ESTOPPEL IN THE CONTEXT OF RUSSIAN CIVIL PROCEDURE: ASPECTS OF THEORY AND PRACTICE

Substantive due process is commonly recognized as fundamental guarantee of a person’s access to justice. One of the main conditions guaranteeing observance of the due process is litigants’ comprehensive sets of procedural rights. Ways in which they can assert their rights should be exhaustively defined as well. The extent of thoroughness of regulation may be different but it may not be absent. In that respect estoppel as a legal principle, which lacks formal requirements in the law, is problematic. The sustainability of judgements which are reasoned by way of employing a broad undefined concept of estoppel is questioned. One of the biggest doubts discussed is the viability of an idea where promissory estoppel is used as a source of a general estoppel concept. It is argued that promissory estoppel being a specific English obligation law instrument cannot be used as a source of limiting procedural rights of litigants. As for estoppel by representation, it can be safely adopted because of its nature as a source of identifying principal issues of fact. It has nothing to do with establishing or banning any personal or procedural rights. But in order to safely implement this type of estoppel it has to be thoroughly considered as to how exactly this instrument of procedure will be married with the current court’s legal duties. It has to decide cases upon all and truly established issues of fact in question. The problem is not a trivial one as even in leading English legal texts it is recognized the contradiction between court’s inquisitorial duties and using of these types of estoppel.

PENDEKATAN SOSIOLOGI HUKUM DALAM MEMAHAMI KONFLIK PERATURAN PERUNDANG-UNDANGAN DI INDONESIA

<p><strong><em>Abstract</em></strong></p><p><em>The issue of regulation has indeed become a lively discourse in recent years. Laws and </em> <em>regulations, which in essence is a set of regulatory systems to provide an orderly legal order and society, often creates conflicts, both internal conflicts between regulations and external conflicts involving government agencies and the community. The study of legal science in the perspective of sociological jurisprudence is a scientific instrument that makes sense to analyze the phenomenon of legal problems that occur in indonesia, this is because the beginning and the end of a regulation is society. The results show that regulatory conflicts occur because in practice the formation of laws and regulations often ignores procedural due process of law and substantive due process of law, one of the main points is that the widest possible public participation is required in the regulatory formation process. As a result, several regulations that have been produced often cause conflicts due to a mismatch between the substance of the regulations and the conditions and needs of the community.</em></p><p><strong> </strong></p><p><strong>Abstrak</strong></p><p>Isu permasalahan regulasi menjadi diskursus yang sering mencuat beberapa tahun terakhir. Peraturan perundang-undangan yang esensinya merupakan sekumpulan sistem aturan untuk menghadirkan tatanan hukum dan masyarakat yang tertib, justru realitanya sering kali memunculkan konflik, baik konflik internal antar peraturan maupun konflik eksternal yang melibatkan lembaga pemerintahan dan masyarakat. Kajian ilmu hukum dalam perspektif sosiologi hukum menjadi instrumen keilmuan yang masuk akal untuk membedah fenomena permasalahan peraturan perundang-undangan yang terjadi, hal ini dikarenakan hulu dan hilir suatu regulasi adalah masyarakat. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa konflik regulasi terjadi dikarenakan di dalam praktik pembentukan peraturan perundang-undangan masih sering kali mengabaikan <em>procedural due process of law </em>dan <em>substantive due process of law </em>yang salah satu poin utamanya adalah dibutuhkan partisipasi publik yang seluas-luasnya di dalam proses pembentukan peraturan. Alhasil beberapa regulasi yang dihasilkan kerap menimbulkan konflik dikarenkan ketidaksesuaian antara substansi peraturan dengan keadaan dan kebutuhan di masyarakat.</p>

A propósito de la oposición formal/material: cuatro aproximaciones interdisciplinares sobre un mismo tema = On the formal/substantive opposition: four interdisciplinary approaches on the same subject

Resumen : El pensamiento cientifista moderno que pretende obtener certezas mediante la búsqueda de afirmaciones indiscutibles sobre hechos irrefutables derivados de la protocolización y estandarización de procedimientos que nos alejen del debate sobre los valores e intereses particulares, ha olvidado que la formalización que requiere el diseño de todo procedimiento aplicable a casos concretos supone siempre la incorporación de finalidades relativas a valores e intereses. Este olvido, propio del pensamiento moderno, se ha visto acompañado de otra actitud: la hiperespecialización de las disciplinas, de manera que sus consecuencias y los debates sobre las mismas en una especie de constante reinvención de la rueda se han reproducido estérilmente. Mediante un estudio interdisciplinar que pone de manifiesto las líneas comunes en debates paradigmáticos en los campos del derecho, la retórica, la lingüística, la ciencia cognitiva y la inteligencia artificial simbólica, así como la teoría política, pretendemos poner de manifiesto la incapacidad de las teorías procesualistas de satisfacer esa aspiración de certeza y neutralidad absoluta propia de las sociedades postmetafísicas en sentido habermasiano.Palabras clave: Debido proceso, debido proceso sustantivo, inteligencia artificial simbólica, filosofía política, J.Rawls, J. Habermas, C. Mouffe. Abstract :The modern scientificist thought that seeks to obtain certainty through the search for indisputable statements about irrefutable facts derived from the protocolization and standardization of procedures that take us away from the debate on particular values and interests, has forgotten that the formalization required for the design of any procedure applicable to specific cases always involves the addition of purposes related to values and interests. This oversight, typical of modern thought, has been accompanied by another attitude: the hyperspecialization of the disciplines, so that its consequences and the debates about them in a kind of constant reinvention of the wheel have been reproduced sterilely. Through an interdisciplinary study that highlights the common lines in paradigmatic debates in the fields of law, rhetoric, linguistics, cognitive science and symbolic artificial intelligence, as well as political theory, we intend to emphasize the inability of processual theories to satisfy an aspiration of absolute neutrality typical of postmetaphysical societies in the Habermasian sense. Keywords: Due process, substantive due process, symbolic artificial intelligence, political philosophy, J. Rawls, J. Habermas, C. Mouffe.

Protecting a Federal Right to Educational Equality and Adequacy

In this chapter, Joshua E. Weishart notes that courts have resolved lawsuits invoking state constitutional rights in ways that have subdued the tension between two principles of justice: equality and liberty. The equality versus adequacy debate in school funding challenges at first stoked that tension until court decisions gradually demonstrated their potential interrelation. State constitutions, however, do not fix standards for the mutual enforcement of educational equality and adequacy, and thus, courts have struggled with remedies that serve both aims. Weishart contends that reconciliation ultimately must come through reconceptualizing children’s equality and liberty interests as an integral demand for equal liberty, one that treats differently situated children according to their needs so as to cultivate positive freedoms for equal citizenship. A federal right to education can elucidate this demand and facilitate its enforcement, aligning with the newly professed synergy between equal protection and substantive due process.

Implying a Federal Constitutional Right to Education

In this chapter, Derek W. Black surveys the various litigation, judicial, and scholarly theories through which courts might recognize a right to education under the United States Constitution. He begins by sorting those theories into their major doctrinal categories and subcategories and explaining their basic arguments, including substantive due process, equal protection, privileges and immunities, citizenship, and originalism. Black then critically evaluates those theories, examining both the positives and negatives of the leading theories. He concludes that while a number of theories are plausible, scholarly theories have tended toward originalism in recent years and are the most likely to be successful before the courts.

The Prospects of the New Proceduralism

The final chapter illuminates the book’s most significant implications. It first highlights the project’s improvements on extant versions of proceduralism. Targeting both legal and philosophical proceduralist critiques, it recounts how they fall prey to the retributivist challenge and unwittingly entail wholesale abolition. The procedural abolitionism developed here, it turns out, has no such shortcomings. The second part of the chapter assesses the book’s contributions to the constitutional debate over capital punishment, analyzing Judge Rakoff’s opinion in United States v. Quinones. Rakoff holds that the specter of irrevocable mistake renders capital punishment unconstitutional on substantive due process grounds; this ruling suggests that substantive due process furnishes the vehicle by which proceduralism could make inroads with a future Supreme Court. However, Quinones was overturned, mainly because its emphasis on error correction conflicts with the hallowed value of finality. Chapter 5 argues that the associated concerns do not generate reasons to reject abolitionism.