Psychic Phenomena and the Existence of God

Author(s):  
Jeremy Fantl

This chapter applies the conclusions of the previous chapters to two cases of controversial belief: atheistic belief and the denial of psychic phenomena (psi). In both cases, in line with so-called “phenomenal conservatism,” the felt obviousness—to the denier—of the non-existence of what they’re denying figures large in their knowledge, if they have it. In both cases, the deniers’ knowledge runs up counterarguments—for example, the fine tuning argument or meta-analyses of a number of controlled studies that purport to demonstrate the existence of psychic phenomena. But these arguments need not destroy knowledge, even if the atheist or psi-denier can’t figure out what’s wrong with those arguments. Knowledge can survive precisely because some atheists and psi-deniers lack sufficient methodological expertise, though it’s crucial that there is no consensus of trustworthy experts offering testimony that the counterarguments are sound.

2017 ◽  
Vol 81 ◽  
pp. 133-155 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Hawthorne ◽  
Yoaav Isaacs

AbstractThe fine-tuning argument purports to show that particular aspects of fundamental physics provide evidence for the existence of God. This argument is legitimate, yet there are numerous doubts about its legitimacy. There are various misgivings about the fine-tuning argument which are based on misunderstandings. In this paper we will go over several major misapprehensions (from both popular and philosophical sources), and explain why they do not undermine the basic cogency of the fine-tuning argument.


Philosophy ◽  
2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Graham Oppy

Philosophical discussion of arguments for the existence of God appeared to have become extinct during the heyday of logical positivism and ordinary language philosophy. However, since the mid-1960s, there has been a resurgence of interest in these arguments. Much of the discussion has focused on Kant’s “big three” arguments: ontological arguments, cosmological arguments, and teleological arguments. Discussion of ontological arguments has been primarily concerned with (a) Anselm’s ontological argument; (b) modal ontological arguments, particularly as developed by Alvin Plantinga; and (c) higher-order ontological arguments, particularly Gödel’s ontological argument. Each of these kinds of arguments has found supporters, although few regard these as the strongest arguments that can be given for the existence of God. Discussion of cosmological arguments has been focused on (a) kalām cosmological arguments (defended, in particular, by William Lane Craig); (b) cosmological arguments from sufficient reason (defended, in particular, by Richard Gale and Alexander Pruss); and (c) cosmological arguments from contingency (defended, in particular, by Robert Koons and Timothy O’Connor). Discussion of teleological arguments has, in recent times, been partly driven by the emergence of the intelligent design movement in the United States. On the one hand, there has been a huge revival of enthusiasm for Paley’s biological argument for design. On the other hand, there has also been the development of fine-tuning teleological arguments driven primarily by results from very recent cosmological investigation of our universe. Moreover, new kinds of teleological arguments have also emerged—for example, Alvin Plantinga’s arguments for the incompatibility of metaphysical naturalism with evolutionary theory and Michael Rea’s arguments for the incompatibility of the rejection of intelligent design with materialism, realism about material objects, and realism about other minds. Other (“minor”) arguments for the existence of God that have received serious discussion in recent times include moral arguments, arguments from religious experience, arguments from miracles, arguments from consciousness, arguments from reason, and aesthetic arguments. Of course, there is also a host of “lesser” arguments that are mainly viewed as fodder for undergraduate dissection. Further topics that are germane to any discussion of arguments for the existence of God include (a) the appropriate goals at which these arguments should aim and the standards that they should meet, (b) the prospects for “cumulative” arguments (e.g., of the kind developed by Richard Swinburne), and (c) the prospects for prudential arguments that appeal to our desires rather than to our beliefs (e.g., Pascal’s wager).


Author(s):  
Yoaav Isaacs

This chapter argues that the fine-tuning argument for the existence of God is a straightforwardly legitimate argument. The fine-tuning argument takes certain features of fundamental physics to confirm the existence of God because these features of fundamental physics are more likely given the existence of God than they are given the non-existence of God. And any such argument is straightforwardly legitimate, as such arguments follow a canonically legitimate form of empirical argumentation. The chapter explores various objections to the fine-tuning argument: that it requires an ill-defined notion of small changes in the laws of physics, that it over-generalizes, that it requires implausible presuppositions about divine intentions, and that it is debunked by anthropic reasoning. In each case it finds either that the putatively objectionable feature of the fine-tuning argument is inessential to it or that the putatively objectionable feature of the fine-tuning argument is not actually objectionable.


2002 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 375-404 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. C. BRADLEY

This paper considers the Bayesian form of the fine-tuning argument as advanced by Richard Swinburne. An expository section aims to identify the precise character of the argument, and three lines of objection are then advanced. The first of these holds that there is an inconsistency in Swinburne's procedure, the second that his argument has an unacceptable dependence on an objectivist theory of value, the third that his method is powerless to single out traditional theism from a vast number of competitors. In the final section of the paper the fine-tuning argument is considered, not now as self-standing, but as one of a number of theistic arguments taken together and applied in the manner of the final chapter of Swinburne's The Existence of God. It is argued that points already made also block the way for this line of thought.


Think ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (46) ◽  
pp. 93-102
Author(s):  
Moti Mizrahi

In this article, I propose that, in addition to the multiverse hypothesis, which is commonly taken to be an alternative explanation for fine-tuning, other than the design hypothesis, the simulation hypothesis is another explanation for fine-tuning. I then argue that the simulation hypothesis undercuts the alleged evidential connection between ‘designer’ and ‘supernatural designer of immense power and knowledge’ in much the same way that the multiverse hypothesis undercuts the alleged evidential connection between ‘fine-tuning’ and ‘fine-tuner’ (or ‘designer’). If this is correct, then the fine-tuning argument is a weak argument for the existence of God.


Author(s):  
Isaac Choi

This chapter deals with two different problems in which infinity plays a central role. It first responds to a claim that infinity renders counting knowledge-level beliefs an infeasible approach to measuring and comparing how much we know. There are two methods of comparing sizes of infinite sets, using the one-to-one correspondence principle or the subset principle, and it argues that we should use the subset principle for measuring knowledge. The chapter then turns to the normalizability and coarse tuning objections to fine-tuning arguments for the existence of God or a multiverse. These objections center on the difficulty of talking about the epistemic probability of a physical constant falling within a finite life-permitting range when the possible range of that constant is infinite. Applying the lessons learned regarding infinity and the measurement of knowledge, the chapter hopes to blunt much of the force of these objections to fine-tuning arguments.


Think ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 5 (14) ◽  
pp. 39-42
Author(s):  
Dene Bebbington

In issue 12 of Think, Rodney Holder developed a version of the fine-tuning argument for the existence of God, claiming that certain features of our universe make the probability that God exists high. Here, Dene Bebbington responds.


Think ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 4 (11) ◽  
pp. 67-74
Author(s):  
Sharon Kaye ◽  
Robert Prisco

Kaye and Prisco draw our attention to one of the more obvious difficulties with all versions of the argument from design (including both the fine-tuning and intelligent design versions).


2018 ◽  
Vol 56 (3) ◽  
pp. 303-317 ◽  
Author(s):  
NEIL A. MANSON

AbstractThe fine-tuning argument for the existence of God requires that the probability that the universe is life-permitting if God exists is not nearly as low as the probability that the universe is life-permitting if God does not exist. Recently, some proponents of the fine-tuning argument have reasoned as follows. ‘Stipulate that the probability that there exists a life-permitting universe if God exists is one in a billion. Only the most hardened sceptic would refuse odds like that, right? So one in a billion is more than just fair to those sceptical of the fine-tuning argument. It is generous. Even on that generous assumption, the fine-tuning argument is very strong.’ This article explains why the assumption is not, in fact, generous.


Author(s):  
Paul Bartha

There is a long history of fruitful connections between work in probability theory and the philosophy of religion. This chapter explores these connections through discussion of two classic arguments: the fine-tuning argument and Pascal’s Wager. The formulation and assessment of both arguments relies upon increasingly sophisticated applications of the probability calculus and other formal tools. Two themes emerge from a survey of recent work. First, diverse forms of ‘philosophical technology’ are invaluable in constructing precise models, clarifying objections and identifying new approaches to venerable arguments concerning the existence of God and the rationality of religious belief. Second, benefits flow in the reverse direction as well: the philosophy of religion is fertile ground for testing ideas in formal epistemology and decision theory.


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