scholarly journals Three Statutory Regimes at Impasse: Reverse Payments in Pay-for-Delay Settlement Agreements between Brand-name and Generic Drug Companies

Author(s):  
Rudolph J.R. Peritz
Author(s):  
Seth Silber ◽  
Kara Kuritz

Since the Hatch-Waxman Act was enacted in 1984, generic drug companies have benefited from its provisions to facilitate approval of generic alternatives to brand-name pharmaceuticals. Upon generic entry, consumers of prescription drugs benefit from large discounts as brand manufacturers lose significant market share to these lower-priced alternatives. Over time, brand-name drug manufacturers have undertaken strategies, such as ‘product switching’ or ‘product hopping’, that may delay or prevent generic entry and protect their market share. Generic drug manufacturers, drug purchasers and antitrust authorities have begun looking to the antitrust laws to address these strategies and their impact on generic entry. This article discusses the regulatory framework under which pharmaceutical companies introduce new drugs, two prominent cases in which courts have wrestled with whether product switching violates the antitrust laws, factors that might support an antitrust claim for product switching, and the FTC's interest in challenging product switching.


2012 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 165-170
Author(s):  
Brenna Jenny

When the Supreme Court in PLIVA v. Mensing determined that certain state tort law failure-to-warn claims against generic drug companies were pre-empted by federal drug regulations, the pronouncement was met with substantial criticism. In light of the Court's decision two years earlier in Wyeth v. Levine, where the Court allowed a similar claim against a brand-name drug manufacturer to proceed, many complained the resulting Levine-Mensing dichotomy created an arbitrary distinction between brand-name and generic drugs, allowing an injured patient's ability to recover to hinge solely on the happenstance of whether the individual had taken the brand-name or generic version. But, although Mensing cut back significantly on the ability of plaintiffs to make state law failure-to-warn claims against generic drug manufacturers, the case did not completely prohibit such claims. Instead, the Court banned only failure-to-warn claims premised on an argument that the generic drug company needed to change its label in order to meet state tort law duties. If plaintiffs can advance other theories independent of a formal label change, such as a failure to adequately warn a physician about a recent change to the drug's label, then they may still be able to proceed against generic drug manufacturers.


2021 ◽  
pp. 38-61
Author(s):  
Neumann Peter J. ◽  
Cohen Joshua T. ◽  
Ollendorf Daniel A

This chapter explores proposed solutions for high drug prices. They include measures to rein in “middlemen” pharmacy benefit managers who may artificially inflate prices; increase generic drug competition to prevent price spikes for older, off-patent drugs; enhance competition for new drugs after brand-name products reach the intended period of market protection; align US drug prices with the lower prices available in other wealthy countries; and leverage the collective bargaining power of government payers to compel drug companies to accept lower prices for their products. Policies that force drug prices down can save money but risk choking off the development of important new advances, limiting patient access to their health benefits. Moreover, the policy solutions typically offered are incremental solutions that will likely put a modest dent in the nation’s $500 billion annual drug bill. Most important, they fail to link a drug’s price to its value.


Author(s):  
Henry Grabowski ◽  
Genia Long ◽  
Richard Mortimer ◽  
Mehmet Bilginsoy
Keyword(s):  

2010 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 369-389 ◽  
Author(s):  
Toshiaki Iizuka ◽  
Kensuke Kubo

AbstractHistorically, brand-name pharmaceuticals have enjoyed long periods of market exclusivity in Japan, given the limited use of generics after patent expiration. To improve the efficiency of the health-care system, however, the government has recently implemented various policies aimed at increasing generic substitution. Although this has created expectations that the Japanese generic drug market may finally take off, to date, generic usage has increased only modestly. After reviewing the incentives of key market participants to choose generics, we argue that previous government policies did not provide proper incentives for pharmacies to boost generic substitution. We offer some recommendations that may help to increase generic usage.


2013 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 207-214 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry Grabowski ◽  
Genia Long ◽  
Richard Mortimer

Blood ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 128 (22) ◽  
pp. 5441-5441
Author(s):  
Vasily Shuvaev ◽  
Mikhail Fominykh ◽  
Vera Udaleva ◽  
Irina I Zotova ◽  
Regina Golovchenko ◽  
...  

Abstract Introduction. A generic drug is a pharmaceutical drug considered to be equivalent to a brand-name product. A generic drug has to contain the same active ingredients as those of the original formulation. Regulatory agencies used to require that generics be identical to their brand-name counterparts with regards to pharmacokinetic properties. In most cases, generic products are available after the patent protection given to a drug's original developer expires. In Russia, a patent protection lasts for a 10-year period from registration of the original drug. To this day, twelve Imatinib generics have been registered in Russia. Aim. To assess the safety and efficacy of Imatinib generics for treatment of newly diagnosed Chronic myelogenous leukemia patients that have been in our center since August 2012. Materials and methods. 30 newly diagnosed CML patients were started on generics. The drugs: 1) GenericPh 100 mg, in capsules (Ph-Syntez, Russia); 2) GenericG 100 mg, in tablets (Laboratorio TUTEUR S.A.C.I.F.I.A., Argentina); 3) GenericIm 100 mg, in tablets (Sandoz d.d. (Slovenia). Switching from one generic to another was done due to intolerance. We analyzed the range and frequencies of adverse events (AE), cumulative incidences of complete hematologic (CHR), major cytogenetic (MCyR), complete cytogenetic (CCyR), and early molecular responses (BCR-ABL<10% by IS), as well as the rate of BCR-ABL<1% by IS, major molecular (MMR) and molecular 4.0 log (MR4.0, BCR-ABL<0.01% by IS) responses at time-points according to the National CML diagnostic and treatment guidelines. The response rates were assessed only in regard to the generic treatment (with death, progression and switching to second-generation inhibitors as competing risks). Statistical analysis included descriptive statistics and cumulative incidence function. Results. Duration of the treatment with generics was 7-45 months, with a median of 13 months (GenericPh (27) + GenericG (2) + GenericIm (1)). No unexpected adverse events were observed during the Imatinib generics treatment. The generics tolerance did not differ from that of the original brand-name drug. Six patients were switched to second-generation tyrosine kinase inhibitors (TKI2) due to Imatinib intolerance. One patient progressed to blastic phase at 3 months after diagnosis. Three deaths were registered (1 - due to CML and 2 due to concomitant diseases). Overall survival rate was 90% and CML-related mortality - 3%. CHR at 3 months of the treatment was achieved in 93% of the patients. Cumulative response rates for cytogenetic and molecular responses are presented in Table 1. MR4.0 was registered in 23% of patients during overall treatment. Seven patients were switched to TKI2 due to insufficient efficacy of Imatinib. At the time of analysis 13 patients remained on Imatinib generics treatment: 12 patients with CCyR and 1 with PCyR, including 10 patients with MMR. Conclusion. Use of generics demands evaluation of its equivalency and control during its adoption into clinical practice. In terms of efficacy or tolerance no significant differences between the Imatinib generics studied and the original brand-name drug in newly diagnosed CML patients were found. Disclosures Shuvaev: Pfizer: Honoraria; BMS: Honoraria; Novartis pharma: Honoraria. Fominykh:BMS: Honoraria; Novartis Pharma: Honoraria.


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