scholarly journals Knowledge as Achievement, More or Less

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Turri
Keyword(s):  
Research Program ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Epistemic Normativity ◽  
Program Performance ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Epistemic Evaluation ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology ◽  
The Gettier Problem

This chapter enhances and extends a powerful and promising research program, performance-based epistemology, which stands at the crossroads of many important currents that one can identify in contemporary epistemology, including the value problem, epistemic normativity, virtue epistemology, and the nature of knowledge. Performance-based epistemology offers at least three outstanding benefits: it explains the distinctive value that knowledge has, it places epistemic evaluation into a familiar and ubiquitous pattern of evaluation, and it solves the Gettier problem. But extant versions of performance-based epistemology have been the object of serious criticism. This chapter shows how to meet the objections without sacrificing the aforementioned benefits.

Explaining Knowledge

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
State Of The Art ◽  
The State ◽  
Methodological Aspect ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology ◽  
The Gettier Problem

This is an edited collection of twenty-three new papers on the Gettier Problem and the issues connected with it. The set of authors includes many of the major figures in contemporary epistemology who have developed some of the well-known responses to the problem, and it also contains some younger epistemologists who bring new perspectives to the issues raised in the literature. Together, they cover the state of the art on virtually every epistemological and methodological aspect of the Gettier Problem. The volume also includes some skeptical voices according to which the Gettier Problem is not deeply problematic or some of the problems it raises are not genuine philosophical problems.

A Pragmatic Phenomenalist Account of Knowledge

Dialogue ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 47 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 565-582 ◽  
Author(s):  
Byeong D. Lee
Keyword(s):  
Social Practice ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Practice Model ◽  
Robert Brandom ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology ◽  
The Gettier Problem

ABSTRACTRobert Brandom argues for a “pragmatic phenomenalist account” of knowledge. On this account, we should understand our notion of justification in accordance with a Sellarsian social practice model, and there is nothing more to the phenomenon of knowledge than the proprieties of takings-as-knowing. I agree with these two claims. But Brandom's proposal is so sketchy that it is unclear how it can deal with a number of much-discussed problems in contemporary epistemology. The main purpose of this article is to develop and defend a pragmatic phenomenalist account of knowledge by resolving those problems. I argue, in particular, that this account can accommodate both the lesson of the Gettier problem and the lesson of reliabilism simultaneously.

scholarly journals Sorte, Virtude, e Anulabilidade Epistêmica

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 179
Author(s):  
João Rizzio Vicente Fett
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Duncan Pritchard ◽  
Satisfactory Theory ◽  
Better Than ◽  
The Gettier Problem

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2016v20n2p179 Duncan Pritchard has suggested that anti-luck epistemology and virtue epistemology are the best options to solve the Gettier problem. Nonetheless, there are challenging problems for both of them in the literature. Pritchard holds that his anti-luck virtue epistemology puts together the correct intuitions from both anti-luck epistemology and virtue epistemology and avoids their problems. Contra Pritchard, we believe that there is already a satisfactory theory on offer, namely, the defeasibility theory of knowledge. In this essay we intend (i) to examine Pritchard’s anti-luck virtue epistemology, and (ii) to defend the defeasibility theory of knowledge as an alternative to Pritchard’s theory. We will provide the reader with reasons for believing that the defeasibility theory is better than Pritchard’s theory because the former is more economic and more ecumenical than the latter, since it goes without non-epistemic notions and remains neutral as for the internalism vs. externalism debate.

When Evidence Isn't Enough: Suspension, Evidentialism, and Knowledge-first Virtue Epistemology

Episteme ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 413-437 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa Miracchi
Keyword(s):  
Research Program ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Rational Belief ◽  
Epistemic Rationality ◽  
Epistemic Evaluation ◽  
Timothy Williamson ◽  
Pyrrhonian Skepticism

AbstractI motivate and develop a novel account of the epistemic assessability of suspension as a development of my knowledge-first, virtue-epistemological research program. First, I extend an argument of Ernest Sosa's for the claim that evidentialism cannot adequately account for the epistemic assessability of suspension. This includes a kind of knowledge-first evidentialism of the sort advocated by Timothy Williamson. I agree with Sosa that the reasons why evidentialism fails motivate a virtue-epistemological approach, but argue that my knowledge-first account is preferable to his view. According to my account, rational belief is belief that manifests proper practical respect for what it takes to know. Beliefs are the only primary bearers of epistemic evaluation since they are the only candidates for knowledge. However, suspension can manifest a derivative kind of practical respect for what it takes to know. Thus, we can explain why the same sort of assessment is applicable to both belief and suspension (epistemic rationality), and why belief has a privileged claim to these properties. Lastly, I'll look at Sosa's and Williamson's treatments of Pyrrhonian skepticism, which treats a certain kind of suspension as the epistemically superior practice, and argue that my account provides a better anti-skeptical response than either of their approaches.

scholarly journals Explicationist Epistemology and the Explanatory Role of Knowledge

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik J. Olsson
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Natural Kind ◽  
Philosophical Method ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Explanatory Role ◽  
Central Argument ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology ◽  
The Gettier Problem ◽  
Do So

AbstractIt has been argued that much of contemporary epistemology can be unified under Carnap’s methodology of explication, which originated in the neighboring field of philosophy of science. However, it is unclear to what extent epistemological theories that emphasize the explanatory role of knowledge fit into this picture, Kornblith’s natural kind epistemology and Williamson’s knowledge first approach being cases in point. In this connection, I raise three questions. Can we harvest the insights of these approaches without loss in the more standard and less idiosyncratic explicationist framework? Can we do so without falling prey to prominent criticism raised against those approaches? Finally, do the approaches come out as coherent under an explicationist rendering? I argue that in Kornblith’s case the answer to all three questions is essentially in the affirmative. Much of the knowledge first approach is also translatable into explicationism. However, from that perspective, Williamson’s central argument for treating knowledge as undefinable, referring to persistent yet unsuccessful attempts to solve the Gettier problem, amounts to an overreaction to that problem. Leaving explicationism aside, I ask, in the penultimate section, what Williamson’s own philosophical method really amounts to.

scholarly journals Knowledge-First Virtue Epistemology

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph Kelp
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Relevant Notion ◽  
The Gettier Problem

This chapter aims to develop a novel virtue epistemological account of knowledge and justified belief, which gives the view a knowledge first spin. It is virtue epistemological in that it offers accounts of knowledge and justified belief in terms of exercises of epistemic abilities. It has a knowledge first twist because, unlike traditional virtue epistemology, it does not unpack the relevant notion of an epistemic ability as an ability to form true beliefs but as an ability to know. In addition, this chapter aims to show that the resulting knowledge first virtue epistemology compares favourably with its traditional cousins as it offers an appealing new solution to the Gettier problem.

Knowledge, Luck, and Virtue

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duncan Pritchard
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
External Factors ◽  
Negative Aspect ◽  
Epistemic Dependence ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Twin Earth ◽  
Proof Analysis ◽  
Analysis Of Knowledge ◽  
The Gettier Problem

The Gettier Problem is conceived in a specific fashion as the problem of offering an informative (but not necessarily reductive) Gettier-proof analysis of knowledge. A solution is offered to this problem via anti-luck virtue epistemology. This is an account of knowledge which incorporates both an anti-luck condition and a virtue condition, and which is thereby able to avoid problems that face some of the main competing accounts of knowledge, particularly those offered by proponents of robust virtue epistemology. In particular, it is able to accommodate the epistemic dependence of knowledge on external factors, where this has both a positive and a negative aspect. Relatedly, it can also avoid the problem posed by epistemic twin earth cases. Anti-luck virtue epistemology is then motivated and defended in light of a range of objections, in order to demonstrate its potential as a resolution to the Gettier Problem, so conceived.

Reliabilist Virtue Epistemology

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Greco ◽  
Jonathan Reibsamen
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Naturalized Epistemology ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Value Of Knowledge ◽  
Intellectual Abilities ◽  
Virtue Reliabilism ◽  
Virtue Responsibilism ◽  
The Gettier Problem

According to reliabilist virtue epistemology, or virtue reliabilism, knowledge is true belief that is produced by intellectual excellence (or virtue), where intellectual excellence is understood in terms of reliable, truth-directed cognitive dispositions. This chapter explains why virtue reliabilism is a form of epistemological externalism, is a moderately naturalized epistemology, and is distinct from virtue responsibilism. It explains virtue reliabilism’s answers to various forms of skepticism, its solution to the Gettier Problem, and its explanation of the value of knowledge. The chapter also describes several varieties of contemporary virtue reliabilism. Finally, it offers replies to two recently prominent objections to virtue reliabilism: that it is committed to an untenable epistemological individualism, and that there are empirical reasons to doubt whether people generally have the kinds of intellectual abilities that virtue reliabilism requires for knowledge.

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