Reading Kant’s Rechtslehre: Some Observations on Ripstein’s Kant and the Law of War

2021 ◽  
pp. 43-51
Author(s):  
Thomas Mertens

The chapter puts forward a semantic observation which he claims reflects not only Ripstein’s Kant interpretation, but also his own perspective as a long-term reader of Kant. Mertens observes that Kantian scholarship has become to a large extent an Anglo-Saxon affair, and Kant is read and interpreted against the background of political and legal problems of that world. History has shown that several readings of Kant are possible, and Ripstein presents a new, powerful reading of Kant which is indebted to that Anglo-Saxon background. Mertens discusses several intriguing questions, inter alia, Ripstein’s interpretation of Kant’s view on the law of war is the distinction between the just war tradition and the regular war tradition and Kant’s departure from both traditions.

2021 ◽  
pp. 13-31
Author(s):  
Yitzhak Benbaji

The chapter explores the Kantian philosophy of the law of war and how it is based on two normative claims. First, states are independent of each other in virtue of their duty to provide a legal order in a territory that they rule. Second, any use of non-defensive force by a state in a territory that it does not actually rule is illegal. Benbaji shows that there is a deep tension between these claims, and he sets out to offer a contractarian theory of the crime of aggression, which he characterizes as semi-Kantian: states are fully legitimate only if their right to rule over their territory is recognized by all other states. Semi-Kantians argue that Ripstein’s Kant misconstrues the standing of states vis-à-vis the territories over which they rule.


2015 ◽  
Vol 109 (2) ◽  
pp. 314-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
BLAISE BACHOFEN

In theSocial Contract, Rousseau declares that he has given up the idea of discussing the “external relations” of states. Yet numerous texts—including a recently reconstituted work about the law of war—show that he thought very seriously about the question of the nature and origin of war and of the possibility of making war subject to the rule of law. Rousseau, in contrast to Hobbes, links war's appearance to that of the sovereign states; the state of war is therefore the necessary result of international relations. Moreover, he considers the international law as chimerical. How can he then conceive a non-utopian theory of “just war”? My hypothesis is that his conception of the law of war is deduced from principles of internal political law and arises from pragmatic necessity. The state that discredits itself in its manner of waging war weakens itself while believing that it is reinforcing itself.


Author(s):  
Marco Barducci

This chapter examines the uses of Grotius’ resistance theory primarily based on the analysis of the natural right of punishment and the law of war devised in De Iure. After an outline of Grotius’ view of resistance, the chapter moves on to examine its multifaceted reception in England until after Locke’s re-elaboration in the Two Treatises of Government, during which time it provided an intellectual and legal groundwork for negotiation between Whigs and Tories around the exclusion of James II and the ascension of William and Mary. In this regard, Grotius not only brought to England a theory of conquest that filled a gap in the shared tradition of common law and ancient constitution, but his attempt to reconceptualize resistance theory in terms of just war fit particularly well in the justification both of the Republic in 1649 and of the Glorious Revolution.


Author(s):  
Stephen D. Bowd

Justifications for the killing of civilians by soldiers rested on an array of theological and legal texts elaborated from classical and medieval sources. These texts focused on the notion of war as a punishment for human sin, but also suggested that war was a just chastisement. Therefore, in the just war tradition writers paid more attention to the causes of war than to its conduct. It was only in a gradual and piecemeal fashion that some protection for groups of civilians, including women, clergy, and children, was developed. However, it was not until c.1700 that a more secular basis for understanding war emerged and began to replace the just war framework with an international law of war. Even then, the civilian did not fully emerge as a notionally protected figure.


2006 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTOPH BURCHARD

Carl Schmitt's Der Nomos der Erde allows us to rethink his interlinked proposals for the organization of the Weimar Republic, namely his theory of ‘democratic dictatorship’ and the ‘concept of the political’. Connecting the domestic homogeneity of an empowered people with the pluralism of the Westphalian state system, Schmitt seeks to humanize war; he objects to the renaissance of the ‘just war’ tradition, which is premised on a discriminating concept of war. Schmitt's objections are valid today, yet their Eurocentric foundations are also partially outdated. We are thus to argue with Schmitt against Schmitt to reflect on possibilities for the humanization of war.


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