Objections
This chapter addresses theoretical and empirical objections that critics have presented against the epistemic argument for democracy presented in the previous chapter (the argument from collective wisdom). The objections this chapter addresses include those based on the average voter’s alleged incompetence and systematic biases, as well as those that challenge the relevance of deductive arguments for democracy. The metrics by which political scientists and economists claim to measure voters’ incompetence are elitist and the argument “garbage in, garbage out” on which people like Brennan rely to criticize democracy fail to take into account the fact that collective intelligence is not a linear function of individual competence but an emergent property that crucially depends on group properties, including cognitive diversity, and thus not captured by Brennan’s purely individualistic framework. Inferring from individual input to collective outcomes is thus neither empirical nor demonstrative. Systematic biases would be, and often are, a problem for democracy but not more than for oligarchies of knowers. In a free and diverse public sphere the public and its democratic representatives have more opportunities to debias themselves, at least over time, than small groups of homogenously thinking elites.