Civilians and Theories of War

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen D. Bowd
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Just War ◽  
Women Clergy ◽  
Law Of War ◽  
Causes Of War ◽  
Legal Texts ◽  
Just War Tradition

Justifications for the killing of civilians by soldiers rested on an array of theological and legal texts elaborated from classical and medieval sources. These texts focused on the notion of war as a punishment for human sin, but also suggested that war was a just chastisement. Therefore, in the just war tradition writers paid more attention to the causes of war than to its conduct. It was only in a gradual and piecemeal fashion that some protection for groups of civilians, including women, clergy, and children, was developed. However, it was not until c.1700 that a more secular basis for understanding war emerged and began to replace the just war framework with an international law of war. Even then, the civilian did not fully emerge as a notionally protected figure.

The Paradox of “Just War” in Rousseau's Theory of Interstate Relations

2015 ◽  
Vol 109 (2) ◽  
pp. 314-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
BLAISE BACHOFEN
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Just War ◽  
The State ◽  
Interstate Relations ◽  
Law Of War ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
External Relations ◽  
The Law ◽  
Utopian Theory

In theSocial Contract, Rousseau declares that he has given up the idea of discussing the “external relations” of states. Yet numerous texts—including a recently reconstituted work about the law of war—show that he thought very seriously about the question of the nature and origin of war and of the possibility of making war subject to the rule of law. Rousseau, in contrast to Hobbes, links war's appearance to that of the sovereign states; the state of war is therefore the necessary result of international relations. Moreover, he considers the international law as chimerical. How can he then conceive a non-utopian theory of “just war”? My hypothesis is that his conception of the law of war is deduced from principles of internal political law and arises from pragmatic necessity. The state that discredits itself in its manner of waging war weakens itself while believing that it is reinforcing itself.

Killing Naked Soldiers: Distinguishing between Combatants and Noncombatants

2005 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 39-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Larry May
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Just War ◽  
Geneva Convention ◽  
Social Groups ◽  
Civilian Population ◽  
Noncombatant Immunity ◽  
Or Groups ◽  
Just War Tradition ◽  
Principle Of Discrimination

Just war theorists contended that weapons are illegitimate unless they can be used in such a way so as to distinguish combatants from noncombatants. Contemporary international legal theory also draws heavily on the principle of discrimination. The Geneva Convention (IV), as interpreted in the Second Protocol of 1977, says: “The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack…Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited.” In both the Just War tradition and contemporary international law, the main justification for such a principle has to do with noncombatant immunity, the idea that only those who are combatants can legitimately be attacked in war. The principle of discrimination also relies on the idea that it is possible to distinguish, in a morally significant way, those classes or groups of people who participate in wars from those who do not. The categories of “civilian” or “soldier,”“combatant” or “noncombatant,” are thought to be stable. Yet, the case of the naked soldier taking a bath challenges such stability in a way that illustrates the serious conceptual and normative problems with identifying such social groups. In this paper I argue that, because of these problems, the traditional principle of discrimination offers no clear, morally relevant, line between those who fight and those who do not. Nonetheless, I argue that a distinction of this sort should be maintained, although one that will restrict tactics in war far more than is normally recognized.

Justified: Just War and the Ethics of Violence and World Order

2021 ◽  
pp. 435-448
Author(s):  
Chris Brown
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Just War ◽  
World Order ◽  
Frame Of Reference ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Just War Tradition ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Impact

This volume’s final Part VII on the impact of legal claims in war discourses is introduced by Chris Brown. In this chapter, he fundamentally questions the relevance of international law as a frame of reference for the justification and limitation of war. Brown turns our attention back to just war which we have discussed earlier in this volume (ch. 2 by Anthony Lang, Jr): Brown argues that, properly understood, the just war tradition can be defended against most of its critics, the exceptions being those Clausewitzian realists and Gandhian pacifists who refuse to make the kind of discriminations upon which the tradition is based. More problematic are some of the newer friends of the tradition, analytical political theorists who reject its praxis-oriented dimension, and focus on the rights and responsibilities of individuals, discounting the importance of collectivities. These writers are, in some respects, closer to the medieval tradition than are defenders of contemporary international humanitarian law, but their reliance on the ability of philosophers to decide matters of justice leads to a dogmatism uncharacteristic of the just war tradition, and their emphasis on the individual undermines the link between theory and practice. This chapter defends a traditional, albeit post-Christian, reading of the notion of justified war against both its overt opponents and its supposed friends.

Reading Kant’s Rechtslehre: Some Observations on Ripstein’s Kant and the Law of War

2021 ◽  
pp. 43-51
Author(s):  
Thomas Mertens
Keyword(s):  
Just War ◽  
World History ◽  
Anglo Saxon ◽  
Law Of War ◽  
Legal Problems ◽  
Just War Tradition ◽  
The Law

The chapter puts forward a semantic observation which he claims reflects not only Ripstein’s Kant interpretation, but also his own perspective as a long-term reader of Kant. Mertens observes that Kantian scholarship has become to a large extent an Anglo-Saxon affair, and Kant is read and interpreted against the background of political and legal problems of that world. History has shown that several readings of Kant are possible, and Ripstein presents a new, powerful reading of Kant which is indebted to that Anglo-Saxon background. Mertens discusses several intriguing questions, inter alia, Ripstein’s interpretation of Kant’s view on the law of war is the distinction between the just war tradition and the regular war tradition and Kant’s departure from both traditions.

If Not Combatants, Certainly Not Civilians

2003 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 138-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven R. David
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Just War ◽  
Terrorist Attacks ◽  
Palestinian Authority ◽  
Targeted Killing ◽  
Just War Tradition ◽  
The Right

Stein and I see targeted killing in fundamentally different ways. Stein sees the Palestinian terrorists as civilian noncombatants who are not engaged in war or even armed conflict with Israel. As such, there is no legal or moral right to target them. I see targeted killing as an appropriate response to an intolerable threat. Israel has the right and obligation to defend itself against armed Palestinians who seek to kill as many innocent Israeli civilians as possible. So long as the Palestinian Authority is incapable or unwilling to halt terrorist attacks, most interpretations of international law, Israeli law, and just war tradition support Israel's efforts to stop these murderous attacks before they can be carried out.

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