Predicting children’s and adults’ preferences in physical interactions via physics simulation

Curiosity is a fundamental driver of human behavior, and yet because of its open-ended nature and the wide variety of behaviors it inspires in different contexts, it is remarkably difficult to study in a laboratory context. A promising approach to developing and testing theories of curiosity is to instantiate them in artificial agents that are able to act and explore in a simulated environment, and then compare the behavior of these agents to humans exploring the same stimuli. Here we propose a new experimental paradigm for examining children’s – and AI agents’ – curiosity about objects’ physical interactions. We let them choose which object to drop another object onto in order to create the most interesting effect. We compared adults’ (N=155) and children’s choices (N=66; 3-7 year-olds) and found that both children and adults show a strong preference for choosing target objects that could potentially contain the dropped object. Adults alone also make choices consistent with achieving support relations. We contextualize our results using heuristic computational models based on 3D physical simulations of the same scenarios judged by participants.

Suspension, Higher-Order Evidence, and Defeat

This paper has two main goals. The first and most central goal is to develop a framework for understanding higher-order defeat. The framework rests on the idea that higher-order evidence provides direct reasons for suspending judgment which leave evidential support relations on the first order intact. Equally importantly, we also seek to explain how this sort of defeat is possible by showing how direct reasons for suspension of judgment flow from the functional profile of suspension of judgment. As a result, our framework is embedded within an account of the nature of suspension of judgment that shows how new insights about its nature lead to a different picture of its rational profile. A second and subsidiary goal of the paper is to show how our framework provides a compelling basis for more moderate positions about disagreement and epistemic akrasia. We show that the puzzles about these topics rest on more fundamental mistakes about suspension and the relationship between reasons for suspension, reasons for belief, and evidence.

Inference and Self-Knowledge

A growing cohort of philosophers argue that inference, understood as an agent-level psychological process or event, is subject to a “Taking Condition.” The Taking Condition states, roughly, that drawing an inference requires one to take one’s premise(s) to epistemically support one’s conclusion, where “takings” are some sort of higher-order attitude, thought, intuition, or act. My question is not about the nature of takings, but about their contents. I examine the prospects for “minimal” and “robust” views of the contents of takings. On the minimal view, taking one’s premise(s) to support one’s conclusion only requires focusing on propositional contents and putative epistemic support relations between them. On the robust view, taking one’s premise(s) to support one’s conclusion also requires knowledge (or being in a position to have knowledge) of the attitudes one holds toward those contents. I argue that arguments for the Taking Condition do not entail or sufficiently motivate the robust view. Accordingly, contra several philosophers, the Taking Condition does not illuminate a deep relationship between inference and self-knowledge.

Bipolar Abstract Argumentation with Dual Attacks and Supports

Bipolar abstract argumentation frameworks allow modeling decision problems by defining pro and contra arguments and their relationships. In some popular bipolar frameworks, there is an inherent tendency to favor either attack or support relationships. However, for some applications, it seems sensible to treat attack and support equally. Roughly speaking, turning an attack edge into a support edge, should just invert its meaning. We look at a recently introduced bipolar argumentation semantics and two novel alternatives and discuss their semantical and computational properties. Interestingly, the two novel semantics correspond to stable semantics if no support relations are present and maintain the computational complexity of stable semantics in general bipolar frameworks.

The Normativity of Evidence

Any case against the argument from analogy appears to rely on the assumption that the evidential-support relation is not itself a normative relation. This chapter identifies three ways in which one might challenge this assumption and responds to each. In doing so it claims that existing responses to this problem in the literature are insufficient: they rely on objective conceptions of probability that are ill-suited to account for epistemic probabilities. It claims that epistemic error theorists may be forced to deny that there are any evidential-support relations but that, surprisingly, this is less of a concession than it may at first appear.

Homelessness in a Post-Soviet City: Weak Social Support and Institutional Alienation

Research has shown that most homeless people suffer from weak support from family, relatives and friends. Based on a descriptive statistical analysis with biographical records of 810 subjects, and a thematic analysis of interviews with homeless people (N = 65), people at risk of homelessness (N = 5) and professionals (N = 20), the article explores the social support system of homeless people from Chisinau (Moldova). Only 18.6 per cent of all users of the Shelter for homeless in Chisinau were in a couple relationship (and only 5.6 per cent registered officially). For former detainees (23 per cent of the Shelter users) and care leavers (11 per cent), it is even more difficult to create a couple and to strengthen their social support network, as the institutions they come from did not foster their social support. As homelessness becomes chronic, people build social support networks with other homeless people. This social support helps homeless people to cope with stressful living conditions. The article suggests, in the case of Moldova, that social support relations with family, friends, acquaintances and other homeless people are affected negatively in the absence of policies and institutional measures targeted to encourage and strengthen such relationships.