The Political Economy of Macroeconomic Policy in Resource-Rich Arab Economies

Author(s):  
Adeel Malik

Revisiting the macroeconomic policies and outcomes of Arab resource-rich economies (RREs), this chapter synthesizes the political economy considerations that underpin policy choices. It argues that, in the context of Arab RREs, fiscal policies play a particularly important role in absorbing natural resource rents. Even where monetary policy has greater room to operate, existing policy frameworks are not geared toward domestic targets, such as inflation and unemployment. I argue that the political objective function is essential for understanding these macroeconomic arrangements. With weak productive constituencies and few institutional constraints, macroeconomic policy involves limited feedback from the private sector and upholds the interest of the sovereign. In this milieu, institutional constraints on fiscal policy are more important than central bank independence (CBI). The chapter also discusses the stability implications of current macroeconomic arrangements, arguing that such stability is almost entirely predicated on the uninterrupted flow of oil rents rather than resilient institutional structures.

Author(s):  
Manuel Iturralde

In both criminology and the sociology of punishment there has been a rebirth of the political economy of crime and punishment, where the relationship between these phenomena and levels of inequality within a given society is a key aspect, to assess the transformation and features of the crime control fields of contemporary societies and to relate them to different typologies. This chapter will discuss and problematize this perspective through the analysis of Latin American crime control fields. Considering the flaws of general typologies, usually coming from the global north, the chapter will stress the need for a more detailed comparative analysis of the penal state and the institutional structures, dynamics and dispositions present in every jurisdiction, in both the global north and south, that have a direct impact on penal policy and its outcomes.


1985 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-186 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amitai Etzioni

ABSTRACTEconomic actors command political power as well as economic power. It is used to the same effect to create monopolies and oligopolies. The two powers can be combined; e.g., aside from monopolies based only on economic power or only on government intervention, there are especially powerful monopolies that command both powers. The stability of the various power holders is related to the nature of their power base; pure economic power is particularly unstable. However, economic power can be more readily amassed than interventionist power, which violates norms, and has a sharply declining marginal utility. When the effects of interventionist power are added to those of economic power, economies such as America, which are often classified as quite competitive, turn out to be much less so.


2014 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Doyle

AbstractWhy are some Latin American states plagued by persistent policy volatility while the policies of others remain relatively stable? This article explores the political economy of natural resource rents and policy volatility across Latin America. It argues that, all else equal, resource rents will create incentives for political leaders, which will result in repeated episodes of policy volatility. This effect, however, will depend on the structure of political institutions. Where political institutions fail to provide a forum for intertemporal exchange among political actors, natural resource rents will result in increased levels of policy volatility. Alternatively, where political institutions facilitate agreement among actors, resource rents will be conducive to policy stability. This argument is tested on a measure of policy volatility for 18 Latin American economies between 1993 and 2008. The statistical tests provide support for the argument.


1998 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 507-546 ◽  
Author(s):  
Torben Iversen ◽  
Anne Wren

This article presents an analysis of the postindustrial economy from a political economy perspective. It identifies a set of specific distributional trade-offs associated with the new role played by the services sector as the chief source of employment growth in advanced democracies over the last three decades. It is argued that three core policy objectives—budgetary restraint, wage equality, and expansion of employment—constitute a political “trilemma” that allows only two of the goals to be successfully pursued at the same time. Using a combination of statistical and caseoriented analysis, the authors demonstrate the political and economic salience of the trilemma, the distributional tensions inherent in each strategy to cope with it, and the political-institutional constraints under which these strategies are chosen.


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