scholarly journals Commodifying Human Life: The Numerus Clausus Principle and Unconventional Property Rights

2013 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua K. Wasylciw ◽  
Scott Nicholas Romaniuk
Land Law ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben McFarlane ◽  
Nicholas Hopkins ◽  
Sarah Nield

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing able students with a stand-alone resource.This chapter investigates legal property rights in land. The numerus clausus (or ‘closed list’) principle is of crucial importance when addressing the content question of legal property rights in land. The Law of Property Act 1925 (LPA 1925) creates a distinction between legal estates and legal interests. As a result of s 1 of LPA 1925, there are now only two permissible legal estates in land. The chapter then explores the content of a freehold and of a lease, and covers the vital question of why the LPA 1925 imposed this limit on the types of permissible legal estate in land. The facts of Hill v Tupper and Keppell v Bailey offer particular examples of a more general question that land law has to tackle when deciding on the content of legal interests in land.


Author(s):  
Константин Путря ◽  
Konstantin Putrya

The article deals with the questions of French law and the recent French judicial practice concerning the type of the registration system of property rights and the nature of the list of property rights. The author briefly reveals the basic essence of the two main types of registration systems of property rights in Europe — the French model and the German model. The author considers the idea of creating in France the new property rights by the efforts of law enforcers and the will of turnover participants and without stipulation of these new rights in the law. Then the author analyzes the arguments of the supporters of open and closed list (numerus clausus) of limited property rights. The author comes to the conclusion that sequential withdrawal of the French law from the principle of numerus clausus. On the basis of the one of judicial decisions of the Cassation Court, which became a continuation of the concept of property right reform, laid down and formed in France in 2007, the author shows that the French law prefers the open list of limited property rights or the transitional mixed nature of the list of limited property rights, which can recognize the new limited property rights created by the entities, and limited property rights already enshrined in law. The author shows and proves, using the example of French and German law that the registration system of property rights based on the “principle of inclusion”, and the registration system of property rights based on transcription-inscriptional approach can affect the nature of the list of property rights — it can be open or closed.


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-127
Author(s):  
Jonwari

Islam gives color to every dimension of human life, including the economic world. This Islamic system tries to dialecticize economic values ​​with the values ​​of faith or ethics in accordance with Islamic teachings. especially in buying and selling transactions, which are required to meet all the requirements and bowls, in order to avoid the practice of Fudhuli as happened in the scrap metal company in Sumber Anyar Village, Banyuputih District, Situbondo Regency. Based on the conclusion, it can be seen that the practice of Fudhuli that occurs in the scrap metal company in Sumber Anyar Village, Banyuputih District, Situbondo Regency is in accordance with the Fudhuli theory which is explained in the fiqh books because one of the conditions for goods being transacted is not fulfilled, namely: property rights or ownership rights to the goods being transacted, as well as the application of business ethics through Fudhuli practice in accordance with the principle of honesty where after the goods are sold the owner is confirmed, and in accordance with the principle of responsibility and mutual help where the employees are selling the goods owned by the factory aims to help the factory where he works because he sees his goods are just wastedn.  


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-37
Author(s):  
Ida Ayu Sadnyini ◽  
I Gede Putu Agus Wistama Putra ◽  
A.A.A.Ngurah Sri Rahayu Gorda ◽  
A.A.A. Ngurah Tini Rusmini Gorda

Intellectual property is creativity that results from human thought in order to meet the needs and welfare of human life. Currently, IPR issues are widely discussed in the context of international issues. IPR includes two parts, namely Copyrights and Industrial Property Rights. Industrial property rights include patents, industrial designs, integrated circuits layout designs, trade secrets, geographic indications, trademarks and plant variety protection (PVP). Interior design is part of industrial design. Interior design has experienced significant developments in recent years, including in Indonesia. Problems that arises is plagiarisms done by imitating or using the "similarity" of an interior design that already has an industrial design certificate without any permission from the design owner. This study aims to find out the legal protection of interior design in the intellectual property rights of industrial design and the legal basis used by judges in deciding industrial design rights disputes. The result of this study showed that the legal protection of interior design in the intellectual property rights of industrial design involved two legal protections; they are preventive legal protections and repressive legal protections. Furthermore, Gustav Radbruch's theory of legal ideals is used as a legal basis in deciding cases of disputes over industrial design rights based on justice, benefits, and legal certainty in the case of industrial design disputes Ecosfera Room.  


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 70
Author(s):  
Esperanza Castellanos Ruiz

Resumen: El Reglamento 650/2012 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 4 de julio de 2012, relativo a la competencia, la ley aplicable, el reconocimiento y la ejecución de las resoluciones, a la aceptación y la ejecución de los documentos públicos en materia de sucesiones mortis causa y a la creación de un certificado sucesorio europeo ha venido a unificar las soluciones tan dispares de Derecho internacional privado que existían en el ámbito de la Unión Europea en materia sucesoria. Reconociendo el esfuerzo de los Estados miembros por coordinar la unificación de las normas de Derecho internacional privado en este área, su aplicación no está exenta de problemas con otras materias que afectan directamente a la regulación de la sucesión de una persona, como sucede, por ejemplo, con la regulación de los derechos reales que pueden afectar a los bienes de la masa hereditaria. Partiendo de que no existe una unificación de las normas de Derecho internacional privado en materia de transmisión de la propiedad de los bienes y de los derechos reales, en general, reconocidos por los distintos Estados miembros se pueden plantear muchos problemas teniendo en cuenta la existencia de un numerus clausus de derechos reales y los distintos sistemas de inscripción registral contemplados para la adquisición de tales derechos reales. Los artículos 1 y 23 del Reglamento sucesorio intentan solucionar este conflicto. Representan las dos caras de una misma moneda pues regulan el ámbito de aplicación de la lex successionis en sentido negativo y en sentido positivo, respectivamente. Por un lado, el artículo 1 recoge las cuestiones excluidas del ámbito de aplicación del Reglamento y, por otro lado, el artículo 23 recoge las cuestiones incluidas en su ámbito de aplicación. Sin embargo, la colisión se plantea en relación con la aplicación de la lex rei sitae a determinadas cuestiones sucesorias que están incluidas en el ámbito de aplicación de la lex succesionis a las que hay que aplicar cumulativamente la dos Leyes. Así, la Ley sucesoria regula la transmisión a los herederos, y en su caso, a los legatarios, de los bienes que integran la herencia, según recoge la letra e) del artículo 23.2, y las letras k) y l) del artículo 1.2, excluyen de la aplicación de la ley sucesoria la naturaleza de los derechos reales y cualquier inscripción de derechos sobre bienes muebles o inmuebles en un registro; cuestiones que, en la mayoría de los casos, quedan sometidas a la lex rei sitae o lex registrationis. Este conflicto de leyes es lo que ha provocado la primera decisión del TJUE sobre el Reglamento sucesorio: Sentencia del Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea, Sala Segunda, de 12 de octubre de 2017: Kubicka.Palabras clave: Sucesión internacional, lex successionis, lex rei sitae, lex registrationis, ámbito de la ley aplicable, derechos reales, derechos de propiedad, legatum per vindicationem y per damnationem.Abstract: Regulation (EU) no. 650/2012 of the European Parliament and the Council of 4 July2012 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of Succession is one of the most important results hitherto achieved for codifying private international law which the European Union. Recognizing the effort of the Member States to coordinate the unification of the rules of private international law in this area, its application is not exempt from problems with other areas that directly affect the regulation of the succession of a person, as happens for example with the regulation of property law that may affect the inheritance assets. Recognition of foreign property law may create problems in light of a Member State’s numerus clausus of property rights and differing land registration regimes. The study of the matters governed by the lex successionis, listed in article 23.2 ESR, must be done taking into account article 1.2 ESR, setting out the issues which are excluyed from the lex successionis scope. Often the exclusion or inclusion of particular matters from or within the scope of application of the lex successionis are two sides of the same coin. In other words, article 1.2 ESR governs the scope of application in a negative sense and article 23.2 ESR in a positive sense. However, the collision arises in relation to the application of the lex rei sitae to certain inheritance questions that are included in the scope of application of lex successionis to which the two Acts must be applied cumulatively. This is what happens with the regulation by lex successionis of the transfer to the heirs and, as the case may be, to the legatees of the assets, rights and obligations forming part of the estate, including the conditions and effects of the acceptance or waiver of the succession or of a legacy, according to letter e) of art. 23.2, bearing in mind that the letters k) and l) of art. 1.2, exclude from the application of the succession law the nature of rights in rem; and any recording in a register of rights in immovable or movable property, including the legal requirements for such recording, and the effects of recording or failing to record such rights in a register; issues that, in most cases, are subject to the lex rei sitae or lex registrationis. This conflict of laws is what led to the first decision of the CJEU on the Succession Regulation: Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, Second Chamber, of October 12, 2017: Kubicka.Keywords: International succession, lex successionis, lex rei sitae, lex registrationis, the scope of the aplicable law, rights in rem, property rights, legatum per vindicationem y per damnationem 


2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 242-263 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johan Olsthoorn

Abstract:This essay explores the meaning and normative significance of Locke’s depiction of individuals as proprietors of their own person. I begin by reconsidering the long-standing puzzle concerning Locke’s simultaneous endorsement of divine proprietorship and self-ownership. Befuddlement vanishes, I contend, once we reject concurrent ownership in the same object: while God fully owns our lives, humans are initially sole proprietors of their own person. (Our property rights in our life and body are restricted to possession, use, and usufruct.) Locke employs two conceptions of “personhood”: as expressing legal independence vis-à-vis humans and moral accountability vis-à-vis God. Humans own their person in the first sense. As original proprietors of their own person, individuals are entitled to subject themselves to self-chosen authorities, thereby incurring obligations of obedience. But they may not choose just any authority. Divine ownership of human life delimits personal self-ownership by restricting the ways in which humans can dispose of their persons: we cannot possibly consensually subject ourselves to absolute and arbitrary power. Locke’s rights-forfeiture theory for crime makes slavery and despotism nonetheless potentially rightful conditions. I argue that, paradoxically, divine dominium of human life underpins both the impermissibility of voluntary enslavement and the justifiability of penal slavery. My analysis helps explain why modern Lockean theories of self-ownership that reject Locke’s theological premises have adopted an ambiguous stance toward despotic rule.


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