Epistemic Akrasia

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Owens
Keyword(s):  
Higher Order ◽  
Epistemic Akrasia ◽  
First Order

In a case of practical akrasia, we freely do something even though we judge that we ought not to do it. This chapter discusses the possibility of epistemic akrasia. Epistemic akrasia is possible only if (a) a person’s (first-order) beliefs can diverge from their higher-order judgements about what it would be reasonable for them to believe, and (b) these divergent (first-order) beliefs are freely and deliberately formed. Several recent authors deny the possibility of epistemic akrasia because they doubt that (a) can be true. I argue that though (a) can indeed be true, (b) cannot. On this point, believing is contrasted with guessing.

scholarly journals Suspension, Higher-Order Evidence, and Defeat

2021 ◽  
pp. 116-145
Author(s):  
Errol Lord ◽  
Kurt Sylvan
Keyword(s):  
Higher Order ◽  
Functional Profile ◽  
Reasons For Belief ◽  
Epistemic Akrasia ◽  
First Order ◽  
Evidential Support ◽  
Support Relations ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Suspension Of Judgment ◽  
Higher Order Evidence

This paper has two main goals. The first and most central goal is to develop a framework for understanding higher-order defeat. The framework rests on the idea that higher-order evidence provides direct reasons for suspending judgment which leave evidential support relations on the first order intact. Equally importantly, we also seek to explain how this sort of defeat is possible by showing how direct reasons for suspension of judgment flow from the functional profile of suspension of judgment. As a result, our framework is embedded within an account of the nature of suspension of judgment that shows how new insights about its nature lead to a different picture of its rational profile. A second and subsidiary goal of the paper is to show how our framework provides a compelling basis for more moderate positions about disagreement and epistemic akrasia. We show that the puzzles about these topics rest on more fundamental mistakes about suspension and the relationship between reasons for suspension, reasons for belief, and evidence.

scholarly journals EPISTEMIC AKRASIA AND EPISTEMIC REASONS

Episteme ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 282-302 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc-Kevin Daoust
Keyword(s):  
Partial Solution ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Epistemic Rationality ◽  
Epistemic Reasons ◽  
Rational Agents ◽  
Epistemic Akrasia ◽  
First Order ◽  
Theoretical Assumptions ◽  
Square Well

ABSTRACTIt seems that epistemically rational agents should avoid incoherent combinations of beliefs and should respond correctly to their epistemic reasons. However, some situations seem to indicate that such requirements cannot be simultaneously satisfied. In such contexts, assuming that there is no unsolvable dilemma of epistemic rationality, either (i) it could be rational that one's higher-order attitudes do not align with one's first-order attitudes or (ii) requirements such as responding correctly to epistemic reasons that agents have are not genuine rationality requirements. This result doesn't square well with plausible theoretical assumptions concerning epistemic rationality. So, how do we solve this puzzle? In this paper, I will suggest that an agent can always reason from infallible higher-order reasons. This provides a partial solution to the above puzzle.

Epistemic Akrasia, Higher-order Evidence, and Charitable Belief Attribution

2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 296-314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hamid Vahid
Keyword(s):  
Higher Order ◽  
Epistemic Status ◽  
Belief Attribution ◽  
Radical Interpretation ◽  
Standard Argument ◽  
Epistemic Akrasia ◽  
First Order ◽  
Higher Order Evidence

Epistemic akrasia refers to the possibility of forming an attitude that fails to conform to one’s best judgment. In this paper, I will be concerned with the question whether epistemic akrasia is rational and I will argue that it is not. Addressing this question, in turn, raises the question of the epistemic significance of higher-order evidence. After examining some of the views on this subject, I will present an argument to show why higher-order evidence is relevant to the epistemic status of the pertinent first-order beliefs. This helps to show why a standard argument for the rationality of epistemic akrasia does not work. Finally, I shall try to show how considerations involving Davidson’s theory of radical interpretation bear on the question of the rationality of epistemic akrasia.

scholarly journals Higher-Order Uncertainty

2019 ◽  
pp. 35-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Dorst
Keyword(s):  
Higher Order ◽  
Clear Picture ◽  
Central Question ◽  
Epistemology Of Disagreement ◽  
Epistemic Akrasia ◽  
First Order ◽  
Higher Order Evidence

You have higher-order uncertainty iff you are uncertain of what opinions you should have. This chapter defends three claims about it. First, the higher-order evidence debate can be helpfully reframed in terms of higher-order uncertainty. The central question becomes how your first- and higher-order opinions should relate—a precise question that can be embedded within a general, tractable framework. Second, this question is nontrivial. Rational higher-order uncertainty is pervasive, and lies at the foundations of the epistemology of disagreement. Third, the answer is not obvious. The Enkratic Intuition—that your first-order opinions must “line up” with your higher-order opinions—is incorrect; epistemic akrasia can be rational. If all this is right, then it leaves us without answers—but with a clear picture of the question, and a fruitful strategy for pursuing it.

Dual systems for all: Higher-order, role-based relational reasoning as a uniquely derived feature of human cognition

2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel J. Povinelli ◽  
Gabrielle C. Glorioso ◽  
Shannon L. Kuznar ◽  
Mateja Pavlic
Keyword(s):  
Temporal Reasoning ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Important Case ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Relational Reasoning ◽  
Dual Systems ◽  
First Order ◽  
Reasoning System ◽  
Role Based

Abstract Hoerl and McCormack demonstrate that although animals possess a sophisticated temporal updating system, there is no evidence that they also possess a temporal reasoning system. This important case study is directly related to the broader claim that although animals are manifestly capable of first-order (perceptually-based) relational reasoning, they lack the capacity for higher-order, role-based relational reasoning. We argue this distinction applies to all domains of cognition.

Challenging the Multidimensional Conception of Perceived Person-Environment Fit

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Julian M. Etzel ◽  
Gabriel Nagy
Keyword(s):  
Higher Education ◽  
University Students ◽  
Educational Outcomes ◽  
Factor Model ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Substantial Proportion ◽  
Unique Variance ◽  
First Order ◽  
Person Environment Fit ◽  
Order Factor

Abstract. In the current study, we examined the viability of a multidimensional conception of perceived person-environment (P-E) fit in higher education. We introduce an optimized 12-item measure that distinguishes between four content dimensions of perceived P-E fit: interest-contents (I-C) fit, needs-supplies (N-S) fit, demands-abilities (D-A) fit, and values-culture (V-C) fit. The central aim of our study was to examine whether the relationships between different P-E fit dimensions and educational outcomes can be accounted for by a higher-order factor that captures the shared features of the four fit dimensions. Relying on a large sample of university students in Germany, we found that students distinguish between the proposed fit dimensions. The respective first-order factors shared a substantial proportion of variance and conformed to a higher-order factor model. Using a newly developed factor extension procedure, we found that the relationships between the first-order factors and most outcomes were not fully accounted for by the higher-order factor. Rather, with the exception of V-C fit, all specific P-E fit factors that represent the first-order factors’ unique variance showed reliable and theoretically plausible relationships with different outcomes. These findings support the viability of a multidimensional conceptualization of P-E fit and the validity of our adapted instrument.

Computational Models for Multilayered Composite Shells with Application to Tires

1996 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. M. Kulikov
Keyword(s):  
Type Theory ◽  
Computational Models ◽  
Geometrical Nonlinearity ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Stress Strain ◽  
Strain Fields ◽  
First Order ◽  
Timoshenko Type ◽  
Joint Influence ◽  
Discrete Layer

Abstract This paper focuses on four tire computational models based on two-dimensional shear deformation theories, namely, the first-order Timoshenko-type theory, the higher-order Timoshenko-type theory, the first-order discrete-layer theory, and the higher-order discrete-layer theory. The joint influence of anisotropy, geometrical nonlinearity, and laminated material response on the tire stress-strain fields is examined. The comparative analysis of stresses and strains of the cord-rubber tire on the basis of these four shell computational models is given. Results show that neglecting the effect of anisotropy leads to an incorrect description of the stress-strain fields even in bias-ply tires.

scholarly journals Simpson type inequalities and applications

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammad Uzair Awan ◽  
Muhammad Zakria Javed ◽  
Michael Th. Rassias ◽  
Muhammad Aslam Noor ◽  
Khalida Inayat Noor
Keyword(s):  
Quadrature Formula ◽  
Convex Functions ◽  
Integral Identity ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Auxiliary Result ◽  
First Order ◽  
New Class ◽  
Differentiable Functions

AbstractA new generalized integral identity involving first order differentiable functions is obtained. Using this identity as an auxiliary result, we then obtain some new refinements of Simpson type inequalities using a new class called as strongly (s, m)-convex functions of higher order of $$\sigma >0$$ σ > 0 . We also discuss some interesting applications of the obtained results in the theory of means. In last we present applications of the obtained results in obtaining Simpson-like quadrature formula.

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