Coordination

2021 ◽  
pp. 167-184
Author(s):  
Omri Ben-Shahar ◽  
Ariel Porat

This chapter examines problems of coordination that could arise under personalized law, where different people are subject to different rules guiding their behavior. While earlier chapters of the book focused on individual actors and their personal legal environments, this chapter shifts to look at joint activity—how the interaction between people could be affected by personalized law. Would a personalized law regime that optimizes the atomistic parts result in more social harm, by neglecting the composite whole? It is often noted, correctly, that standardization and uniformity are needed for well-coordinated activity, to help people anticipate what others will do and synchronize their own actions. The chapter argues, however, that personalized law has a surprising potential to advance new forms of coordination. The chapter examines rules of traffic, methods of contracting, procedure in litigation, and the forms of property rights (numerus clausus), and argues that a properly designed personalized law regime could potentially achieve coordination in these spheres despite the greater variation and the non-uniformity of rules and of individual actions.

Land Law ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben McFarlane ◽  
Nicholas Hopkins ◽  
Sarah Nield

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing able students with a stand-alone resource.This chapter investigates legal property rights in land. The numerus clausus (or ‘closed list’) principle is of crucial importance when addressing the content question of legal property rights in land. The Law of Property Act 1925 (LPA 1925) creates a distinction between legal estates and legal interests. As a result of s 1 of LPA 1925, there are now only two permissible legal estates in land. The chapter then explores the content of a freehold and of a lease, and covers the vital question of why the LPA 1925 imposed this limit on the types of permissible legal estate in land. The facts of Hill v Tupper and Keppell v Bailey offer particular examples of a more general question that land law has to tackle when deciding on the content of legal interests in land.


2020 ◽  
pp. 19-29
Author(s):  
Andrii Khridochkin ◽  
Petro Makushev

The article deals with homogeneous group of administrative offences - administrative offences in the field of intellectual property as a basis of administrative liability. It is emphasized that the objective features of this administrative offence are its social harm, wrongfulness and punishment, and subjective ones are guilt and subjectivity. It is emphasized that only in the presence of all these features can one speak of qualifying an individual’s act as an administrative offence and resolving the issue of bringing him to administrative liability. The definition of the term “administrative offence in the field of intellectual property” is proposed as envisaged by the legislation on administrative liability of socially harmful, unlawful, guilty act, committed by the subjects of such unlawful acts that encroach on the set of property and personal non-property rights to the intellectual results. It is established that all warehouses of administrative offences in the field of intellectual property (art. 51-2, 107-1, 156-3 (in the part concerning intellectual property objects), 164-3, 164-6, 164-7, 164-8, 164-9, 164-13) there are such elements as objective signs and subjective features, which in their unity form the composition of administrative offences of this group. It is noted that the only generic object of these administrative offences is the group of public relations of intellectual property, which are protected by the law on administrative liability, and the subject of this group of public relations are objects of intellectual property. It is proved that the objective side of administrative offences in the field of intellectual property is a set of ways of infringement of intellectual property rights. Attention is drawn to the fact that in practice the violation of intellectual property rights to different objects has different economic, social and legal consequences, and therefore the degree of their social harm is different, and therefore there is a need to differentiate administrative liability depending on the intellectual property. Subjective signs of the administrative offences of this group, which are represented by their subject, are established, and the subjective side is characterized by the fact that they are committed only intentionally.


Author(s):  
Константин Путря ◽  
Konstantin Putrya

The article deals with the questions of French law and the recent French judicial practice concerning the type of the registration system of property rights and the nature of the list of property rights. The author briefly reveals the basic essence of the two main types of registration systems of property rights in Europe — the French model and the German model. The author considers the idea of creating in France the new property rights by the efforts of law enforcers and the will of turnover participants and without stipulation of these new rights in the law. Then the author analyzes the arguments of the supporters of open and closed list (numerus clausus) of limited property rights. The author comes to the conclusion that sequential withdrawal of the French law from the principle of numerus clausus. On the basis of the one of judicial decisions of the Cassation Court, which became a continuation of the concept of property right reform, laid down and formed in France in 2007, the author shows that the French law prefers the open list of limited property rights or the transitional mixed nature of the list of limited property rights, which can recognize the new limited property rights created by the entities, and limited property rights already enshrined in law. The author shows and proves, using the example of French and German law that the registration system of property rights based on the “principle of inclusion”, and the registration system of property rights based on transcription-inscriptional approach can affect the nature of the list of property rights — it can be open or closed.


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 70
Author(s):  
Esperanza Castellanos Ruiz

Resumen: El Reglamento 650/2012 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 4 de julio de 2012, relativo a la competencia, la ley aplicable, el reconocimiento y la ejecución de las resoluciones, a la aceptación y la ejecución de los documentos públicos en materia de sucesiones mortis causa y a la creación de un certificado sucesorio europeo ha venido a unificar las soluciones tan dispares de Derecho internacional privado que existían en el ámbito de la Unión Europea en materia sucesoria. Reconociendo el esfuerzo de los Estados miembros por coordinar la unificación de las normas de Derecho internacional privado en este área, su aplicación no está exenta de problemas con otras materias que afectan directamente a la regulación de la sucesión de una persona, como sucede, por ejemplo, con la regulación de los derechos reales que pueden afectar a los bienes de la masa hereditaria. Partiendo de que no existe una unificación de las normas de Derecho internacional privado en materia de transmisión de la propiedad de los bienes y de los derechos reales, en general, reconocidos por los distintos Estados miembros se pueden plantear muchos problemas teniendo en cuenta la existencia de un numerus clausus de derechos reales y los distintos sistemas de inscripción registral contemplados para la adquisición de tales derechos reales. Los artículos 1 y 23 del Reglamento sucesorio intentan solucionar este conflicto. Representan las dos caras de una misma moneda pues regulan el ámbito de aplicación de la lex successionis en sentido negativo y en sentido positivo, respectivamente. Por un lado, el artículo 1 recoge las cuestiones excluidas del ámbito de aplicación del Reglamento y, por otro lado, el artículo 23 recoge las cuestiones incluidas en su ámbito de aplicación. Sin embargo, la colisión se plantea en relación con la aplicación de la lex rei sitae a determinadas cuestiones sucesorias que están incluidas en el ámbito de aplicación de la lex succesionis a las que hay que aplicar cumulativamente la dos Leyes. Así, la Ley sucesoria regula la transmisión a los herederos, y en su caso, a los legatarios, de los bienes que integran la herencia, según recoge la letra e) del artículo 23.2, y las letras k) y l) del artículo 1.2, excluyen de la aplicación de la ley sucesoria la naturaleza de los derechos reales y cualquier inscripción de derechos sobre bienes muebles o inmuebles en un registro; cuestiones que, en la mayoría de los casos, quedan sometidas a la lex rei sitae o lex registrationis. Este conflicto de leyes es lo que ha provocado la primera decisión del TJUE sobre el Reglamento sucesorio: Sentencia del Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea, Sala Segunda, de 12 de octubre de 2017: Kubicka.Palabras clave: Sucesión internacional, lex successionis, lex rei sitae, lex registrationis, ámbito de la ley aplicable, derechos reales, derechos de propiedad, legatum per vindicationem y per damnationem.Abstract: Regulation (EU) no. 650/2012 of the European Parliament and the Council of 4 July2012 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of Succession is one of the most important results hitherto achieved for codifying private international law which the European Union. Recognizing the effort of the Member States to coordinate the unification of the rules of private international law in this area, its application is not exempt from problems with other areas that directly affect the regulation of the succession of a person, as happens for example with the regulation of property law that may affect the inheritance assets. Recognition of foreign property law may create problems in light of a Member State’s numerus clausus of property rights and differing land registration regimes. The study of the matters governed by the lex successionis, listed in article 23.2 ESR, must be done taking into account article 1.2 ESR, setting out the issues which are excluyed from the lex successionis scope. Often the exclusion or inclusion of particular matters from or within the scope of application of the lex successionis are two sides of the same coin. In other words, article 1.2 ESR governs the scope of application in a negative sense and article 23.2 ESR in a positive sense. However, the collision arises in relation to the application of the lex rei sitae to certain inheritance questions that are included in the scope of application of lex successionis to which the two Acts must be applied cumulatively. This is what happens with the regulation by lex successionis of the transfer to the heirs and, as the case may be, to the legatees of the assets, rights and obligations forming part of the estate, including the conditions and effects of the acceptance or waiver of the succession or of a legacy, according to letter e) of art. 23.2, bearing in mind that the letters k) and l) of art. 1.2, exclude from the application of the succession law the nature of rights in rem; and any recording in a register of rights in immovable or movable property, including the legal requirements for such recording, and the effects of recording or failing to record such rights in a register; issues that, in most cases, are subject to the lex rei sitae or lex registrationis. This conflict of laws is what led to the first decision of the CJEU on the Succession Regulation: Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, Second Chamber, of October 12, 2017: Kubicka.Keywords: International succession, lex successionis, lex rei sitae, lex registrationis, the scope of the aplicable law, rights in rem, property rights, legatum per vindicationem y per damnationem 


2021 ◽  
pp. 150-171
Author(s):  
Ben McFarlane ◽  
Nicholas Hopkins ◽  
Sarah Nield

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing able students with a stand-alone resource. This chapter investigates legal property rights in land and their content. The numerus clausus (or ‘closed list’) principle is of crucial importance when addressing the content question in relation to legal property rights in land. The Law of Property Act 1925 (LPA 1925) divides such rights into legal estates and legal interests. As a result of s 1 of LPA 1925, there are now only two permissible legal estates in land. The chapter then explores the content of a freehold and of a lease, and covers the vital question of why the LPA 1925 imposed this limit on the types of permissible legal estate in land. The facts of Hill v Tupper and Keppell v Bailey offer particular examples of a more general question that land law has to tackle when deciding on the content of legal interests in land.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document