Schelling on the Compatibility of Freedom and Systematicity
Schelling’s Freedom essay revolves around a division between two aspects of the essence or “non-ground” of human freedom: “ground” and “existence”. This distinction structures Schelling’s anti-dogmatic solution to the metaphysical placement problem, which in turn provides the basis for his resolution of various puzzles surrounding the compatibility of freedom and systematicity. The first part of this essay accordingly interprets Schelling’s ontology as committed to a neutral monism. Further, reflection on the very possibility of reflection on the domain of which nature and mind are aspects leads to a top-down epistemological architecture, which constrains any metaphysical explanation of how natural creatures can become finite knowers. The second part of the essays then explains how this ontology enables Schelling to move beyond a “formal” in favour of a “real” concept of freedom as a capacity for good or evil.