Both the Rule and the Exception

Author(s):  
Valentin Jeutner

The chapter considers whether there can be legal states of affairs that are both the rule and the exception or, in other words, whether there can be situations where the rule and the exception are superimposed upon each other so that neither the rule nor the exception singularly controls the legal classification of a given situation, although both the rule and the exception continue to apply. The chapter attempts to show that such situations can exist and that such situations can have a very distinct and useful legal function. The argument is illustrated with reference to the International Court of Justice’s 1996 Advisory Opinion concerning the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons and, in particular, with reference to the notion of the ‘survival of the State’ as a ground of self-defence, as discussed in the Advisory Opinion.

1999 ◽  
Vol 68 (3) ◽  
pp. 225-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  

AbstractThe aim of this paper is to examine whether the possibility of a genuine non liquet is ruled out by a so-called ‘closing rule’underlying public international law. The answer to this question largely determines the relevance of the debate on the legality and legitimacy of the pronouncement of a non liquet by an international court. This debate was recently provoked by the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat and Use of Nuclear Weapons. In this opinion, the Court held that it could not definitively conclude whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons was contrary to international law in an extreme circumstance of self-defence in which the survival of a state is at stake. Nevertheless, some authors have argued that, since international law contains a closing rule stating that the absence of a prohibition is equivalent to the existence of a permission (or vice versa), the Court had in fact decided the legality of nuclear weapons. By virtue of this closing rule, the pronouncement of a non liquet would be impossible. In our analysis, we have taken issue with this view and claim that there are no a priori reasons for the acceptance of a closing rule underlying international law. It is possible indeed that a legal system is simply indifferent towards a certain type of conduct. Moreover, even if a closing rule would be assumed, this rule would be of no help in determining the legality or illegality of the threat and use of nuclear weapons, since the Court asserted that the current state of international law and the facts at its disposal were insufficient to enable it to reach a definitive conclusion. Nothing follows from this assertion, except the assurance that international law cannot definitively settle the question of the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons: to be permitted or not to be permitted, that is still the question. Hamlet's dilemma precisely.


Author(s):  
Esam Elden Mohammed Ibrahim

The International Court of Justice had the opportunity to establish the principles of international humanitarian law and restrict the use or threat of nuclear weapons, on the occasion of its fatwa, on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons at the request of the United Nations General Assembly, after realizing that the continued development of nuclear weapons exposes humanity to great risks, and its request It states, "Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permissible under the rules of international law" (Atalm, 1996), (Shahab, 2000), Therefore, the comment seeks to answer the question: What is the legality of possession, production and development of nuclear weapons? What is the extent of the legality of the threat to use it in light of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in this regard? Was the decision of the International Court of Justice in favor of documenting the principles of international humanitarian law and international human rights law? Or was it biased in its decision to the interests of a particular class itself? The researcher used in that descriptive, descriptive and critical analytical method, and the results that lead to criticism of the work of the International Court of Justice in this regard were reached on the premise that they tended towards tipping the political nature of the issue presented to it under the pressures and directions of the major nuclear states and this strengthens my criticism to the United Nations that I see It only works for the benefit of the major powers under the auspices of the Security Council by veto (right to veto) at a time when the Security Council itself is responsible for maintaining international peace and security, just as it can be said that the United Nations does not work for the benefit of mankind but works for the five major countries Even with regard to nuclear weapons Regardless of whether or not there was a threat to international peace and security. From this standpoint, the researcher reached several recommendations, the most important of which is the necessity of the independence of the International Court of Justice in its work from the political considerations of member states, especially the major countries, as a step to establish and support international peace and security in a practical way in practice. The United Nations should also reconsider what is known as a veto, which is and it is rightly one of the most important and most important measures that truly threaten international peace and security.


1997 ◽  
Vol 37 (316) ◽  
pp. 56-64
Author(s):  
Hisakazu Fujita

The Advisory Opinion handed down by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on 8 July 1996 concerning the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons contains many elements that are of fundamental interest from the standpoint of international humanitarian law. Indeed, humanitarian law, which has developed to a remarkable extent since the Second World War, has always lacked an express ruling on nuclear weapons.


1997 ◽  
Vol 37 (316) ◽  
pp. 6-8
Author(s):  
Yves Sandoz

There are some questions which one would prefer not to raise. The legality of the use of nuclear weapons in war is surely a case in point.


1997 ◽  
Vol 91 (3) ◽  
pp. 554-555
Author(s):  
Peter H. F. Bekker

This Note summarizes the judicial work of the International Court of Justice during 1996, using the updated General List, pleadings filed, Orders and Judgments given and hearings held at the Peace Palace in The Hague to describe the Court’s current record.During the calendar year 1996, the Court was seized of one new contentious case: Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia). In 1996 a total of eleven cases appeared on the General List. Besides the new case referred to, the contentious proceedings before the full Court were Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 (Iran v. United States), Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. United Kingdom) and (Libya v. United States), Oil Platforms (Iran v. United States), Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), and Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon v. Nigeria). Advisory proceedings were concluded in Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (request for an advisory opinion by the World Health Organization) and Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (request for an advisory opinion by the General Assembly of the United Nations).


1997 ◽  
Vol 37 (316) ◽  
pp. 92-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manfred Mohr

On 8 July 1996, the International Court of Justice finally rendered its Advisory Opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. The procedure had been dragging on since the start of the public sittings on 30 October 1995. Several deadlines set by the Court for reaching a decision came and went, ultimately giving rise to the fear that there would be no decisive majority to affirm the basic unlawfulness of the use of nuclear weapons. This would have been a bitter setback for the initiators of the Advisory Opinion proceeding and for the development of international law.


2013 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 449-472 ◽  
Author(s):  
VAIOS KOUTROULIS

AbstractThe equal application of international humanitarian law (jus in bello) to all parties to an international armed conflict is a cornerstone principle of jus in bello. In his article, Professor Mandel casts doubt on the legal basis of this principle. Reacting to this claim, this contribution demonstrates that the ‘equality of belligerents’ is a principle firmly grounded in both conventional and customary international law. Moreover, its legal force withstands the test of international jurisprudence, including the International Court of Justice's controversial Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion.


1999 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 613-624 ◽  
Author(s):  
Terry Gill

The 1996 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion of the International Court has been both hailed and criticized on various grounds. However, one area, namely the Court's treatment of the distinction between the law regulating the use of force and the humanitarian law of armed conflict, has received relatively little attention. This author is convinced and concerned that the Court's treatment of this issue misconstrued the relationship between these two branches of the law, and in doing so potentially weakened any restraining influence the law of armed conflict might have on the potential use of nuclear weapons.


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