Personal Jurisdiction and Fifth Amendment Due Process Revisited

2020 ◽  
pp. 231-250
Author(s):  
Chimène I. Keitner

This chapter addresses the contested role of U.S. courts in adjudicating disputes with foreign elements. As a matter of domestic law, the Due Process Clauses in the U.S. Constitution constrain the scope of adjudicatory jurisdiction that legislatures can confer on State and federal courts. The Fourth Restatement restates the U.S. law of personal jurisdiction in civil proceedings as requiring that “sufficient contacts” exist between the defendant and the forum, “and that the exercise of jurisdiction be reasonable.” These criteria limit the reach of U.S. courts’ personal jurisdiction. The chapter explores these limits and Congress’s ability to extend them. It also revisits the history and jurisprudence of Fifth Amendment due process limits on personal jurisdiction, considering the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act of 2018 (ATCA) and the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of 2019 (PSJVTA).

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew D. Bradt ◽  
Zachary D. Clopton ◽  
Maggie Gardner ◽  
D. Theodore Rave ◽  
Pamela K. Bookman

Petitioner Bristol-Myers Squibb argues that specific personal jurisdiction “exists only where the defendant’s contacts with the forum caused the plaintiff’s alleged injuries and the resulting suit.” Pet. Br. 17 (emphasis added). This has never been the law. While general jurisdiction may be amenable to narrowly defined categories, specific jurisdiction is not. Ever since this Court’s pathmarking decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, specific jurisdiction has been a far more flexible inquiry into the relationship among the forum, the defendant, and the dispute. This is as it should be. Requiring that specific jurisdiction rest on a strict causal link between the defendant’s forum-state contacts and the plaintiff’s claims provides no new benefits. Yet it would create uncertainty, risk destabilizing the system of litigation in both state and federal courts, and cast doubt on several of this Court’s earlier personal jurisdiction decisions.The current law, as established by this Court, is well calibrated both to ensure an appropriate forum for lawsuits and to prevent unfairness to defendants. To affirm the decision of the California Supreme Court in this case, the Court need only hold that Petitioner has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in California (which no one disputes), Respondents’ claims relate to Petitioner’s California contacts (which is barely, if at all, disputed), and California’s assertion of jurisdiction is reasonable (which Petitioner has effectively conceded (Pet. App. 35a)). No more need be said.The purpose of this brief is to explain why Petitioner’s proposed causation rule is a historical, inconsistent with the principles of personal jurisdiction, potentially destabilizing, and unnecessary to protect defendants from abusive exercises of state power. In short, this Court should decline to adopt petitioner’s proposal and should leave the law on specific jurisdiction unchanged for three reasons.First, this Court has never relied on a causation requirement to endorse — or reject — a state’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant. In fact, for this Court to do so would be inconsistent with a number of cases in which this Court found — or all involved assumed — that there was personal jurisdiction over claims against the defendant that were not caused by its forum-state contacts.Second, changing course now by adopting a causation requirement would lead to disruptive, inefficient, and unfair results — in both simple and complex litigation, and in both state and federal courts. A new causation test would throw into doubt even chestnuts of the first-year jurisdictional curriculum, like World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson. And it could wreak havoc with the way courts resolve our most complicated and economically important disputes, like the extensive litigation arising out of the ongoing Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” scandal.Third, it is unnecessary to take that risk in order to protect defendants from litigating in an unfair forum. Indeed, in this case, Petitioner has not even argued that California is an unfair place to litigate. To the extent that Petitioner’s concern is being haled into an inconvenient or distant forum, those concerns are already addressed in this Court’s requirement that any exercise of personal jurisdiction be reasonable. And in cases where another court is manifestly more appropriate, defendants may move to transfer the case or dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds. To the extent that Petitioner’s concerns relate to the law a court applies, such concerns are covered by each state’s choice-of-law rules and the constitutional restrictions on those rules. To the extent that Petitioner’s concerns relate to a state’s hostility towards out-of-state corporations, such concerns are addressed by diversity jurisdiction. Remedies for any such bias are therefore best left to Congress in defining the right to remove and the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. Finally, to the extent that Petitioner’s concerns are that the cases are being litigated against it at all — as Petitioner candidly admitted before the Court of Appeal — those concerns are not covered by the Due Process Clause.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zachary D. Clopton

70 Stanford Law Review 1077 (2018)Civics class teaches the traditional mode of law enforcement: The legislature adopts a regulatory statute, and the executive enforces it in the courts. But in an increasingly interconnected world, a nontraditional form of regulatory litigation is possible in which public enforcers from one government enforce laws adopted by a second government in the second government’s courts. That is, one government provides the executive while the second provides the legislature and the judiciary. I call this nontraditional form “diagonal public enforcement.”Although diagonal public enforcement has escaped systematic study, one can find examples in U.S. courts going back more than a century. Foreign governments have used U.S. courts to enforce federal antitrust laws, state environmental laws, and civil rights statutes, among others. Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court heard a case in which the European Community sued U.S. tobacco companies in a federal court in New York under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Diagonal public enforcement occurs within the U.S. system as well. States routinely enforce federal laws in federal courts, and opportunities exist for states to enforce sister-state law, especially with respect to climate change and other cross-border issues.Despite these examples, some view diagonal public enforcement as a category error: Why would legislatures rely on foreign governments to enforce domestic law, and why would foreign executives take up the task? In light of these questions, this Article attempts to demystify diagonal public enforcement by exploring when it is consistent with the rational pursuit of legislative and executive interests. Legislatures are likely to authorize diagonal public enforcement in order to increase deterrence or influence global regulation. Executives are likely to forum shop for diagonal options in order to achieve better outcomes in foreign courts. These predictions explain existing patterns of enforcement and suggest a larger role for diagonal public enforcement in the coming years.Finally, this Article critically evaluates the costs and benefits of diagonal public enforcement at the interstate, intrastate, and individual levels. At first glance, diagonal public enforcement may seem to raise concerns about the diffusion of regulatory authority, the extraterritorial reach of domestic law, and the interference in relationships with foreign sovereigns. Upon closer scrutiny, however, diagonal public enforcement turns out to have the capacity to improve enforcement efficacy, promote the public interest, protect foreign and minority interests, and nudge gridlocked institutions. At least under certain conditions, therefore, these transgovernmental cases may be models for deeper cooperation and improved enforcement.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason Chin

In response to what has been termed the “replicability crisis,” great changes are currently under way in how science is conducted and disseminated. A question therefore arises over how such change impacts law’s treatment of scientific evidence. The present standard for the admissibility of scientific evidence in federal courts in the U.S. asks judges to play the role of gatekeeper, determining if the proffered evidence conforms with several indicia of scientific validity. The replicability crisis, however, has demonstrated that these indicia frequently fail to adequately capture, or have lagged behind, science’s best practices. Therefore, this article suggests that as much as the replicability crisis highlights serious issues in the scientific process, it should have similar implications and actionable consequences for legal practitioners and academics. The Article concludes with some suggestions to help ensure that legal decisions are influenced by the best science has to offer.


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