Explaining Knowledge

This is an edited collection of twenty-three new papers on the Gettier Problem and the issues connected with it. The set of authors includes many of the major figures in contemporary epistemology who have developed some of the well-known responses to the problem, and it also contains some younger epistemologists who bring new perspectives to the issues raised in the literature. Together, they cover the state of the art on virtually every epistemological and methodological aspect of the Gettier Problem. The volume also includes some skeptical voices according to which the Gettier Problem is not deeply problematic or some of the problems it raises are not genuine philosophical problems.

Introduction

10.1093/oso/9780198724551.003.0001 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Edmund L. Gettier

Keyword(s):

State Of The Art ◽

The State ◽

Philosophical Methodology ◽

Factual Knowledge ◽

Gettier Problem ◽

The Subject ◽

The contributions to this volume reflect and deepen the Gettier Problem’s impact on epistemology and on philosophical methodology. Fifty-four years ago, in his three-page paper, Edmund Gettier taught us that the generally accepted account of factual knowledge was defective because there are cases of true justified beliefs that are not knowledge. Most of the issues on our epistemological agenda since then are closely related to his lesson. To reflect on the very latest developments in the scholarship on this problem, we gathered the papers of twenty-six experts, including many of the most influential epistemologists of our time. This is the largest, most authoritative collection of essays on the Gettier Problem. The contributions to this volume reflect the state of the art on the subject.

A Pragmatic Phenomenalist Account of Knowledge

Dialogue ◽

10.1017/s0012217300002845 ◽

2008 ◽

Vol 47 (3-4) ◽

pp. 565-582 ◽

Cited By ~ 5

Author(s):

Byeong D. Lee

Keyword(s):

Social Practice ◽

Gettier Problem ◽

Practice Model ◽

Robert Brandom ◽

ABSTRACTRobert Brandom argues for a “pragmatic phenomenalist account” of knowledge. On this account, we should understand our notion of justification in accordance with a Sellarsian social practice model, and there is nothing more to the phenomenon of knowledge than the proprieties of takings-as-knowing. I agree with these two claims. But Brandom's proposal is so sketchy that it is unclear how it can deal with a number of much-discussed problems in contemporary epistemology. The main purpose of this article is to develop and defend a pragmatic phenomenalist account of knowledge by resolving those problems. I argue, in particular, that this account can accommodate both the lesson of the Gettier problem and the lesson of reliabilism simultaneously.

Explicationist Epistemology and the Explanatory Role of Knowledge

Journal for General Philosophy of Science ◽

10.1007/s10838-020-09520-8 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Erik J. Olsson

Keyword(s):

Philosophy Of Science ◽

Natural Kind ◽

Philosophical Method ◽

Gettier Problem ◽

Explanatory Role ◽

Central Argument ◽

The Gettier Problem ◽

Do So

AbstractIt has been argued that much of contemporary epistemology can be unified under Carnap’s methodology of explication, which originated in the neighboring field of philosophy of science. However, it is unclear to what extent epistemological theories that emphasize the explanatory role of knowledge fit into this picture, Kornblith’s natural kind epistemology and Williamson’s knowledge first approach being cases in point. In this connection, I raise three questions. Can we harvest the insights of these approaches without loss in the more standard and less idiosyncratic explicationist framework? Can we do so without falling prey to prominent criticism raised against those approaches? Finally, do the approaches come out as coherent under an explicationist rendering? I argue that in Kornblith’s case the answer to all three questions is essentially in the affirmative. Much of the knowledge first approach is also translatable into explicationism. However, from that perspective, Williamson’s central argument for treating knowledge as undefinable, referring to persistent yet unsuccessful attempts to solve the Gettier problem, amounts to an overreaction to that problem. Leaving explicationism aside, I ask, in the penultimate section, what Williamson’s own philosophical method really amounts to.

Knowledge as Achievement, More or Less

10.31219/osf.io/d93fk ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

John Turri

Keyword(s):

Research Program ◽

Virtue Epistemology ◽

Epistemic Normativity ◽

Program Performance ◽

Gettier Problem ◽

Epistemic Evaluation ◽

This chapter enhances and extends a powerful and promising research program, performance-based epistemology, which stands at the crossroads of many important currents that one can identify in contemporary epistemology, including the value problem, epistemic normativity, virtue epistemology, and the nature of knowledge. Performance-based epistemology offers at least three outstanding benefits: it explains the distinctive value that knowledge has, it places epistemic evaluation into a familiar and ubiquitous pattern of evaluation, and it solves the Gettier problem. But extant versions of performance-based epistemology have been the object of serious criticism. This chapter shows how to meet the objections without sacrificing the aforementioned benefits.

Practical Picture Processing

Proceedings, annual meeting, Electron Microscopy Society of America ◽

10.1017/s0424820100051700 ◽

1974 ◽

Vol 32 ◽

pp. 338-339

Author(s):

T. A. Welton

Keyword(s):

Radiation Damage ◽

Coherence Length ◽

Spatial Information ◽

State Of The Art ◽

Coherent Radiation ◽

The State ◽

Energy Spread ◽

Electron Micrograph ◽

Picture Processing ◽

Molecular Skeleton

Various authors have emphasized the spatial information resident in an electron micrograph taken with adequately coherent radiation. In view of the completion of at least one such instrument, this opportunity is taken to summarize the state of the art of processing such micrographs. We use the usual symbols for the aberration coefficients, and supplement these with £ and 6 for the transverse coherence length and the fractional energy spread respectively. He also assume a weak, biologically interesting sample, with principal interest lying in the molecular skeleton remaining after obvious hydrogen loss and other radiation damage has occurred.