
Brand Name ◽  
Pharmacy Benefit ◽  
High Drug ◽  
Drug Prices ◽  
Market Protection ◽  
Drug Companies

This chapter explores proposed solutions for high drug prices. They include measures to rein in “middlemen” pharmacy benefit managers who may artificially inflate prices; increase generic drug competition to prevent price spikes for older, off-patent drugs; enhance competition for new drugs after brand-name products reach the intended period of market protection; align US drug prices with the lower prices available in other wealthy countries; and leverage the collective bargaining power of government payers to compel drug companies to accept lower prices for their products. Policies that force drug prices down can save money but risk choking off the development of important new advances, limiting patient access to their health benefits. Moreover, the policy solutions typically offered are incremental solutions that will likely put a modest dent in the nation’s $500 billion annual drug bill. Most important, they fail to link a drug’s price to its value.

Product Switching in the Pharmaceutical Industry: Ripe for Antitrust Scrutiny?

2010 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 119-130
Author(s):  
Seth Silber ◽  
Kara Kuritz
Keyword(s):  
Market Share ◽  
Generic Drug ◽  
Prescription Drugs ◽  
New Drugs ◽  
Pharmaceutical Companies ◽  
Brand Name ◽  
Generic Entry ◽  
Product Switching ◽  
Drug Companies ◽  
Antitrust Laws

Since the Hatch-Waxman Act was enacted in 1984, generic drug companies have benefited from its provisions to facilitate approval of generic alternatives to brand-name pharmaceuticals. Upon generic entry, consumers of prescription drugs benefit from large discounts as brand manufacturers lose significant market share to these lower-priced alternatives. Over time, brand-name drug manufacturers have undertaken strategies, such as ‘product switching’ or ‘product hopping’, that may delay or prevent generic entry and protect their market share. Generic drug manufacturers, drug purchasers and antitrust authorities have begun looking to the antitrust laws to address these strategies and their impact on generic entry. This article discusses the regulatory framework under which pharmaceutical companies introduce new drugs, two prominent cases in which courts have wrestled with whether product switching violates the antitrust laws, factors that might support an antitrust claim for product switching, and the FTC's interest in challenging product switching.

Pharmaceuticals, Patents, and Politics: Canada and Bill C-22

1993 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 147-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joel Lexchin
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Research And Development ◽  
Patent Protection ◽  
The United States ◽  
New Drugs ◽  
Compulsory Licensing ◽  
High Drug ◽  
Drug Prices ◽  
Future Demands ◽  
The Impact

In response to high drug prices, the Canadian government amended the country's patent act in 1969 to allow for compulsory licensing to import pharmaceuticals. As a result of the legislation, by 1983 drug costs in Canada were over $200 million lower than they would otherwise have been. The multinational drug industry was strongly opposed to compulsory licensing, despite any evidence that its economic position had been harmed. Restoration of patent protection for drugs was one of the key U.S. demands during free-trade negotiations between Canada and the United States in 1985–1987. The result was Bill C-22, which gave new drugs protection from compulsory licensing for seven to ten years. This article analyzes the impact of Bill C-22 on the generic industry, the creation of jobs in research and development, drug prices, and research and development expenditures. It concludes with an examination of future demands from the pharmaceutical industry.

Pharmacy Benefit Managers, Brand-Name Drug Prices, and Patient Cost Sharing

2018 ◽  
Vol 168 (6) ◽  
pp. 436 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ge Bai ◽  
Aditi P. Sen ◽  
Gerard F. Anderson
Keyword(s):  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Brand Name ◽  
Pharmacy Benefit ◽  
Patient Cost ◽  
Drug Prices

scholarly journals Public research funding and pharmaceutical prices: do Americans pay twice for drugs?

F1000Research ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 707
Author(s):  
Rena M. Conti ◽  
Frank S. David
Keyword(s):  
Pharmaceutical Industry ◽  
Research Funding ◽  
New Drugs ◽  
Major Contributor ◽  
Public Research ◽  
High Drug ◽  
Drug Prices ◽  
Research Investment ◽  
Publicly Supported ◽  
Pharmaceutical Prices

In the debate over prescription drug pricing, some pharmaceutical industry critics claim that U.S. taxpayers pay twice for costly therapies, because publicly supported research is a major contributor to drug discovery and American taxpayers are inadequately rewarded for their research investment due to high drug prices. In fact, the empirical evidence supporting these claims is weak, and the pay twice argument distracts from important efforts to ensure that impactful new drugs continue to be developed and made widely available to patients who need them.

Recent Developments in Health Law

2012 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 165-170
Author(s):  
Brenna Jenny
Keyword(s):  
Generic Drug ◽  
Generic Drugs ◽  
Tort Law ◽  
Drug Manufacturer ◽  
Recent Change ◽  
Brand Name ◽  
Drug Companies ◽  
Drug Regulations ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
The Individual

When the Supreme Court in PLIVA v. Mensing determined that certain state tort law failure-to-warn claims against generic drug companies were pre-empted by federal drug regulations, the pronouncement was met with substantial criticism. In light of the Court's decision two years earlier in Wyeth v. Levine, where the Court allowed a similar claim against a brand-name drug manufacturer to proceed, many complained the resulting Levine-Mensing dichotomy created an arbitrary distinction between brand-name and generic drugs, allowing an injured patient's ability to recover to hinge solely on the happenstance of whether the individual had taken the brand-name or generic version. But, although Mensing cut back significantly on the ability of plaintiffs to make state law failure-to-warn claims against generic drug manufacturers, the case did not completely prohibit such claims. Instead, the Court banned only failure-to-warn claims premised on an argument that the generic drug company needed to change its label in order to meet state tort law duties. If plaintiffs can advance other theories independent of a formal label change, such as a failure to adequately warn a physician about a recent change to the drug's label, then they may still be able to proceed against generic drug manufacturers.

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