Central Bank Planning

Author(s):  
Benjamin Braun

Central banks have increasingly used communication to guide market actors’ expectations of future rates of interest, inflation, and growth. However, aware of the pitfalls of (financial) central planning, central bankers until recently drew a line by restricting their monetary policy interventions to short-term interest rates. Longer-term rates, they argued, reflected decentralized knowledge and should be determined by market forces. By embracing forward guidance and quantitative easing (QE) to target long-term rates, central banks have crossed that line. While consistent with the post-1980s expansion of the temporal reach of monetary policy further into the future, these unconventional policies nevertheless mark a structural break—the return of hydraulic macroeconomic state agency, refashioned for a financialized economy. This chapter analyses the theoretical and practical reasoning behind this shift in the governability paradigm and examines the epistemic and reputational costs of modern central bank planning and the non-market setting of long-term bond prices.

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Braun

Central banks have increasingly used communication to guide market actors’ expectations of future rates of interest, inflation, and growth. However, aware of the pitfalls of (financial) central planning, central bankers used to draw a line by restricting their monetary policy interventions to short-term interest rates. Longer-term rates, they argued, reflected decentralised knowledge and should be determined by market forces. By embracing forward guidance and quantitative easing (QE) to target long-term rates, central banks have crossed that line. While consistent with the post-1980s expansion of the temporal reach of monetary policy into the future, these unconventional policies nevertheless mark a structural break – the return of hydraulic macroeconomic state agency, refashioned for a financialised economy.


Author(s):  
Ilona Skibińska-Fabrowska

Faced with the financial crisis in 2008, the central banks used conventional monetary policy instruments. However, the problem of zero lower bond forced them to use unconventional monetary policy instruments - quantitative easing carried out as part of the so-called central bank balance sheet politics and relying on the buying by the central bank of di&erent kinds of financial assets - resulting in stabilization of the situation on financial markets in conditions of low long-term interest rates. Balance sheet totals of the central banks rose repeatedly. Their structure also changed. At present possible effects for the stability of the financial system of the return to the pre-crisis monetary policy are the topic of debate. The exit strategy is giving rise to a significant risks and the coordination of economic policy and the transparency of action taken by monetary authorities can only minimize possible negative effects


Author(s):  
Pierre L. Siklos

Many central banks took on additional responsibilities. Inadequate self-assessments remain unfinished almost a decade after the crisis erupted. Government-central bank relationships need to be conditioned on whether times are normal versus crisis conditions. Transparency confronts ambiguity when central banks must communicate the outlook and the conditionality of their decisions. Forward guidance was taken too far and ended up being futile. Central bankers simply exhausted their ability to influence behavior through mere words or ambiguous statements. This is a self-inflicted wound for institutions that are seen as overburdened. These forces leave central banking more vulnerable than is commonly acknowledged. Squaring the conventional objectives of monetary policy with the unclear aims of financial stability is difficult. Adequate limitations on the authority of central banks have yet to be thoroughly debated. We are nowhere near resolving the inherent tensions between old and new sets of central bank objectives.


Author(s):  
Uwe Hassler ◽  
Dieter Nautz

SummaryCritics of the Bundesbank's monetary policy recently suggested the abandonment of monetary targeting in favour of the term structure of interest rates as the main indicator of central bank policy. However, a term structure oriented policy requires a reliable link between short- and long-term interest rates. Our analysis clearly suggests that there is no stable relationship between German short- and long-term interest rates, in particular not after the German monetary union. Consequently, the empirical results of this paper indicate that this policy has not much chance of success.


2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ulrich Bindseil

Abstract Open market operations play a key role in allocating central bank funds to the banking system and thereby in steering short-term interest rates in line with the stance of monetary policy. Many central banks apply so-called ‘fixed rate tender’ auctions in their open market operations. This paper presents, on the basis of a survey of central bank experience, a model of bidding in such tenders. In their conduct of fixed rate tenders, many central banks faced specifically an ‘under-’ and an ‘overbidding’ problem. These phenomena are revisited in the light of the proposed model, and the more general question of the optimal tender procedure and allotment policy of central banks is addressed.


Significance Expectations that the Fed will refrain from hiking its benchmark rates from its target range of 0.25-0.5% and that the Japanese central bank will provide further stimulus are suppressing volatility in financial markets and fuelling demand for risk assets. However, evidence that "overburdened" monetary policy is losing its efficacy triggered a sell-off in bonds and equities on September 9, increasing the scope for sharper price falls as investors worry that central banks have run out of ammunition. Impacts Services expanded in August at their slowest pace since 2010, making it less likely that the Fed will raise interest rates this month. EM bond and equity mutual funds have enjoyed a surge in inflows since the Brexit vote as yield-hungry investors pour money into risk assets Oil, a key determinant of investor sentiment, will stay below 50 dollars/barrel unless major producers agree measures to stabilise prices.


2019 ◽  
Vol 66 (4) ◽  
pp. 487-506
Author(s):  
Giovanni Verga ◽  
Nicoleta Vasilcovschi

Interbank rates are affected by the monetary policy of a country and represent a link to other financial and credit markets. In 2007, Romania became a member of the European Union and its central bank, the National Bank of Romania (NBR), joined the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) but not the Eurosystem. This paper analyses the role of the central bank and the use of its instruments concerning interbank rates. The research evaluates the influence of the Romanian Central Bank on interbank rates and shows that the policy rate and bank liquidity are among the main determinants of interbank rate movements. It is also presented that the NBR’s deposit and lending rates can limit the free movements of the interbank rate of interest. This research confirms that interbank interest rates influence bank rates strongly. The methodology used in this research includes cointegration, dynamic econometric measurement and analyses with Granger causality. Our research uses mainly ROBID and ROBOR of different maturities, showing that the influence of the Romanian Central Bank (NBR) on the interbank rate is strong, while the influence of the ECB and Fed is weak.


Author(s):  
Jan Toporowski

Open market operations are the buying and selling of securities by the central bank. Such operations differ from discount operations in that open market operations are undertaken at the initiative of the central bank rather than a commercial bank. Historically, such trading of securities has predated the setting of interest rates. The emergence of long-term finance and complex financial systems has extended the range of securities in which central banks may deal. Open market operations depend on the policy framework set by the central bank. But such operations are not necessary for the setting of interest rates. Such operations are often undertaken when the monetary transmission mechanism from interest rates appears to have failed, as in the case of recent quantitative easing operations. In general, open market operations have proved effective in times of banking or financial crisis.


Author(s):  
Jakob de Haan ◽  
Jan-Egbert Sturm

Many central banks in the world nowadays regard their external communication as an important tool to achieve their goals. This chapter provides an overview of the different ways in which central banks inform the public about the future direction of monetary policy and how successful they have been in recent years. Forward guidance is either part of a monetary policy strategy in which an explicit inflation target is targeted or is part of a strategy that attempts to circumvent the effective lower bound regarding the nominal interest rate. In both cases, forward guidance attempts to influence longer-term interest rates and inflation expectations through the expected future short-term interest rates.


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